

Immigration and Integration

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Immigration has brought significant changes to German society in the postwar period. In this chapter we present evidence on the scope and scale of these changes, and on the changes that German society has wrought upon immigrants and their descendants. Drawing on both historical and comparative evidence, we argue that integration is a process that should be expected to take place on a generational time scale. Data are now becoming available that make it easier to study integration on the generational scale in Germany. We present new evidence that the children of immigrants remain poorer and less educated than native Germans, with little sign of progress over recent decades. The chapter closes with a discussion of reforms that might improve integration outcomes for the country's immigrants and, especially, for their children.

In this chapter we focus mainly on migration to the former West Germany. Like the West, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became home to German refugees from eastern Europe in the immediate postwar period. Additionally, the GDR recruited migrant workers from Communist regimes such as Poland, Hungary, Vietnam, and Mozambique, but only small numbers settled permanently in Germany, with the result that the immigrant-origin population of today's Germany is composed predominantly of people who moved to West Germany, as well as those who arrived after unification in 1990.

IMMIGRATION: EXPELLEES, GUESTWORKERS, AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

Expellees

Knowing the history of immigration to Germany is a necessary first step towards understanding how migration has changed German society, and what future changes we should expect. The history of immigration is itself bound up with the country's political history. At the peak of World War II, in the summer of 1944, Germany was home to around 7.7 million forced workers and prisoners of war from other countries (Herbert 2001: 193). Almost all of them left the country or perished as Germany was defeated, but millions more migrants soon arrived, and indeed often took over the same accommodation. By far the largest group were the millions of Germans who fled the Red Army or were expelled by eastern European governments. These refugees included three types of people: those who had lived within the boundaries of Germany in 1913, the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, and those of ethnic German descent who had lived further east. The first two groups were culturally and linguistically similar to other residents of Germany; the last was a mixed movement, including some who still had close ties to Germany and some who were German only by distant descent. By 1960 the number of Germans who had arrived as refugees – including emigrants from the

nominally democratic but in fact authoritarian East Germany – was 13.2 million, or almost one quarter of the total German population (Herbert 2001: 194).

The expellees (*Vertriebene*) were distinctive migrants. On the one hand, they were German citizens, and mostly spoke German. On the other hand, they faced the same kind of native resentment over scarce resources and space that most migrants face. The harsh conditions in bomb-ravaged Germany exacerbated those problems. Until the West German economy stabilized and started to grow rapidly after currency reform in 1948, hunger and deprivation were widespread in the new republic. After this period of hardship, once the West German economy recovered, the refugees and expellees enjoyed some key advantages: language skills, full rights of citizenship, and plentiful employment opportunities in the years of the economic miracle (*Wirtschaftswunder*), which lasted from the early 1950s until – with a brief pause in 1967 – 1973.

‘Guestworkers’

As the West German economy grew through the 1950s, even the millions of German expellees were insufficient to meet the demand for labour. Employers, starting in the agricultural sector, pushed the government to facilitate the recruitment of workers from other parts of Europe. The first treaty for this purpose was signed with Italy in 1955, and the first ‘guestworkers’ (*Gastarbeiter*) were employed mainly on farms in southern Germany. Demand increased after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 had put an end to migration from the East, and further agreements were signed with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). Workers were recruited by representatives of the German Labour Ministry (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*) in response to requests from German employers. Much of the work was in heavy industry, especially mining and steel production, in manufacturing, and in construction. Most of the recruits were men between the ages of 20 and 40.

Initially, the guestworkers were granted residence permits for one year, during which time they had to remain with the original employer. The permits could be renewed only at the discretion of the Labour Ministry. The idea was that workers would ‘rotate’ out of the country after two years to be replaced by newcomers. If the rate of economic growth slowed, the plan was that the guestworkers would leave. In practice, however, employers found that they preferred to hold on to trained workers. Certain jobs became the preserve of foreign workers, since native Germans could earn more in other sectors of the economy (Herbert 2001: 214). In 1971 the government recognized this trend, granting a five-year residence permit to foreign workers who had already worked in Germany for five years. Beginning in the late 1960s, foreign workers began to bring spouses and children to Germany. As economic conditions deteriorated in the wake of the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, and amid growing concern that the guestworkers were no longer playing the role of reserve labour force, but instead competing for employment with native Germans, the government ceased recruitment.

From a technical point of view, the guestworker policy was not, as many people now believe, a failure. Temporary labour was a boon to employers, and in most cases the rotation principle worked. Around two thirds of those who came to Germany for stays of longer than 30 days returned home (Martin 1994). However, given the massive number of arrivals, the one third who stayed translated into a large remaining population. Herbert (2001: 384) records 7.1 million arrivals between 1962 and 1973, and 5 million departures. Following the migration stop of 1973, which meant that there was only a one-way ticket home, the family members of those who had chosen to stay in Germany came to join them in growing numbers. This pattern was common across Europe; similar dynamics were found in Austria and France and, in the earlier postwar period, in the UK. From the 1970s onwards, the number of foreign residents living in Germany rose steadily: from 4 million in 1973 to 4.5 million by 1980 and nearly 5 million by the late 1980s.

The greatest difference between the pre- and post-1973 periods concerned employment. Whereas in 1973 two thirds of the immigrant population were working, by 1980 the figure had fallen to 43 per cent and by 1989 to 35 per cent (Herbert 2001: 233). This trend reflected the combination of falling employment in the heavy industrial and resource extraction sectors where foreigners had been concentrated, and the rising numbers of non-working spouses and children.

Asylum seekers

The next new source of migration to Germany was growing numbers of refugees and applicants for asylum. Numbers rose from less than 10,000 asylum applications in 1975 to over 100,000 in 1980. This was due to conflicts in areas such as Eastern Turkey and Afghanistan and also to the fact that many western European countries moved to restrict migration in the 1970s, with the result that applying for asylum became one of the only ways for people to move to the continent.

West Germany was not the only European country to see growing numbers of asylum seekers in the 1970s and 1980s. The German experience was distinctive, however, because Germany was the only country in the world with a constitutionally guaranteed right to asylum. The other signatories to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees, and its 1967 Protocol, guaranteed asylum seekers a right to *apply* for asylum, but without a corresponding duty on the part of the state to provide it. Article 16A of the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) states that ‘Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum.’ This clause was adopted against the backdrop of the horrors of National Socialism and some Germans’ success in securing asylum from the Nazis abroad. The provision made Germany a relatively easy place to receive asylum. After the fall of the Berlin Wall the number of applicants shot up in the early 1990s, reaching nearly half a million in 1992, due to arrivals from eastern Europe and, above all, the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia.

The wave of asylum seekers arrived at exactly the moment when Germany faced a different mass influx: hundreds of thousands of ‘ethnic German’ migrants (*Aussiedler*)

who had been stuck behind the Iron Curtain also moved to Germany. In 1989, 380,000 arrived, followed by 400,000 in 1990 (Klekowski von Koppenfels 16). The *Aussiedler* were, formally, citizens rather than immigrants. Article 116 of the Basic Law and the 1953 Expellee and Refugee Law gave German citizenship to citizens and refugees within Germany's 1937 borders, to German expellees, and to those stripped of German citizenship from 1933 to 1945 (the latter group included Jews and political opponents of the Nazi regime; see Rock and Wolff 2002: 103; Klekowski von Koppenfels 4). During the Cold War, the West German government continued to regard these people as German citizens. This policy was adopted in part out of recognition that Germans in Eastern Europe and the USSR had been harshly treated in the aftermath of World War II, but also in order to support the argument that West Germany was the sole legitimate state of the German people. Granting a right to citizenship to ethnic Germans in the East had been largely theoretical while the Cold War continued, but suddenly entailed welcoming large numbers of migrants with ethnic German ancestry – not all of whom spoke German – after the Berlin Wall fell. For several years in the early 1990s, net migration to Germany exceeded 300,000 per year, a product of family migration, asylum seekers, and the arrival of ethnic Germans. The German government made efforts to reduce all three.

Following the great upsurge in asylum applications in the early 1990s, the German government, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, moved to restrict those movements by negotiating an amendment to the constitution. The amendment limited the right to asylum by stating that people who passed through 'safe third countries' before reaching Germany should apply in those countries, rather than in Germany. The list of safe countries was soon defined to include all of those bordering Germany. The Kohl Government also gradually restricted the class of 'ethnic Germans,' by requiring evidence of persecution in the case of migrants from certain countries, by requiring that applicants provide evidence of language ability, and by limiting the number of family members who would also be eligible to migrate. Germany's guestworkers benefited from these negotiations: the Social Democrats agreed to the constitutional amendment only on the condition that the government ease nationality requirements. Wolfgang Schäuble, then Interior Minister, guided through a law that granted a right to German citizenship to individuals who had lived in Germany for at least 15 years, with a shorter waiting period (eight years) for those who had gone to school in the country.

The net migration rate fell as a result of these reforms. By the final years of the 20th century, nearly as many Germans were leaving the country as there were foreigners arriving. This state of affairs has continued into the 21st century, with some years even showing negative net migration. Nonetheless, German society has been lastingly altered by recent immigration. The foreign population grew from around 5 million in 1989 to nearly 7.5 million a decade later, while around 3 million 'ethnic Germans' arrived during the 1990s. Although the latter group enjoyed immediate citizenship, many Germans viewed them as immigrants (they were often referred to as 'Russians') because many spoke little or no German (Klekowski von Koppenfels).

FAMILY MIGRATION

Family immigration is a particularly complex area for several reasons. First, in many countries, family migration accounts for the majority of migrants. Serious efforts to limit the number of immigrants must, therefore, address family migration. Secondly, governing family migration involves both a control logic and an integration logic. Concerns are frequently expressed that too many members of ethnic minority groups marry spouses from their countries of origin, which encourages home country language use and discourages integration. Thirdly, family migration is often difficult to control because courts and international treaties (e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Germany is a signatory) view family unification as a human right. The German courts blocked the federal government's efforts to restrict family reunification in the 1970s, and they have also blocked less ambitious efforts, launched at the state level, to initiate long waiting periods before foreign spouses can move to Germany. Finally, family migration can exaggerate certain features of the immigration system, such as the socio-economic profile of immigrants. Highly educated migrants tend to have spouses who are also highly educated, and to send their children on to higher education. Migrants with fewer skills tend to bring low-skilled family members with them. Of course, some family migrants are able to acquire new skills, but in general family migration tends to perpetuate the educational profile of past migrants, in some cases for decades to come. Insofar as countries aim to attract the most educated workers, this helps to explain why Canada, which selects migrants on the basis of skill, can afford to be relaxed about family migration (at least for the immediate family), while western European countries, which have tended to recruit low-skilled workers, cannot.

OVERVIEW OF GERMANY'S IMMIGRANT POPULATION

Table 1 provides an overview of the foreign-born population of Germany. Here we focus on immigrants; we turn our attention to the children of immigrants later in the chapter. There are now nearly 11 million people living in Germany who were born in another country. Almost half of them now hold German citizenship, but this figure is driven upwards by the 'ethnic Germans' who make up a large share of migrants from Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. If we exclude these people, the share of migrants who now hold German citizenship falls to 24 per cent. The information in Table 1 on length of residence also marks out the ethnic Germans, who arrived mainly in the 1990s, from the former guestworkers, who have lived in the country for around twice as long. Indeed, it is worth stressing that many of the foreigners living in Germany have been in the country for a very long time, often 30 years or more. Finally, Table 1 also shows the share of the immigrant population at risk of poverty. The poverty line is measured as 60 per cent of the median income, adjusted for household size. The overall poverty rate among immigrants is 27 per cent, compared with 12 per cent for Germans with no recent family history of immigration.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics on the foreign-born population of Germany

Country/region of origin	Number of residents	With German citizenship	Mean years residence	Risk of poverty
EU 27	3,470,000	40%	24.3	18.4%
• of which Greece	227,000	7%	29.7	24.9%
• of which Italy	425,000	6%	31.9	22.8%
• of which Poland	1,137,000	67%	21.4	17.8%
Other Europe	3,933,000	39%	22	31.9%
• of which Bosnia Herz.	155,000	12%	23.6	24.6%
• of which Croatia	227,000	10%	30.6	17.7%
• of which Russia	1,004,000	77%	14.8	27.6%
• of which Serbia	185,000	8%	24.8	29.4%
• of which Turkey	1,491,000	23%	27.1	38.2%
• of which Ukraine	233,000	36%	12.8	43%
Africa	350,000	35%	16.3	42%
Americas	276,000	32%	16.8	15%
Near and Middle East	1,239,000	75%	15.7	32.5%
• of which Kazakhstan	747,000	93%	15.6	24.6%
S and SE Asia	526,000	33%	16.9	38%
Other	896,000	n/a	n/a	n/a
TOTAL	10,690,000	47%	21.8	26.6%

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2012a. *Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund -- Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2011.*

INTEGRATION

The concept of integration is contested. Integration involves immigrants and their descendants becoming part of the society of the country where they live. But in Germany, as elsewhere, there is fierce debate over how this should happen, how far the receiving country must change in order to accommodate newcomers, and which aspects of their culture immigrants and their children should be able to retain. Even when describing how integration actually proceeds, there is no way to be neutral on these questions. It is

important, therefore, that we explain how we use the concept of 'integration' in this chapter.

Our view is that, in social domains characterized by scarcity, integration means similarity with mainstream society. For example, integration in the labour market means similar rates of employment for immigrants and natives, in jobs with similar levels of prestige and with similar pay scales. This implies a group-level approach. Just as there will be some individuals with no family history of immigration who struggle to find a job, so we would expect this to be true of some immigrants. But systematically different levels of access to scarce resources would count as evidence of incomplete integration. This understanding of integration in areas such as employment or income appears to be widely shared. Although some native members of societies that receive immigrants may prefer to retain privileged access to scarce resources, most people see this kind of integration in a positive light (Abali 2009).

In domains that do not involve competition over scarce resources, matters are more complex. Consider, for example, religious practice. Integration is complicated in part because the host society typically has multiple religious traditions; there is no single standard for integration. In the absence of direct competition it may be possible for immigrant traditions to coexist with native practices, without creating conflict. Muslims, for instance, could work on Sunday but take Friday off. Nonetheless, the question of integration arises. Organized religions must interact with state institutions that regulate issues such as public holidays, dress codes, the provision of certain kinds of food in schools or prisons, or mandatory participation in sports activities. Questions of integration arise, then, in deciding how the state will treat the minority religion: whether it will be recognized and, if it is recognized, if, when, and how religious requirements will be accommodated. In Germany, for example, some organized religions are recognized as public bodies that can use taxpayers' money to provide services such as care for the elderly (they are *Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts*). Should such recognition be extended to Islam and, if not, how can such inequality by faith be justified in a liberal society?

In this chapter our main focus is on processes of integration in terms of similarity in domains such as employment, education, and income. At points we also discuss integration as a process of dispute and accommodation in areas such as language, religion, and cultural practices, although these are issues that are also covered in other chapters of this volume. In order to understand the processes of integration it is important to consider the advantages and disadvantages that each set of migrants to Germany has faced. We focus on five areas: the degree of selection in the immigration process; access to citizenship; expectations regarding settlement; the state of the economy; and language. When scholars describe immigrants as positively or negatively selected, they refer to the idea that immigrants may have skills and characteristics that make them more (positively) or less (negatively) likely to achieve high socio-economic status in the new homeland.

The refugees and expellees who moved to Germany in the late 1940s and the 1950s initially faced great economic hardship, but matters improved rapidly as the postwar

'economic miracle' got under way. These migrants benefited from their ability to speak German. Like guestworkers decades later, they harboured illusions of returning to their countries of origin in due course, despite the fact that their integration into German society, to say nothing of the Iron Curtain, made such an outcome highly unlikely. The forced nature of migration meant that migration was not selective, in the sense that people with low levels of skills were just as likely to move as the high-skilled. As a result the newcomers filled a range of economic roles similar to those occupied by native Germans.

The expellees and refugees also benefited from their status as German citizens. As noted above, these immigrant groups formed a large share of the postwar West German population. They were a voting bloc to be courted, and formed a highly influential lobby in the *Bund der Vertriebenen* (Union of the Expellees). Many were able to obtain work as civil servants, which would not have been possible without German citizenship. In short, a range of factors facilitated the integration of the postwar refugees and expellees into West German society. No data exist that would allow us to measure integration levels among the postwar arrivals and their descendants. Since they were treated as Germans, statistical records do not even allow us to identify these people. The absence of a debate over integration can be taken as evidence that it was not perceived to be a major source of social problems.

The conditions were less conducive to the integration of the guestworkers. The economic context was favourable in some ways: not only was work plentiful, but the German trade unions had also insisted, as a condition of supporting the recruitment of foreign workers, that the foreigners would have equal wages and labour rights. The goal of the unions was to prevent employers from using the guestworkers to undercut the employment conditions of natives. As a result, foreign workers were well integrated in certain sectors of the German economy. This was not integration in the sense of equality, however. The sectors in which they worked involved physical labour and often low wages, though some jobs – such as in the automobile industry – were relatively well paid. Indeed, the guestworkers were deliberately recruited as low-skilled labourers from the poorest and least educated parts of southern Europe and Turkey, in order to carry out physical labour. This was an example *par excellence* of negative selection for educational levels and skills. The prospects for integration dimmed as sectors such as mining and steel production began to decline in the 1970s and 1980s.

The expectation on the part of both the German government and the guestworkers themselves that they would soon return to their countries of origin worked to delay integration. The guestworkers were not unique in this regard. Many migrants initially intend to return to the country of origin, and keep their faith in the 'myth of return' even as they become embedded in the labour market and society of their new homeland. In fact, rates of return tend to fall over time, especially once migrants have children and grandchildren in the country of residence (see e.g. Dustmann 2003). Nonetheless, the expectation of impermanence was especially strong in the case of the guestworkers, and was actively reinforced by German governments that insisted the country was not a 'country of immigration' ('*kein Einwanderungsland*'), using financial incentives to encourage return.

Very few of the guestworkers spoke German when they arrived, and, in line with the policy of rotation, the state did little to help them learn. The secondary literature contains reports that the children of the guestworkers were educated separately and in the languages of their parents' countries of origin, although the details are often lacking. Perhaps of greater impact was the crushing effect of low expectations on the part of both teachers and pupils (Popp 2011). The guestworkers were also barred from becoming German citizens. Naturalization was possible in postwar Germany but required evidence of assimilation, and the presumption was that migrant workers did not qualify. Some of the guestworkers married Germans and were able to use this as evidence of assimilation, but the numbers were very small. As a result there was no German equivalent of the view famously uttered by a leading British Conservative Party politician on the country's immigrants: 'Let this party's position be absolutely clear. They are British. They live here ... They vote here' (Heseltine 1987). German politicians had little to gain from representing the interests of migrant workers. Some of the guestworkers became influential within the trade unions, but in other domains they rarely rose to positions of prominence.

Overall, while the guestworkers enjoyed some advantages with respect to labour market integration, on the whole the conditions of their entry were not conducive to integration on equal terms with the German population. Much the same can be said of the family members who moved to join their spouses and parents in Germany. There were some advantages to moving to a country where ethnic communities were already becoming established, providing sources of information on the receiving society for potential incomers and, in some cases, opportunities for employment. But many of those who moved to the country as spouses were not looking for work and thus had relatively few opportunities for interaction with native Germans. As the poverty data in Table 1 indicate, the former guestworkers have not integrated on terms of equality into German society. Migrants from two important sending countries – Greece and Italy – exhibit higher poverty rates than those who came to Germany from other countries in what is now the European Union. Poverty rates are also two or three times higher among migrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia than among native Germans with no family history of immigration. Higher incidence of poverty among Greeks and Italians is noteworthy, since it suggests that arguments attributing poverty among Turkish migrants to either the reluctance of Muslims to integrate, or to racism and Islamophobia, are oversimplifying the matter. It is not only the Turks who have struggled to reach the level of prosperity that is typical among native Germans.

The prospects for the integration of the refugees who came to Germany in growing numbers from the 1980s onwards were arguably more favourable than those for migrant workers. Most refugees accept that the move will be permanent, which encourages integration. Recognized refugees are typically given state aid in settling, and this is also true in Germany. For asylum seekers the situation is more complicated, since they cannot be sure that their applications will succeed. Acceptance rates have fallen dramatically since the 1980s and early 1990s. The economic conditions in the years that have seen relatively many refugees and asylum seekers coming to Germany have been moderately

favourable to integration. Few of these people speak German before their arrival, of course, which can delay their integration.

Microcensus data show that migrants from countries that send large numbers of refugees to Germany have widely varying standards of living in Germany. Migrants from African countries are overrepresented among the poorest of the country's residents, whereas migrants from Iran are relatively prosperous. These differences may be linked to the nature of the conflicts that result in political persecution in different parts of the world and in different time periods: refugees and asylum seekers typically arrive with little by way of physical capital, but may have varying skill profiles. Civil wars often displace poor, rural populations, leading to streams of migrants with relatively low human capital; other forms of political oppression may focus on members of social elites who are seen as having the potential to compete for power with incumbents. This can result in streams of migrants who have relatively high levels of education and skills, as, for example, in the case of many Cuban emigrés to the United States (see Borjas 1994). Even skilled refugees often face difficulties having their qualifications recognized in the new country of residence. This has certainly been an issue of contention in Germany, although there is some evidence that the country performs better than its European neighbours in this regard (Will 2012).

The conditions that brought ethnic German migrants from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to West Germany in the 1990s were distinctive. Like the refugees and expellees of the 1940s and 1950s, they were automatically eligible for German citizenship upon arrival, and the expectation on all sides was that migration would be permanent. Indeed, the newcomers received some support from the *Bund der Vertriebenen*, which lobbied against restrictions on the numbers of new arrivals. However, the migrants who moved to Germany in the 1990s did not form a lobby of their own. The share of people fluent in German was much smaller than in the immediate postwar period, and that has been a barrier to integration. The economic conditions in the mid to late 1990s and the early years of the 21st century were not favourable, since the unemployment rate in Germany was quite high. Census data suggest that ethnic German migrants from the 1990s occupy an intermediate socio-economic position, between native Germans with no family history of migration and most other migrant groups. For example, the poverty rate in this group is 19 per cent, which is higher than the 12 per cent among native Germans, but lower than the rate among naturalized German citizens (23 per cent) or foreign residents (32 per cent; see Statistisches Bundesamt 2012a: 240).

In Table 2 we provide a summary of the conditions for integration, as they applied to the most important streams of immigrants to Germany in recent decades.

Table 2 Conditions for integration

Migrant stream	Timing	Conditions for integration
Refugees and expellees	1940s and 1950s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Citizenship: automatic - Language: almost all migrants already spoke German - Economy: initially very difficult, but soon very good - Selection: range of social backgrounds - Expectations: some hope of return, but unrealistic
Guestworkers	1950s to 1970s; then family migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Citizenship: access very difficult - Language: few spoke German before coming, little help - Economy: good for workers in low-wage sectors - Selection: migrants from poor regions had few skills - Expectations: migrants and state planned for return
Refugees	1980s on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Citizenship: access difficult - Language: few spoke German, but some help on arrival - Economy: low demand for labour, some discrimination - Selection: some very poor, some middle class or elite - Expectations: refugees plan to stay, asylees less certain
Ethnic Germans	1990s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Citizenship: automatic - Language: some already spoke German - Economy: low demand for labour, quals. not recognized - Selection: range of social backgrounds - Expectations: most planned to stay

INTEGRATION ACROSS GENERATIONS

Our focus in this chapter so far has been on immigrants in the narrow sense of people born in one country who have moved to live in another. It is reasonable to ask whether immigrants are able to integrate in the sense of adapting to the patterns of behaviour and the living standards of natives. However, full integration is much more likely for the children of immigrants. The so-called immigrant ‘second generation’ is much more likely to learn the language. Spending many years in the educational system does a great deal to familiarize the children of immigrants with the norms and institutions of the country of residence, as well as providing them with skills and credentials that are fully relevant. The evidence from Germany and many other countries with significant numbers of immigrants is that integration is a process that moves forward during the individual life span but is much more clearly evident across generations (e.g. Alba and Nee 2003; Sürig and Wilmes 2011). To put the point another way, it is much more troubling when we see that the children of immigrants are not integrating, since this suggests either systematic barriers to the full social inclusion of cultural minorities, an enduring reluctance to integrate, or some combination of the two.

One difficulty in studying integration on a generational time scale is that it requires high-quality data collected to ensure comparability over many years. Countries that do not have long histories of experience with mass immigration often lack this kind of data. Belatedly, 50 years after the heyday of the guestworker program, the German government and German research institutes are now collecting the kind of data that are needed to study integration across generations. The most important source of data is the microcensus (*Mikrozensus*), a yearly survey of 1 per cent of the resident population. The large and representative sample allows high-quality data to be collected even on small segments of the population, including immigrants born in particular countries. Since 2005, the microcensus asks a series of questions that make it possible not only to distinguish between German citizens and foreigners, but also to identify the subset of German citizens who previously held another citizenship, as well as the German-born children of immigrants. The microcensus defines ‘people with a migration background’ (*Personen mit Migrationshintergrund*) as ‘all those who migrated to Germany after 1949, as well as all foreign citizens born in Germany and all of those born in Germany to at least one parent who immigrated or was born in Germany as a foreign citizen’ (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012a: 6). Despite the unwieldy terminology, ‘*mit Migrationshintergrund*’ has become a standard phrase.

Evidence from the microcensus data is published each year in grueling detail by the Federal Statistical office, and researchers can also use the original data for their own analyses. The major limitation of these data for the study of integration, however, is that they go back only to the year 2005. We are thus able to study current differences between immigrants and their children, but cannot compare those with the differences that emerged in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s.

In order to provide evidence on the progress of integration across generations, we turn to another data source, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). This is an annual survey that follows the same people over the course of their lives. The survey began in 1984 and is ongoing. The panel also aims to follow children who grew up with adults in the survey, even after they move out and form households of their own. Not everyone is able to participate across multiple years, of course. The panel is therefore refreshed with new respondents every few years. In a typical year the survey reaches between 10,000 and 15,000 individuals.


The great advantage of the GSOEP data, for our purposes, is the long timeframe. The survey also included, from the very beginning, an over-sample of immigrants from four of the main countries of origin for guestworkers: Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia. The data are not perfect, of course. Scholars must rely on assumptions about response likelihood, and about the reasons people drop out of the panel, to create weights that give a representative picture of the German population. The smaller sample size results in much less precise estimates than are possible with the microcensus and can preclude subdividing the immigrant-origin population e.g. by country of origin. Finally, the focus on the same people over time implies that these panel data are slow to pick up on changes that arise due to the replacement of cohorts, although this concern is offset by

the recruitment of young people into the sample and by the very long time horizon available with the GSOEP data. Despite these limitations, we believe that the GSOEP provides a valuable source of information on integration and that scholars of immigration and citizenship could make greater use of this resource. In this chapter we focus on three issues: poverty, child poverty, and education.

Figure 1 shows trends in poverty rates among immigrants, the children of immigrants, and native Germans with no recent family history of immigration. The data run from 1984 to 2009. The poverty line is set at 60 per cent of median household income. Equivalence scales are used to reflect the fact that larger households require more income in order to avoid poverty, but, since some resources are shared, do not require as much extra income as would be needed by a set of individuals living separately.¹ In Figure 1, the black points and the connecting line show results for German citizens with no migration background. The red points and line show values for immigrants, and the blue points and line show the results for the children of immigrants. Vertical lines through the estimate for each year show 95 per cent confidence intervals. Because it is not possible to identify the country of origin of all of the parents of the second generation, we do not distinguish between, for example, the children of guestworkers and the children of ethnic German migrants who moved to Germany in the 1990s. All of the analyses of GSOEP data in this paper use cross-sectional and longitudinal weights, and standard errors are clustered by household.

The patterns in Figure 1 show that, since the early 1980s, the poverty rate among native Germans has consistently been around half the level of the poverty rate among people with a migrant background. We also see that poverty rates among immigrants, and among the children of immigrants, have been similar. The figure provides suggestive evidence that, since 2000, the second generation is slightly less likely to be poor than the first generation. However, since confidence intervals overlap for much of this period, the evidence is not conclusive.

Poverty rates in Germany (Source: GSOEP)




Note: Figure 1 shows the percentage in poverty (less than 60 per cent of median income, adjusted for household size) among first and second generation immigrants, and native Germans; 95 per cent confidence intervals for the annual estimates are shown with vertical lines. The analysis used longitudinal weights and clustered standard errors by household.

We now turn to the issue of child poverty. Living in poverty as a child can have long-term detrimental effects in areas such as education, income, and health. Figure 2 presents the poverty rate among children (aged 17 or younger) living in Germany, from 1984 to 2009, again using the GSOEP data. The black points, connected by a black trend line, are for children without a migration background, and the blue points are for the children of immigrants. Vertical lines through each point estimate show 95 per cent confidence intervals.

All of these children were born and grew up in Germany. Thus, comparing poverty rates between natives and the second generation allows us to see whether children who have much in common – having been born in the same country – are set on different tracks by the experiences of their parents. By studying whether the difference becomes smaller over time, we can also assess whether the impact of parental differences is declining. The results in Figure 2 show that child poverty rates are around twice as high among those with a migration background as among those with no such family history. There is no evidence that this difference has been attenuated in the quarter-century since the survey that generated these data was first conducted.

Child poverty rates in Germany (Source: GSOEP)




Note: Figure 2 shows the percentage in poverty (less than 60 per cent of median income, adjusted for household size) among native and second generation children (aged under 17); 95 per cent confidence intervals for the annual estimates are shown with vertical lines. The analysis used longitudinal weights and clustered standard errors by household.

Finally, we turn to educational attainment. Among the most consistent findings in the social sciences is that higher levels of education are associated with many other ‘goods’, including income, health, and the breadth and depth of one’s social networks. Again, we compare the German-born children of immigrants with people born in Germany to parents who were not migrants. Since all of these people grew up in the same country and went through the same educational system, one might expect similar outcomes. Our measure of educational attainment is the percentage of people with the *Abitur*, the qualification obtained at age 18 or 19 that allows Germans to attend university.

Figure 3 shows results from the study of education. As before, black points and the black trend line show estimates for people without a migration background, and the results for the children of immigrants are displayed in blue. We restrict the analysis to people aged 22-40. The lower end of this category is set just above the age when most people complete full-time education, and we use an upper limit because the second generation population is relatively young and we want to compare them with natives who grew up around the same time. This is important because the trend, over time, has been towards a higher proportion of people obtaining the *Abitur*. That trend is evident in the black line, which increases significantly from the early 1980s to 2009. It appears, however, that the

children of immigrants have, since the late 1990s, been excluded from this trend. Following a period during which they matched, and indeed exceeded, the rate among natives, the children of migrants have been falling behind.



Note: Figure 3 shows the percentage obtaining the Abitur among native Germans and second generation immigrants, in the age range of 22-40; 95 per cent confidence intervals for the annual estimates are shown with vertical lines. The analysis used longitudinal weights and clustered standard errors by household.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS: IMPROVING INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

Concerns over immigrant integration are nothing new in Germany. Indeed, German opinion makers have recently been engaged in heated debates over the perceived ‘failure’ of integration. A book published by the politician Thilo Sarrazin (2010) provides an instructive example of recent discussions. The book has the title ‘Germany Does Away with Itself: How we are Gambling our Future’ (*Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*). It claims that Germany’s prosperity is endangered by recent immigrants, especially the guestworkers and their children. Sarrazin expresses two concerns. The first is that immigrants and their children have low intelligence, and, due to higher birth rates, will drag down the average intelligence of the population. This claim rests on a misunderstanding of both the relationship between genetics and intelligence, on the one hand, and the effect of birthrates on average IQ, on the other. Indeed, the book

recycles long-discredited eugenic arguments from the early 20th century (Gould 1981; Kevles 1999). Secondly, Sarrazin sees Islam as a source of ‘authoritarian, anti-modern and anti-democratic tendencies’ that pose ‘a direct threat to our way of life’ (Sarrazin 2010: 266; our translation).

Sarrazin’s book sold millions of copies and was among the most popular nonfiction works in recent decades. Three factors explain its success. First, it had a populist, scapegoating message: Sarrazin suggests that his readers simply blame Muslims for the complex problems facing German society. Secondly, Sarrazin tapped into a widespread impression that concerns about migration, particularly among the less educated and less well earning, were insufficiently expressed by a liberal political elite; in this narrow sense, Sarrazin was something of a German Enoch Powell (see Hansen 2000, chapter 8). Thirdly, the book benefited from Sarrazin’s reputation as a competent Finance Minister in the Berlin Senate, which, along with the book’s use of statistics, gave it an aura of credibility. The fact that these statistics were used selectively would not be picked up by a lay reader. One noteworthy inaccuracy in the book is the claim that fertility rates among immigrants and their children are much higher than among native Germans. In fact, birthrates have converged surprisingly quickly over recent years. Whereas in 1990 non-citizen women had, on average, 2.1 children, by 2010 the number of children per non-citizen woman had fallen to 1.6 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012b: 35). The average number of children for female German citizens remained steady, at around 1.4, over this time period.

The exaggerated claims about Germany’s demise, and about the threat posed by Islam, stand in contrast to evidence from academic research on interactions between Muslims and other residents of Germany, which paint a picture of accommodation and mediated conflict (e.g. Foroutan *et al.* 2010; Haug, Müssig and Sticks 2009). One feature of the debate over Sarrazin’s book, which in itself serves as evidence against his theses, is that immigrants and the children of immigrants, many with roots in predominantly Muslim countries, have been prominent amongst his critics. We take it as evidence of progress towards integration that these debates are no longer only *about* immigrants, but also feature immigrants as recognized experts in academia and public policy. In all such debates, however, a certain academic caution is in order, as they are ideologically infused on both sides. In all countries, pro-migrant lobbyists exaggerate the benefits of migration, while anti-migration lobbyists exaggerate the costs.

Most scholars agree that education is a crucial domain, perhaps even *the* crucial domain, for improving integration outcomes. Sarrazin (e.g. 2010: 59) argues that immigrant parents are to blame for not placing sufficient value on their children’s education. The evidence in favour of such a claim is limited. There is certainly evidence that the children of immigrants, especially those with origins in countries where migrants were selected from social groups with poor education, are struggling in the German educational system. In Germany and elsewhere, there is empirical and anecdotal evidence that parents’ expectations have a powerful influence on children’s educational success (e.g. Chen 2001; Fan and Chen 2001; Schmitt 2009). On the other hand, there is evidence that Turkish-Germans, in particular, do value education. A 2011 survey by the Bertelsmann

Stiftung suggests that Turkish parents are more likely than native German parents to say they would pay higher taxes for improved schools, and also more confident that a better school system would reduce poverty, unemployment, and criminality (Projektbüro Bildung 2011). Wippermann and Flaig (2009: 11) also draw on survey evidence to characterize German immigrants as ‘education optimists’, but note that ‘structural hurdles, information deficits and unrealistic expectations’ can prevent the optimism from feeding through to qualifications.

Other commentators, including many academics, focus not on parents but on the structure of the German educational system. For example, Kalter, Granato, and Kristen (2011: 258) cite research suggesting that inequality between the second generation and native Germans is due to general mechanisms of social inequality, rather than ethnic background in particular. Schoolchildren in most parts of Germany are placed in academic or vocational tracks between the ages of 10 and 12, based on teacher assessments and consultation with parents. As in most cases of early selection, there is a strong class bias in the choices: middle-class parents tend to set their children on academic tracks, working-class parents on vocational ones. This can serve as a barrier to intergenerational mobility. As Kalter, Granato, and Kristen argue: ‘To put it simply, the problems of the second generation are due mainly to the earlier, negatively selected immigration [...] and to the peculiarities of German institutions that – independent of immigrant background – tend to perpetuate disadvantages across generations’ (2011: 258).

According to this view, promoting the integration of immigrants and their children may require fundamental changes in the educational system in order to enhance social mobility. However, this account appears incomplete. The German educational system has provided middle-class living standards for millions of people who were placed on the vocational track. Vocational training cannot be equated with low income and unrewarding work. The combination of on-the-job training and apprenticeships has produced a steady supply of skilled workers for German employers. According to a recent report, two thirds of young adults without a family history of migration find a place in this ‘dual education system’, compared to just one third of youth with a migration background (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2012: 36). Some recent research suggests that discrimination on the part of teachers and administrators, from the kindergarten to the university, is holding back people with immigrant backgrounds (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2013). An urgent priority for future research is to explain exactly why the children of immigrants are unable to reap the potential benefits of the German education and training system.

CONCLUSION

Immigrant integration will remain among the most pressing issues facing Germany, for two reasons. First, as we have seen, the country is already home to a large number of immigrants and their descendants. Many have lived in the country for decades, or were even born in Germany – they are not going to leave. As a group they are typically poorer, less well educated, and more vulnerable to economic risks. This chapter presents new evidence that those disadvantages are not attenuating over time or across generations.

We should ignore the fearmongers who claim that Germany is doomed, but this systematic inequality is a matter of great social, economic, and political concern.

The second reason that the issue of immigrant integration will stay at the top of the agenda is that Germany is likely to continue to attract significant numbers of immigrants. An ageing society will create demand for migrant labour, and even if immigration from other sources can be curtailed, EU member states seem likely to provide a ready supply. Even in the absence of economic push and pull factors, chains of family migration that have now been established will continue to draw immigrants to Germany. As in the past, many of these immigrants will return to their homelands, but some will settle and will need to find their place in German society.

In recent years public debate over integration has become more intense, and politicians of all parties recognize the need for action. As yet, however, there is little evidence that this will involve deep changes in existing structures such as the educational system. It remains to be seen whether German institutions can be reformed so that they serve all of the country's residents, regardless of background.

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¹ We use the OECD equivalence scale. This assigns a value of 1 to the first household member, a value of 0.7 to each extra adult, and 0.5 to each child. For example, if 60 per cent of the median monthly income is €1,500, then a single-person household requires at least this amount of income to avoid poverty. A household with two adults would require €1,500 + (0.7*€1,500) = €2,550. A household with two adults and two children would require €1,500 + (0.7*€1,500) + (0.5*€1,500) + (0.5*€1,500) = €4,050 per month.