Autonomism and Federalism

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This article aims to understand autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design. In particular, I ask whether the theory and practice of autonomism is consonant with federalist principles. “Autonomism” is a normative term that advocates the use of autonomist principles, and it has an intricate relationship with federalism, but is generally distinct from it. Autonomists are wary of federalism because they believe it has homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies. Autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design exhibits a number of clear anti-federalist stances, but yet it is based on the general federalist principle that multiple levels of government can lead to better governance in multinational states. To this complex anti-federalist and federalist hybrid stance, autonomism adds a nuanced anti-secessionism stance.

Autonomism

In many multinational democracies, models of federation are the preferred institutional configuration to address the complexities of multinationalism, and much of the scholarly literature echoes this preference for federation (Keating 2004; Hechter 2000; Norman 2006; Kymlicka 1998; Gibbins et al. 1998; Stepan 2001; Burgess and Gagnon 1993; Elazar 1987; Watts 2008; McRoberts 1997; Griffiths et al. 2005; Gagnon and Iacovino 2007; Karmis and Norman 2005). Yet, there are autonomist national parties in sub-state national societies that reject a model of federation as an appropriate institutional design to address their needs. Instead, many stateless nationalists advocate territorial autonomy as the ideal institutional design to accommodate them. Autonomism has been under-studied, and we need to understand it as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design. We also need to understand how autonomist parties have developed autonomism as a body of ideas. Autonomist political parties of long-standing conceive autonomism as a rich and complex political tradition.

In particular, we need to inquire whether the theory and practice of autonomism is consonant with federalist principles. A number of scholars have argued that
autonomism and federalism should be seen as distinct categories, without further elaboration (Ackrén 2009; Olausson 2007). In this regard, Suksi maintains that it is possible to “...to draw a boundary of some kind between federal forms of organization and territorial autonomies,” although the boundary may be fluid and subject to interpretation (Suksi 2011). The strongest thesis has been advanced by Benedikter, who argues that autonomy “is a specific territorial organization having its own constituent features. It should not be confused with a subcategory of federalism...[It] is a political and constitutional organization sui generis that deserves distinct attention and analysis in theory and practice” (Benedikter 2007).

My empirical findings demonstrate that autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design exhibits a number of clear anti-federalist stances, but yet it draws inspiration from the general federalist principle that a federal political system is one where power is at once divided and coordinated. Its anti-federalist stance has four basic components: diminished predominance of dual national identities, rejection of federation’s homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies, negative perception of the possibilities for recognition and accommodation by the central structures of the state, and (in some cases) willingness to trade the value of meaningful influence on the center for the perception of more autonomy (Légaré and Suksi 2008; McGarry 2002; Suksi 2011). To this dual anti-federalist and federalist hybrid stance, autonomism adds a nuanced anti-secessionism stance.

“Federalism” is a normative term recommending the use of federal principles, and favors a political system of multilevel government combining elements of shared-rule and territorial self-rule (McGarry and O’Leary, 2007; Watts 2008). Thus, federalism is a philosophical term “to the extent it is a normative judgment upon the ideal organization of human relations and conduct” (Burgess and Gagnon 1993). Similarly, “autonomism” is a normative term that advocates the use of autonomist principles, and envisions autonomy as the ideal constitutional and political framework for accommodating diversity. Autonomism has an intricate relationship with federalism, but is generally distinct from it. Autonomist parties are wary of federalism because they believe it has homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies. Thus, a model of classic federation is not appealing to autonomists, according to my findings. Even relatively asymmetric federations are generally unappealing to autonomists. Yet, autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government within existing state structures, and thus autonomists adopt elements of the federal idea, given that they are proponents of a peculiar form of multilevel government combining elements of shared-rule and partial territorial self-rule. Moreover, autonomists may be advocates of asymmetry within a broadly understood “federal political system,” but not of classic federation.
Scholarly efforts by comparativists and political theorists to develop theories of independentism abound (Bartkus 1999; Beissinger 2002; Hechter 2000; Hale 2008; Hannum and Babbitt 2006; Moore 1998). We also have theories about the origins of federalism and federation (Riker 1987, 1964; Watts 2008, 1966; Wheare 1953; Stepan 2001). Yet, we have relatively little in the existing scholarly literature on autonomism as a political program and as an ideology capable of mobilizing people. This is an unfortunate gap, given that there are in fact important political actors in sub-state national societies that are proponents of models of autonomism. Existing works on autonomy and actually existing autonomies have not analyzed autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design nor have they asked whether autonomism is a carrier of the federal idea (Weller and Wolff 2005; Ghai 2000; Suksi 1998; Winter and Türsan 1998). None of the works cited above have based their theorizing on in-depth fieldwork in specific countries, or empirical research into the attitudes, opinions, and discourse of autonomists who are leaders and militants of autonomist political parties, which is the approach taken here.

In order to make analytic progress, we must unpack the notion of territorial autonomy by distinguishing between autonomism, autonomies, and autonomists. “Autonomism” is a term imbued with normative content, and it implies a commitment to forms of territorial control that challenge traditional conceptions of the nation-state, and the generalized reification of statist principles. These are political statuses that generally renounce full sovereign statehood, but lay claim to specific aspects of self-government (Suksi 1998). Autonomy is a grey area of territorial management of ethnic differences. It may be conceptualized as “the legally entrenched power of ethnic or territorial communities to exercise public functions independently of other sources of authority of the state, but subject to the overall legal order of the state” (Weller and Wolff 2005). Autonomies typically have legislative powers that are normally enumerated so that its competences in certain fields are clearly specified, while the central state’s legislature retains residual power (Benedikter 2007; Safran and Maíz Suárez 2000).

Autonomism does not seek independence—at least for the medium- to short-term—but seeks to promote the self-government, self administration, and cultural identity of a territorial unit populated by a society with national characteristics (Henders 2010). Autonomism is clearly distinguishable from independentism. Autonomist proposals can also be distinguished from models of federation. Certain forms of autonomism may be described as a sub-species of the general category of “federal political systems,” if we recognize that the latter is a broad genus including confederations, “federacies,” associated states, condominiums, etc. (Watts 2008). However, most autonomist proposals can be clearly distinguished from full-fledged federations. De jure symmetry is typical of most federations, which we can denominate “classic” federations, although there are also a number of asymmetric
ones (McGarry 2007; Agranoff 1999). Classic federations, where all the constituent units typically have substantially equal powers, may not be sufficiently sensitive to the particular needs of a substate national society, which require a greater degree of self-government (Ghai 2000). Autonomist parties seek a special status and special powers within a defined geographical territory, but one that does not constitute a constituent unit of a classic federation, nor an independent state (Olausson 2007; Ackrén and Olausson 2008; Ackrén 2009). Indeed, even models of federation that have asymmetrical elements are shunned by autonomists. Generally speaking, moreover, “autonomy is always a fragmented order, whereas a constituent . . . [unit of a federation] is always part of a whole . . . The ties in a federal State are always stronger than those in an autonomy” (Suksi 1998).

“Autonomies” are the actually-existing varieties of territorial autonomies. These are models of territorial order that have been successfully established by sub-state territorial units, in cooperation with central state governments. In their institutional design, actually-existing autonomies are the obligatory starting points of reference for giving concrete shape to the aspirations of autonomism. However, actually-existing autonomies do not exhaust the ambitions or the inventiveness of the autonomist political agenda. Autonomism may also put forward models of institutional design that are presently-inexisting, but which, under the right political circumstances, could become juridically and politically viable entities.

“Autonomists” are the actual leaders and militants of autonomist political parties. Many autonomist political parties are also sub-state national parties. Aside from autonomist intellectuals and sympathizers, autonomists leaders and militants are the main proponents of the ideology of autonomism. Their attitudes, ideas, and programs will help us reach a better understanding of the contemporary meaning of autonomism, given that actually-existing autonomies do not exhaust the autonomist political imagination.

I rely principally on an analysis of four autonomist parties of three substate national societies, namely Catalonia, Quebec, and Puerto Rico. My scope conditions encompass autonomist parties in well-established democracies with developed economies that are in federations or federal political systems. The autonomist parties of substate societies located in federations or federal political systems—as opposed to unitary states—are ideal cases to study the relation between autonomism and federalism, and in particular how autonomists relate to a model of federation. The parties are: the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ), the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), and the federation of Convergència i Unió (CiU)—consisting of Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC). For each of these four political parties, I have conducted in-depth fieldwork. I have conducted interviews with over forty top-level leaders of these autonomist parties. Also, I conducted focus group interviews with base-level militants of these parties. In total, I have received 365 answered questionnaires.
from the militants of the autonomist national parties of Puerto Rico, Quebec, and Catalonia. Whenever possible, I went to party congresses or assemblies and, with the permission and cooperation of the parties, I distributed my questionnaire in person and received the responses the same day directly from the militants.

The PPD in Puerto Rico operates in an actually existing nonfederalist autonomy while CDC and UDC in Catalonia are in a semi-federalist autonomy. The ADQ puts forward a political program that would establish a semi-federal autonomy in Quebec, although it is at present a constituent unit of a federation. As Eric Duhaime, counselor to former party leader Mario Dumont, said: “[The ADQ] is a nationalist party, given that almost all quebecois are nationalists, although we are autonomists.”4 The choice of Catalonia, Quebec, and Puerto Rico is an auspicious one. Puerto Rico belongs to a symmetrical and centralized federation, Quebec is part of a relatively decentralized federation with elements of asymmetry, and Catalonia is part of an asymmetric federal political system. Despite this diversity in degrees of symmetry of these federal systems, autonomist parties have developed autonomism as a coherent ideology of territorial order with a common core of principles.

Contemporary Autonomies and Federalism

Actually existing autonomies do not exhaust the imagination of the autonomist political agenda, and thus we need to examine the attitudes and discourse of autonomists (see below). However, in light of our interest in the relationship between autonomism and federalism, we need to scrutinize contemporary cases of actually existing autonomies in order to understand three aspects: (i) the degree to which autonomies embody federalist elements in their institutions; (ii) the relationship between autonomism and asymmetric federalism; and (iii) the relationship between autonomism, federalism, and consociational theory.

Federalist and Nonfederalist Elements in Contemporary Autonomies

Contemporary autonomies embody in their institutional design both federalist and nonfederalist elements. Existing scholarship has failed to explore this important axis of variation among contemporary exemplars of autonomy. Thus, I present in figure 1 an original typology of presently existing autonomies that shows a continuum between those cases with the most pronounced federalist-like elements and those with the strongest nonfederalist characteristics. Some of the cases of actually existing autonomies are very small territories or have very small populations.5 There is a wide variety of autonomies in the contemporary world.
(Benedikter 2007), but I will concentrate in the narrative description on some of the larger cases that are prototypical exemplars of autonomism, encompassed by my scope conditions. I am interested in autonomies located in federations or federal political systems. Given that the latter term is a broad genus, at its outer edge one can find “decentralized unions with some federal features” (Watts 2008), a category which includes the UK and Italy.

**Nonfederal Autonomies**

On one end of the spectrum we have actually existing autonomies that are nonfederalist territorial units, having few federalist elements, and in fact exhibiting a number of anti-federalist characteristics. Some of these cases are “federacies,” and Elazar cites the Puerto Rico–United States relationship as the prototype of a “federacy,” although he mischaracterized the nature of the relationship, as I explain below (Elazar 1991).  

In the case of an autonomy such as Puerto Rico, there are four ways in which such an autonomy is nonfederalist. First, in autonomies such as Puerto Rico the formal distribution of legislative and executive authority between the two levels of government is not constitutionally entrenched. A review of the origins of the current political status of Puerto Rico as an “unincorporated territory” of the United States demonstrates that it is a judicial and statutory creation, not a constitutionally entrenched level of government. Since 1898, Puerto Rico has been an “unincorporated territory” of the United States, and the nature of its relationship with the United States has been set by federal statutes, especially the Foraker Act of 1900 and the Jones Act of 1917. Although the U.S. Constitution

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*Italy is a regionalizing and federalizing union state with autonomous regions, particularly after the Reform of Title V of the Constitution in 2001.

**Figure 1** Varieties of actually existing autonomies in federal political systems.
provides for “states” and “territories,” the category of “unincorporated territory” was sculpted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held in a series of cases known as the “Insular Cases” that Puerto Rico belongs to the USA, but is not part of it (Rivera Ramos 2001). In 1952, it was established as an *Estado Libre Asociado* (ELA), artfully translated into English as “Commonwealth.” Public Law 600 was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1950 and it aimed to provide constitutional government for the people of Puerto Rico. After approval by the people in a referendum, Congress ratified the Puerto Rican Constitution, and the newly baptized ELA came into effect on July 25, 1952 (Ramírez Lavandero 1988).

Second, autonomies such as Puerto Rico are nonfederalist because they are constitutionally subordinate to the center. The “shared rule” component between the central state and the autonomous unit is weak or practically inexistent. The power to terminate or modify the Puerto Rico-USA relationship rests squarely on the U.S. Congress, contrary to what Elazar asserts (Elazar 1987, 1991). During 1952–1953, the United States succeeded in getting Puerto Rico off the agenda of the UN Decolonization Committee in part by arguing that the ELA was a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms may only be changed by common consent. However, soon thereafter Congress and the Executive branch started to behave “as if no compact of any kind existed and as if Puerto Rico continued to be a territory or possession of the United States, completely subject to its sovereign will. Puerto Rico leaders would spend the rest of the century unsuccessfully trying to convince the United States to allow full decolonization” (Trías Monge 1997). Supporters of the ELA have tried on several occasions to negotiate a “culminated ELA,” starting with the Fernós–Murray bill of 1959, but they have been unable to obtain the consent of the U.S. Congress. However, Congress continues to assume that it can unilaterally exercise plenary powers over Puerto Rico under the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S. government contends that sovereignty over Puerto Rico resides solely in the United States and not in the people of Puerto Rico (Trías Monge 1997). In the ELA–U.S. federal government relationship, there is a “higher” or “senior” level of government and a “lower” or “junior” authority. The subunit government has less sovereignty in its sphere than the federal government in its own. This is contrary to one of the defining elements of the federal idea: that the subunit governments “have as much sovereignty in their sphere as the… federal government has in its [sphere]” (Griffiths et al. 2005).

Third, autonomies such as Puerto Rico are nonfederalist if their influence over the policy-making institutions of the center is weak or negligible. Under the ELA, Puerto Rico has a degree of self-government, with local government institutions that are similar to the ones in the U.S. states. Puerto Rico enjoys fiscal autonomy, and income received from sources in Puerto Rico is not subject to federal personal income taxation. However, most federal laws apply, but Puerto Rico has no effective representation in Congress, except for a token representative that has no
right to vote there. Nor do the residents of Puerto Rico vote for the U.S. federal executive. This is an element of the status quo that is clearly anti-federalist, given that the Puerto Rican case is an extreme one: there is no real representation in the institutions of the central state (Karmis and Norman 2005). On the other hand, given that local governmental institutions and agencies are controlled by Puerto Ricans, some of the ethnosymbols of nationhood are present in the form of flags, hymns, institutions of culture, national days, etc., and such matters as representation in international sports events have also become subtle mechanisms of nation-building.

Fourth, autonomies are also nonfederalist if the two orders of government that have been set up are so unequal that the element of “self rule” in the relationship gives the autonomy a special status arrangement that is not part of the core institutional apparatus of the central state. The ELA is not part of the whole, given that it is a special status that is outside the U.S. federation, while being an unincorporated territory that is in a subordinate relationship with the central state. In essence, the ELA–U.S. federal government relationship has some elements of empire, and nearly none of federalism.

Autonomism in Puerto Rico has until very recently been the dominant political tendency there since the 1950s, and this long-standing exemplar of territorial autonomy continues to be an acceptable model of autonomy for many in the U.S. government as well.

**Devolutionary Autonomies**

Autonomies that are created in “union-states” or unitary states, undergoing a process of asymmetric decentralization or “devolution,” have some federal features. Those that have been created in the United Kingdom since 1998 are the most illuminating contemporary exemplars of the cases covered by my scope conditions. I will here focus on Scotland, although some of the generalizations will also be applicable to Wales, and, less so, to Northern Ireland (Loughlin 2001; Keating et al. 2001).

“Devolution” is a distinctly British term coined in the nineteenth century, and it has some similarities with federal political systems but with a number of distinct features. Powers and governmental authority have been transferred to the territories and nations, but the ultimate sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament remains unaltered. “Westminster retains the constituent power and could even suspend or abolish the devolved institutions (as happened in Northern Ireland in 1972, 2000, and 2002)” (Keating 2005). The devolved institutions of the United Kingdom are not currently constitutionally entrenched and Westminster could theoretically change them unilaterally and by ordinary law. The custom at present is that “London will ‘normally’ not over-rule the Scottish Parliament on devolved matters,
but it insists on a residual claim to do so” (Keating 2009). These are nonfederalist elements that devolutionary autonomies in the United Kingdom share with nonfederalist autonomies such as Puerto Rico because their autonomic (or devolutionary) institutions are constitutionally subordinate to the center. It also violates the general federalist principle that “federalism involves a polycentric noncentralized arrangement in which neither the constituent governments nor the general government can unilaterally alter the constitutional distribution of power” (Griffiths et al. 2005). The devolved institutions in the United Kingdom have a constitutionally subordinate status rather than coordinate status. Some scholars have argued that the United Kingdom is a “federal political system” (McGarry 2002). Other scholars such as Ronald Watts have questioned whether the United Kingdom is a “quasi-federation,” and have argued that it is closer to the model of a decentralized union with some federal features (Watts 2007). Moreover, the language of classic federalism may not be sufficient to understand devolutionary autonomies (Suksi 2011).

In Scotland, as in federal political systems, some competences have been devolved to Scotland, some have been reserved to the center, and others are shared between the two. Yet, unlike a genuine federation, “the constitutional limits apply only to Scotland and not to Westminster, which retains the right to legislate even within devolved spheres, although under the Sewell conventions…this should happen only with the consent of the Scottish Parliament” (Keating 2005) In addition, the U.K. institutional arrangement is highly asymmetrical, given that “Westminster continues to rule directly in England and proposals for regional government there fall far short of creating units comparable with Scotland. This creates a structural imbalance since Westminster, doubling as the U.K. and English government, will be the predominant partner” (Keating 2005; Trench 2007a). Moreover, as Alan Trench noted, the powers of the devolved administrations in the United Kingdom are significantly lesser than those of the U.K. government, which in many aspects is able to outmaneuver them. “Their powers are contingent, dependent on the passive restraint and nonopposition of the U.K. Government or its active cooperation” (Trench 2007b). The relationship between the devolved institutions and the U.K. government is not one of co-ordinate partners, and thus the name “federal” cannot be fully applied to a system where the governments of the devolved administrations are subordinate to the center (Wheare 1941; Suksi 2011).

Semi-Federal Autonomies

Since the nineteenth century, two visions of Spain have competed with each other: a homogeneous vision that has sought to establish congruence between state and nation, and a pluralist vision, which has its roots in the republican federalist
tradition (Fossas 2000; Conversi 1997; Légaré and Suksi 2008; Conversi 2000; Keating 2000; McRoberts 2001; Caminal 2002). The Spanish model of state established by the 1978 Constitution is a quasi-federation, consisting of seventeen “autonomous communities” (ACs) having the constitutional right to self-rule. Spain is not a federation in name and is not yet a fully formed federation, but it does exhibit some of the institutional characteristics of contemporary federal political systems. According to Eliseo Aja, it is a federal political system because it features the constitutional recognition of the right to autonomy, the institutions of the ACs do not depend on the central state, two levels of government were created when the ACs were configured with their own institutions, and intergovernmental conflicts are resolved by the Constitutional Court according to judicial criteria (Aja 2003). The “State of Autonomies” can be considered an example of ‘devolutionary federalism,’ and is analyzed as such by many scholars (Griffiths et al. 2005; Moreno 2001). Some have argued that it is in an early stage of an evolutionary path that could possibly lead eventually to a type of asymmetric federalism (Moreno 2001). “As a unitary state engaged in devolutionary federalization within its own borders by a process characterized by considerable asymmetry, Spain is an interesting example of an effort to accommodate variations in the strengths of regional pressures for autonomy” (Karmis and Norman 2005).

Decentralization in Spain is designed for all the territorial subunits and not only for some of them, which is characteristic of federations. Yet, as Ferran Requejo has noted, despite the federalizing impetus of the State of Autonomies, “there are many arguments that would suggest that perhaps it would be more appropriately situated in the group of ‘regional states’” (Requejo Coll 2005). It does not have some important institutional and procedural elements that usually define “federations” (Suksi 2011). For example, the ACs are not constituent entities. The Constitution establishes “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation” (Art. 2) and the ‘Spanish people’ as subject of the “national sovereignty” (Art. 1). In fact, some of the ACs did not even exist before 1978. In addition, the decentralization of legislative powers is unclear. The central state maintains its hegemony through the leyes de base and leyes orgánicas that are the same throughout the state and can be developed with a centralizing animus. There may be areas of overlap between “the regulations of central and ‘autonomous’ powers in the majority of subjects without clear procedural rules of ‘shared government’” (Requejo Coll 2005). Moreover, unlike the executive and legislative powers, the State of Autonomies has had “practically no effect on the structure of the judiciary, which continues to be that of a centralized state” (Requejo Coll 2005). Finally, the State of Autonomies is a long way from any model of fiscal federalism. In sum, the de facto political evolution of the model has demonstrated that Spain still lacks some of the fundamental traits of federations, according to Requejo.
Therefore, autonomies such as post-1978 Catalonia, Euskadi, and Galicia are semi-federal autonomies. Of the three types of actually existing autonomies examined here, they have the most pronounced federalist elements, although they are not subunits of a federation. Hence, they are properly classified as autonomies.

**Autonomism and Asymmetric Federalism**

Asymmetry in federal political systems arises to meet the challenges of diversity within federal societies, and it refers to the differentiation of status and rights between the constituent units of a federal system (Ghai 2000). In federal systems, two distinct types of asymmetry exist: *de jure* and *de facto*. *De facto* asymmetry refers to variations (commonly observable in most federations) in size and wealth of constituent units, geography, population, economic development, etc. *De jure* asymmetry emerges out of deeply rooted historical factors, and is often a response to the existence of plurinational diversity (Ghai 2000; Agranoff 1999). Forms of autonomy that are symmetrical are likely to “work unproblematically only in states that are nationally homogeneous” (McGarry 2007).

Asymmetry may be further distinguished by whether it relates to full-fledged constituent units of a federal system or to peripheral political units. The latter may be “peripheral” because of geographical remoteness, or because they have a small population, or are a large but sparsely populated territory. Such territories have commonly required a “degree of self-government and representation in the central institutions different from the full-fledged member states, thus involving considerable asymmetry” (Watts 1999). Such territories may be granted a special status arrangement that may exhibit horizontal, vertical, or symbolic asymmetry (Henders 2010).

While *de jure* symmetry is typical of most federations, it is not universally so (McGarry 2007; Benedikter 2007; Légaré and Suksi 2008; Ghai 2000; Watts 1999). Canada, Belgium, Malaysia, and India are the prototypes of asymmetric federations (Watts 2000, 1999; Keating 1999). Moreover, although interest in asymmetry originally arose out of the examination of asymmetrical relations within federations (Tarlton 1965), asymmetry is also observable in the broader genus of “federal political systems.”

Actually existing autonomies are typically exemplars of *de jure* asymmetric arrangements, and they may be full-fledged constituent units of a federal political system (e.g., Catalonia), or may be peripheral units of a federal system (e.g., Puerto Rico), or may be special status arrangements within a unitary state (e.g., Corsica) (Cordell and Wolff 2004; Henders 2010; Légaré and Suksi 2008). Autonomism is by definition asymmetrical, and the question of negotiating and sustaining asymmetry is fundamental to the design and operation of autonomy (Benedikter 2007; Ghai 2000). As Rafael Hernández Colón, a former three-time governor of Puerto Rico
and president of the autonomist party there during 19 years, explained when contrasting the ideological stance of federalists with the ideology of autonomism: ‘[federalists] believe that the only way that their federalism can be realized is symmetrically... We autonomists are the ones that propose an asymmetrical approach... Now, this is one of the major problems we face when we talk about a ‘new pact’ [with the USA]... i.e., the symmetry... [of the U.S. federation].’\textsuperscript{7}

In federations and in actually existing autonomies within federal political systems, autonomist parties and their leaders and militants generally reject models of classic federation. They may be advocates of asymmetry within a broadly understood federal political system, but not of federation. As one PPD militant wrote: “the U.S. federation has little flexibility to attend the autonomist claims that Puerto Rico (or other territories) could make in its relation with the U.S.” To the extent they propose a form of autonomism that exists within a broadly-defined “federal political system,” the special status arrangement they propose may be a type of highly asymmetrical form of federal system. But, they are very hesitant to support any model of federalism that resembles a federation. The United States, for example, is a federal political system composed of a symmetrical federation with fifty full-fledged constituent units and the federal capital, two “federacies,” a number of small unincorporated territories, and maintains relations with three associated states (Griffiths et al. 2005; Benedikter 2007; Légare and Suksi 2008). For well over a century, autonomists in Puerto Rico (one of the “federacies”) have favored autonomism within the U.S. federal political system, but not within the U.S. federation. Similarly, contemporary autonomists in Catalonia favor a special status arrangement within the Spanish state, but reject a model of federation for Spain.

In some contemporary federations, certain national parties of sub-state national societies may put forward proposals for asymmetric federation. Such parties are federalist parties with a program for asymmetric decentralization of the federation. At various times since the 1960’s, for example, this kind of proposal has been put forward by the Parti Libéral du Québec, or the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya at present. These parties reject autonomism and are electoral rivals of autonomist parties, given that they are advocates of a model of federation with asymmetric elements.

Federations or federal political systems, moreover, may also have national parties of sub-state national societies that put forward proposals for autonomism. Generally speaking, autonomist proposals within an actually existing federation or federal system reject a model of classic federation. Even federations with elements of asymmetry are inadequate in the autonomist political imagination. They are not interested in being a constituent unit of a federation. Exemplars of this kind of autonomist parties are: Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Partido Popular Democrático, and the Action Démocratique du Québec. Autonomist parties are
ideological rivals of parties that favor a model of asymmetric federation, such as Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds in Catalonia. Jaume Bosch, the vice-president of IC-V, explained his federalist predilections as follows: “Many people would say the Spanish state is a federalizing system but in reality it is not... Our option is for a federalism... that has a lot in common with the ideas of Miquel Caminal on pluralist federalism. Our starting point is the recognition of Spain as a plurinational and plurilingual state...” As one prominent autonomist leader in Catalonia remarked: “as a nationalist, I want the maximum sovereignty within a realist context... [i.e.,] within a superior political unit.” As my findings below indicate, autonomist militants reject federation because they believe that federations tend to homogenize all of their full-fledged constituent units.

Autonomists favor instead forms of autonomism that are special status arrangements, and some of these models may be asymmetrical arrangements within broadly-defined federal political systems. As José Arsenio Torres, one of the major intellectual exponents of autonomism in Puerto Rico, explained: “[The PPD] believes that the ELA represents the best of both worlds: participation in the American world, migration [opportunities], trade, federal transfers...[while maintaining] a cultural distance... and although we don’t have all the powers of sovereignty, it is a quid pro quo, and thus it is a pragmatic political status.”

**Autonomism and Federalism in Consociational Theory**

In deeply divided societies, consociational principles may be usefully applied to ameliorate ethnic conflict and violence. As originally developed by Lijphart and further elaborated by O’Leary and McGarry, classic consociational democracies are a general type of democracy defined in terms of four broad principles, all of which can be applied in a variety of ways: grand coalition, segmental autonomy (including nonterritorial and territorial autonomy), proportionality, and minority veto (Lijphart 1995). Consociationalism is both an empirical and a normative model (Lijphart 1977), and all four consociational features can assume quite different forms, but do not work equally well in all multi-ethnic societies with consociational institutions. Lijphart has recently emphasized that grand coalition and segmental autonomy are the most crucial principles, and the other two “occupy a somewhat lower position of importance” (Lijphart 2008). For Lijphart, segmental autonomy is “minority rule over the minority itself in matters that are the minority’s exclusive concern,” and complements the grand coalition principle (Lijphart 1979).

Segmental autonomy can take the form of territorial autonomy or nonterritorial cultural autonomy. “If the segments are geographically intermixed, autonomy will have to take a mainly non-territorial form” (Lijphart 1995). Nonterritorial and territorial autonomy “are eminently compatible” and can be combined (Lijphart...
1995). But, “a special form of segmental autonomy that is particularly suitable for divided societies with geographically concentrated segments is federalism” (Lijphart 1995). Lijphart recommends “territorial federalism” as an institutional form to accommodate substate societies, where the “segmental cleavages coincide with regional cleavages” (Lijphart 1977). In the classical statements by Lijphart, the geographical concentration of ethnic groups in a plural society has the advantage of allowing the application of a model of federation (Lijphart 1977). In these classical statements, Lijphart failed to see the distinctiveness of autonomism as a philosophy of territorial order and as a political ideology. One does not find a recognition that autonomists’ political program is distinct from federalists’ agenda, and no analysis of why autonomists envision autonomy as the ideal constitutional framework, which they differentiate from federation (Lijphart 1979). However, other scholars writing more recently in the consociational tradition have recognized the distinction between federation and the types of special status arrangements that autonomists seek (O’Leary et al. 2005; Weller and Wolff 2005; Wolff 2009).

Lijphart also argued that federations embodied all of the basic consociational principles, even if in rudimentary form. In particular, federations share with consociational democracy two crucial features: the component units of federations enjoy a degree of secure autonomy and they all share in the decisionmaking at the central level of the state. “These are the principles of autonomy and power-sharing that are also fundamental features of consociational democracy” (Lijphart 1979). Proponents of autonomism, however, are strong advocates of self-government, but not as constituent units of a federation. In contemporary autonomies, autonomists prefer special status arrangements that are not subject to the homogenizing tendencies of federations, as they see it. Moreover, some autonomists are willing to trade the value of meaningful influence on the center for the perception of more political autonomy (Légaré and Suksi 2008; Suksi 2011; McGarry 2002).

All consociational democracies have segmental autonomy as one of their defining features, but not all actually existing autonomies have adopted all four of the classic power sharing practices. There are autonomies such as Northern Ireland, South Tyrol/Alto Adige, or Brussels that are regional consociations (Weller and Wolff 2005). Yet, there are also autonomies with very strong autonomist parties that have not adopted any consociational principles aside from the territorial autonomy component (e.g., the Partido Popular Democrático), or are located in states that are weak consociational cases. The strong consociational cases at present are Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Iraq, etc. (Taylor 2009). Consociational arrangements at the local or central levels are likely to be found necessary in autonomies that are highly significant relative to the rest of the state and are internally heterogeneous (Wolff 2009).
Autonomists

Actually existing autonomies do not exhaust the autonomist imagination. In order to understand the relationship between autonomism and federalism, we need to examine the evidence derived from the discourse of leaders and militants of autonomist parties, centered on four aspects of the autonomists’ credo: the relation between autonomism and federation, secessionism, identity, and recognition by the central state.

Autonomism and Federation

Autonomists tend to be wary of federation. Artur Mas, the president of CiU, had this to say about how CDC’s founder has viewed autonomism: “I believe that President Pujol has never been a federalist. He always tried to make the most of the statute of autonomy and the Constitution of 1978, interpreting it in a Catalanist and autonomic note. It was logical that he should do that given that this was the only way available. He lived within that framework, within a Spanish Constitution that he helped to create.” Dolors Batalla was vice-secretary of CDC for political action and strategy when I interviewed her and has also been a member of Parliament. With respect to federation, Batalla echoed the views of other CDC members: “we try to avoid at all costs any kind of federalism that leads to the homogenization of all the constituent units... In reality what we are looking for is to have a different and differentiated status within the Spanish state.”

As former President Pujol has often emphasized, CiU rejects a model of federation. In Pujol’s view, as he said in a conference in 1996: “we have to say clearly that we are not federalists, because federalism, as it is normally understood... is a federalism that wants to emerge out of a homogeneous base that does not exist, and of a will to homogenize that is unjust towards us” (Pujol 1997).

Autonomists in Quebec are also cautious about models of federation. The general idea behind the autonomist nationalism of the ADQ is to “obtain more power for Quebec, but within Canada, yet taking into consideration that Quebec is a nation. Our position is not necessarily against sovereignty nor against Canada... [After two failed referendums] our position is that the people don’t want another referendum but neither do they want the status quo. We want to see Quebec recognized as an ‘autonomous state’ given that we are unlike the other ten provinces. We are different... and we want more powers in fields such as immigration and health... In a certain sense, we are more confederalists than federalists.” The ADQ would put into effect the institutional reforms that were recommended by the Jean Allaire Report of January, 1991, originally entitled Un Québec Libre de ses choix. I asked what is the difference between the autonomist proposal of the ADQ and the proposals for a decentralized federalism coming
from certain quarters in the PLQ. “The liberals [PLQ] want piecemeal agreements. We want a completely new [political and] social model.” The ADQ stresses that autonomist nationalism has historically been much stronger in the province than independentism.

**Autonomism and Secessionism**

Most mainstream autonomists reject the independence alternative. Autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government within existing state structures.

Ramon Camp has been one of the most distinguished CDC members of the Parliament, and has served as the spokesman of the party in the Parliament. He said: “CDC is not a federalist party but its autonomism...[is clearly non-secessionist]...Neither Flanders nor Scotland propose to break with their respective states. Not all nations have to find the political solution to their nationness in independence...”\(^\text{15}\) Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida is the President of UDC, and with Artur Mas, part of the duo that currently leads CiU. What does UDC aspire to, according to Duran i Lleida? “Not to separate ourselves from Spain...In 1931 when UDC was founded it had a confederal proposal for all the Spanish state...Our aspiration is that the Spanish state will be able to configure itself as a sum of various nations, and not have Spain be identified as the only nation.”\(^\text{16}\) CDC’s public face is decidedly autonomist in orientation, even if some of its more recent internal declarations have taken on a more sovereigntist hue (Guibernau i Berdu´ n 2004; Aguilera de Prat 2002; Culla 2001). In sum, CDC and UDC are nationalist and autonomist formations that propose an asymmetric autonomism, without renouncing to a certain dose of supplemental sovereigntist rhetoric (Conversi 1997).

One of the ADQ’s most complete statements on its autonomist position to date was disseminated in a document entitled *Projet: L’ADQ - La Voie Autonomiste*, originally dating from 2004. The ADQ estimates that it is time to ask sovereigntists if it is still pertinent to want to continue having referendums, repeatedly. More than waiting for a “yes” to a question to which the Quebecois have already said “no” twice, or worse risking a third “no” that will further weaken Quebec, it is time to examine new approaches, to explore new avenues, to turn towards new horizons to advance the autonomy of the Quebecois people. “On the federal side, it is hardly better. The federal government has not shown any sign that it understands the need for autonomy of the Quebecois...Apart from the federal intention, the idea of sovereignty in Quebec will never die. We believe that the energy that is at the source of this project, which resides in the will for progress of our people, ought to be canalized in the following years to construct a strong and proud society.” The ADQ concludes: “for a long time, the Quebecois have been divided
between sovereigntists and federalists... Today, we refuse to be forced to have the label “sovereigntists” or “federalists.” We are ‘autonomists.’”

**Autonomism and Identity**

Autonomists have a strong sense of identification with their sub-state national society, and my findings show that autonomist militants are much less likely to exhibit dual national identities than militants of pro-federation national parties. The autonomist militants of the *Partido Popular Democrático* show a strong sense of Puerto Rican nationhood (table 1). Autonomists agree (99 percent) that Puerto Rico is a nation and they were almost monolithic in identifying as Puerto Ricans, not as “Americans.” Very few of them think of the United States as their country or their nation, and, at best, merely see the United States in legal realist terms: by law, they are U.S. citizens and thus the United States is simply the sovereign state of which they are citizens.

As table 1 shows, the militants of the ADQ strongly identified Québec as a nation or as a distinct society and their own party as a nationalist party. Most were inclined to identify strongly with Quebec, and only a minority seemed to express dual national identities. The militants of the two Catalan parties, CDC and UDC, were also strongly inclined to identify with Catalonia, and few expressed dual national identities.

**Autonomism and Recognition by the Central State**

I asked the autonomist militants in my questionnaire about their perception of the central state and of the majority nation that generally controls the apparatus of the central state. A significant proportion of autonomist militants expressed negative views of the central state. Another significant proportion of militants expressed neutral views, but very few expressed positive views.

Thirty-six percent of the CDC militants expressed that Spain was a dominating country, an invader, a conqueror by the force of arms, and the like. “A state that does not want to let us be. A state with different nations of which one, the Castillian belligerent, has imposed itself,” commented one militant. Fifty-four percent of CDC militants had a more neutral view opinion: it is an administrative entity, the state. “It is an entity, the sum of diverse nations. Us Catalans we belong there only from an administrative viewpoint.”

Twenty-five percent of UDC respondents expressed that Spain was an imposition, a conquering power, and the like. “Spain is a state with a Jacobin vocation where there coexist different nations, not always in a voluntary fashion,” summarizes well the sentiment of this cluster of respondents. Sixty-one percent of UDC respondents wrote that Spain was the state, in a rather neutral fashion.
Table 1 National identities among autonomists. Responses from CDC/UDC, ADQ, and PPD militants (N=365).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quebec/Catalonia/Puerto Rico is a nation?</th>
<th>PPD (%) (n=197)</th>
<th>CDC/UDC (%) (n=88)</th>
<th>ADQ (%) (n=80)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 (colony)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>16 (distinct society)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National identification</th>
<th>PPD (%) (n=197)</th>
<th>CDC/UDC (%) (n=88)</th>
<th>ADQ (%) (n=80)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only C/PR/Q</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More C/PR/Q than Spanish/Canadian/United States</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally C/PR/Q and Spanish/Canadian/United States</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish/Canadian/United States than C/PR/Q</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Spanish/Canadian/United States</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21 (also European)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural or political nation?</th>
<th>PPD (%) (n=197)</th>
<th>CDC/UDC (%) (n=88)</th>
<th>ADQ (%) (n=80)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only political</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only cultural</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/cultural</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the majority nation (e.g., United States)?</th>
<th>PPD (%) (n=197)</th>
<th>CDC/UDC (%) (n=88)</th>
<th>ADQ (%) (n=80)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My country or nation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state to which I belong as a citizen</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The colonizing state</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ADQ respondents (23.7 percent) expressed rather unsympathetic views of Canada, at times emphasizing the themes of domination and subordination, etc. One militant wrote that “it is an immense territory of which I haven’t visited a tenth part of it, that is inhabited by persons having a culture, a language, a history, that are different from mine. I do not feel particularly close to Canada.” Forty-one percent had neutral views of the Canadian state.

Twenty-eight percent of PPD militants wrote that the United States was the colonizing state that conquered their island in 1898, while 63 percent had a more neutral opinion and wrote that the U.S. was the state to which they belonged as U.S. citizens.

The last section of the questionnaire I distributed among the militants of the autonomist parties (PPD, ADQ, CDC, UDC) asked them to evaluate the relative impact of various factors (using a 10-point scale) on their decision to opt for autonomism as their political orientation. These various factors generally represented cultural, political, and economic considerations. I asked them to sort which of these factors weighed most heavily in their decision to opt for autonomism. I consider only the responses that placed a given factor in the top three deciles in the questionnaire (i.e., 8, 9, or 10 in their response in a 10-point scale). The respondents were provided additional space and additional questions allowing them to explain their answers. Please refer to table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>CDC/UDC (%)</th>
<th>ADQ (%)</th>
<th>PPD (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture, identity, language</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic or industrial development</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal considerations/tax considerations</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union/NAFTA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political structures of Spain/Canada/United States</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish/United States/Canadian centralist nationalism</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past history of minority-majority nation relations</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing demographics of “Hispanics” in the United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percent of responses of militants that indicated this factor was “important” in accounting for their decision to opt for autonomism. “Important” = answered 8, 9, 10 on the 10-point scale in the questionnaire.
The autonomist militants of all four parties indicated in their questionnaire responses and during the focus group interviews that considerations of culture, language, and identity are the primary reason accounting for their choice of political orientation. This is not surprising: as nationalists, identity is a primary consideration. In the case of CDC, UDC, and ADQ, the second most important bloc of factors influencing their choice were political factors. Especially important was the impact of majority-nation centralist nationalism on their decision to opt for autonomism. The second most important political factor was their perception of central state political structures and the likelihood these could accommodate their imagined community. As one CDC militant wrote: “our experience with the Spanish state has shown us that it makes us feel like second-class citizens.” Autonomists have strong negative opinions about the likelihood that the political structures of the central state can accommodate them.

The economic factors, as a bloc, came in third in the case of the Catalans and the Québécois. In the case of the PPD, given that the ELA is a very dependent economic model (on the United States), considerations about economic development came in second, but third was a political factor: the long history of relations between metropole and sub-state national society and the militants’ perception of the role of central state political structures in accommodating their autonomist claims. This reaffirms our point about the importance of political factors in accounting for autonomists’ preferences.

Conclusion: Autonomism and the Federal Idea

The empirical investigation I have conducted into the attitudes and discourse of the militants of four autonomist parties has yielded a rich bounty of data, which we can use to establish the general contours of autonomism as an ideology of territorial order, and to establish autonomism’s relationship with federalism.

Autonomism and Dual National Identities

Autonomism is one of the varieties of minority-nation nationalism. Federalism in multinational democracies thrives where there are dual national identities or dual identification with the two levels of government (Keating 2004; Moreno 2001; Riker 1964). Autonomists have a strong sense of identification with their sub-state national society as their nation, and although some do have dual national identities, most autonomist militants do not. This is one of autonomism’s anti-federalist stances.

Autonomism and Federation

Autonomists reject a model of federation because they believe that federations generally lead to the homogenization of all the constituent units. This is
autonomism’s most characteristic anti-federalist stance. They therefore advocate a third way between federation and independence, given that models of autonomism may be more flexible and adaptable to the needs of their sub-state national society.

**Autonomism and Secessionism**

Most autonomists are nationalists. However, most mainstream autonomists reject the independence alternative, and wish to work within existing state structures. Moreover, for some autonomists, independence and sovereignty are distinct categories. Autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government within existing state structures. In this sense, autonomism partakes of one key element of the federal idea: autonomism subscribes to the general federalist principle that advocates multiple levels of government within the same state. There may be presently existing juridical or political barriers that impede the expansion of their sphere of self-government within existing state structures. Autonomism’s challenge is to find mechanisms, processes, and institutional openings that will overcome such obstacles, within extant state structures.

**Autonomism and Recognition by the Central State**

Federalism requires trust and reciprocity between the federal government and the subunit governments. Federalism also flourishes where one can establish a sense of federal loyalty, Bundestreue or loyauté fédérale, which is more than the moral commitment to work together in a federal polity. It is the willingness to compromise, reciprocate, and work with one’s federal partners (Griffiths et al. 2005). My findings show, however, that autonomist militants have little trust in the institutions of the central state and are pessimistic about the prospects for accommodation by the central state. This is the most profound of autonomism’s anti-federalist stances.

**Conclusion**

We have analyzed the attitudes and discourse of the militants and leaders of autonomist parties in a nonfederalist autonomy that belongs to a symmetrical and centralized federation (United States), in a constituent unit of a relatively decentralized federation with elements of asymmetry (Canada), and in a semi-federalist autonomy that is part of an asymmetric federal political system (Spain). Autonomism is a powerful force in a wide variety of institutional contexts in the contemporary world. The autonomist imaginary challenges mainstream conceptions of the nation-state, sovereignty, and citizenship. Autonomism is a normative term that recommends the adoption of autonomist principles, and opts for territorial autonomy as the ideal institutional framework for accommodating national diversity. Actually existing autonomies in the contemporary scene embody
both federalist and nonfederalist elements in their institutional design, and range from nonfederal autonomies to semi-federal ones. Autonomism shares some of the normative aspirations of federalism, but is generally distinct from it. Autonomists are wary of federalism because they believe it has homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies. Thus, a model of classic federation is not agreeable to autonomist parties. Autonomists also generally find that federations with elements of asymmetry are also incongruent with their political program. Yet, autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government within existing state structures, and thus autonomists adopt elements of the federal idea, given that they are advocates of special status arrangements, which are models of multilevel government within the same state. Moreover, autonomists may be supporters of asymmetry within a broadly-understood “federal political system,” but not in a classic federation.

The virtues of autonomism are its hybridity, malleability, and multiplicity. My empirical findings show that autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design exhibits a number of clear anti-federalist stances, but yet it is based on the general federalist principle that multiple levels of government can lead to better governance within the same state, combining elements of shared-rule with partial territorial self-rule. To this complex anti-federalist and federalist hybrid stance, autonomism adds a nuanced anti-secessionism stance. Its anti-federalist stance has four basic components: diminished predominance of dual national identities, rejection of federation’s homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies, negative perception of the possibilities for recognition and accommodation by the central structures of the state, and (in some cases) willingness to trade the value of meaningful influence on the center for the perception of more autonomy. Autonomism succeeds as an ideology of territorial order because of its hybridity and multiplicity: it can perfectly balance its anti-federalist stances with its grounding in the federalist principle of multiple levels of government within the same state apparatus, complemented by its anti-secessionism stance.

Notes

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1. Although a number of scholars are critics of a model of federation (Hale 2004; Treisman 2007; Roeder 1991), and others recognize its possible benefits but are wary of some of its features (Horowitz 2007).
2. I am interested in territorial autonomy, not in cultural nonterritorial autonomy. All of the sub-state societies I am interested in are territorially concentrated.

3. Samples of the questionnaires used in my fieldwork can be found in an online Appendix available at: http://publius.oxfordjournals.org

4. Personal interview with Eric Duhaime, June 10, 2005, at the National Assembly, Quebec City.

5. Contemporary instances of actually existing autonomist relationships include: Åland Islands/Finland, South Tyrol/Italy, Faroe Islands/Denmark, etc. (Suksi 1998; Lapidoth 1997; McGarry 2002).

6. Puerto Rico is a nonfederal autonomy, which is officially an unincorporated territory belonging to the federal political system that is the U.S. state, and subject to the plenary powers of the U.S. Congress under the Territorial Clause of the United States. It is not a “free-associated” state (Keating 2009; Benedikter 2007).


11. CiU is a federation of two parties (CDC and UDC).


17. See also Lluch, 2011.

18. In a survey at the XI National Congress of CDC held in 2000 at Cornellà de Llobregat, the delegates at the Congress responded that 66 percent were only catalan, and 26 percent more catalan than Spanish, and 4 percent equally Spanish and Catalan (Baras i Gómez 2004).

19. Since 1990, federal government transfer benefits have provided 25–28 percent of Puerto Ricans’ incomes in the nonfederalist autonomy of Puerto Rico, which is about twice the equivalent percentage in the continental United States. “Living standards in Puerto Rico are farther from the U.S. average today than they were in 1970, and per capita income is only about half that of the poorest state” (Collins et al. 2006).

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