

EUI Working Papers

MAX WEBER
PROGRAMME

MWP 2009/02

National Identity and Political Identity:
Resolving the Stateless Nationalists' Dilemma

Jaime Lluch

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
MAX WEBER PROGRAMME

***National Identity and Political Identity:
Resolving the Stateless Nationalists' Dilemma***

JAIME LLUCH

EUI Working Paper **MWP** 2009/02

This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher.

The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Max Weber Programme of the EUI if the paper is to be published elsewhere, and should also assume responsibility for any consequent obligation(s).

ISSN 1830-7728

© 2009 Jaime Lluch

Printed in Italy
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
www.eui.eu

Abstract

The internal political tendencies making up national movements tend to bifurcate or, at times, trifurcate, into two or three basic nationalist orientations: independentist nationalism, autonomist nationalism, and federalist nationalism.

Stateless nationalists therefore face a fundamental political dilemma. While all nationalists pursue nation-affirming and nation-building goals, they have three fundamental political identities to choose from. The general expectation is that a nationalist would seek to align her nation with a state, but in the contemporary world, we find many nationalists who do not seek their own state, and instead seek an autonomous special status or the status of a constituent unit within a federation.

This article seeks to explain how nationalists go about resolving their fundamental political dilemma.

Rejecting deterministic accounts of nationalism, this article argues that stateless nationalists are distinguished by having concentric political identities: they have a political identity that reflects their sense of national identity and belonging, and they have another that reflects their preferred political/constitutional orientation vis-à-vis the central state.

The argument evinces the importance of political factors in explaining how stateless nations' nationalists resolve their dilemma. My argument points us towards a revalorization of the primacy of political factors in understanding the origins of the contemporary internal variation in the political and constitutional orientation of stateless nations' national movements. Nationalists adopt these various orientations as part of an overarching political strategy, in the course of performing a balancing act between economic, political, and cultural factors.

Keywords

Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Nationalists; Independence; Autonomy; Federalism

Internal Variation in Stateless Nations' National Movements

In the political party systems of sub-state national societies¹, there is a recurring empirical pattern. The internal political tendencies (i.e., nationalist parties) making up national movements² tend to bifurcate or, at times, trifurcate, into two or three basic political orientations: independence, autonomy, and, oftentimes, federalism. Obviously, independentists and some stripes of autonomists pose a challenge to the stability and territorial integrity of the central state. On the other hand, federalists rarely pose a challenge to the continuity and territorial integrity of the central state. An interesting political puzzle emerges: why do some nationalists refuse to see independence as a desirable option, preferring to opt for non-secessionist political models? After all, the general expectation is that a nationalist would seek to align her nation with a state, but in the contemporary world we find many nationalists who do not seek their own state, and instead seek an autonomous special status or their objective is to become a constituent unit within a classic federation.

Therefore, stateless nationalists face a fundamental political dilemma. While all nationalists pursue nation-affirming and nation-building goals, they have three fundamental political identities to choose from: independentist,³ autonomist,⁴ or federalist.⁵ Stateless nationalists exhibit concentric political identities: they have a sense of national identity and belonging in common, but they find themselves divided into different camps because of their different visions of the political/constitutional future of their sub-state national society. How do nationalists go about resolving their fundamental political dilemma? How do they choose among these political/constitutional orientations?

¹ In general, "sub-state national societies" are historically settled, territorially concentrated, and previously self-governing societies with distinctive socio-linguistic traits whose territory has become incorporated into a larger state. The incorporation of such societies has in some cases been through imperial domination and colonization, military conquest, or the cession of the territory by an imperial metropolis, but in some cases reflect a voluntary pact of association (Kymlicka 1995).¹ These are also known as "stateless nations," "internal nations," or "national minorities." I prefer to use the term "stateless nation", given that, as Michael Keating writes, the term "national minority" more often refers to a "people within a state whose primary reference point is a nation situated elsewhere" (Keating 2001: x) (Brubaker 1997: 57). Some stateless nation nationalists, moreover, would even object to being considered a "minority" within another nation, even if it is a "national" one. Examples of stateless nationhood include: Scotland, Quebec, and the Basque Country.

² I use here the terminology of Miroslav Hroch, who refers to "national movements" as organized endeavors to achieve all the attributes of a fully-fledged nation. National movements tend to pursue three aims: (1) the development of a national culture, based on the native language; (2) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration (autonomy or independence); and (3) the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group (Hroch 1993: 6) (Hroch 1994:4).

³ Independence is the realization of full political sovereignty for a nation. For stateless nations, it is the attainment of separate statehood, completely independent from the majority nation with which they have coexisted within the same state for some time. Also, proposals for Sovereignty-Association and Associated Statehood are variants of the independence option.

⁴ Autonomy proposals are political arrangements that generally renounce independence -- at least for the medium- to short-term -- but which seek to promote the self- government, self administration, and cultural identity of a territorial unit populated by a polity with national characteristics. The cases of autonomy vary widely and no single description will be applicable to all such situations. Contemporary instances of actually-existing autonomy relationships include: Åland Islands/Finland, Alto Adige/Italy, Faroe Islands/Denmark, Greenland/Denmark, Puerto Rico/USA. Most cases of actually-existing autonomy arrangements can be clearly distinguished from classic *federations*. Classic federations, where all the constituent units have substantially equal powers, may not be sufficiently sensitive to the particular cultural, economic, institutional, and linguistic needs of a sub-state national society, which require a greater degree of self-government (Ghai 2000: 8). Generally speaking, moreover, "autonomy is always a fragmented order, whereas a constituent...[unit of a federation] is always part of a whole...The ties in a...[federation] are always stronger than those in an autonomy" (Suksi (ed.) 1998: 25).

⁵ Federalists seek to have their nation become a constituent unit of classic *federations*, which constitute a particular species within the genus of "federal political systems," wherein neither the federal nor the constituent units' governments (cantons, provinces, *länder*, etc.) are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e., each has sovereign powers derived directly from the constitution rather than any other level of government, each is given the power to relate directly with its citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive and taxing competences, and each is elected directly by its citizens.

Political Identity and Existing Theories of Nationalism

Theories of nationalism have tended to overemphasize structure over agency (Beissinger 2002: 451). This perspective is unsatisfying. First, it relies on a deterministic view of causation, which even in the natural sciences, is no longer the reigning paradigm. It misses the element of contingency in political life, and the interdependency of human actions within and across spatial contexts. “The interdependence of human activity across time and space presents a problem for deterministic, linear, or atemporal explanations of political and social phenomena” (Beissinger 2002: 453). The approach taken here will underscore the role of agency in nationalism, focusing on the actual discourse, attitudes, and beliefs of the nationalists of various stripes, and how these mold the shape of the national movement, which is the sum total of the efforts of nationalists of all varieties.

Political identity has been defined as the “collective label for a set of characteristics by which persons are recognized by political actors as members of a political group...There are many sources of such recognition, such as...nation-state membership, ethnicity, economic status, language...All these possible sources are only political identities when political actors treat them as such” (Rogers M. Smith 2004: 302).⁶ Stateless nationalists are distinguished by having concentric political identities: they have a political identity that reflects their sense of national identity and belonging, and they have another that reflects their preferred political/constitutional orientation vis-à-vis the central state. Stateless nationalists have a sense of national identity and belonging in common, but they are in disagreement due to their diverging visions of the political/constitutional future of their sub-state national society.

All too often, scholars studying political identity have failed to advance explicitly political accounts of such forms of identity (Smith 2004: 303). This article seeks to redress this imbalance, and I present an analysis of the concentric political identities of stateless nationalists using “richly interpretive methods that involve discursively grasping the consciousnesses and senses of value and meaning that identities give to people.” (305) As Smith writes, formal models, ahistorical behavioralism, and statistical analyses are bound to be less useful in studying the political identity of nationalists, given that “abstract connotations of identity preferences cannot go very far in helping us comprehend the substantive appeal and normative significance of particular identities...” (305) We are more likely to advance our knowledge further in this area using other tools from our methodological tool-kit, such as, for example, “interpretive textual analyses; ethnographic fieldwork; biographical studies; in-depth interviews, individual and comparative case studies, both historical and contemporary; participant observation research; narrative historical institutional analyses, and other methods rather crudely termed ‘qualitative’” (305).

In order to understand the concentric political identities of stateless nationalists, we must center our analysis on the actual discourse, attitudes, and beliefs of the nationalists of various stripes.

National Movements and National Parties

I am interested in stateless nations’ national movements, located within or belonging to states with a high level of socio-economic development, with long-standing liberal democratic regimes (25 year minimum duration), where the minority nation-majority nation relationship has lasted for at least one century, and where the principal cause for the differential between majority and minority nations is language, culture, history, and institutions, as opposed to race or religion. The universe of cases included within my scope conditions is detailed in Table 1 (Mahoney and Goertz 2004: 660).

Importantly, in most of these cases of stateless nationhood/peripheral nationalism, there are two or three major national parties⁷, one being pro-independence (or genuine free-association) and the others being pro-autonomy or pro-federation, as shown by Table 1.

⁶ Courtney Jung writes that political identity is that aspect of a person’s identity that manifests itself in, and relevant to, political action (Jung 2000: 22).

⁷ A “national party” is one that assumes the existence of a political nation and identifies with it. Such parties may not be necessarily independentist. In fact, a national party may be either independentist, autonomist, or federalist in its political orientation (Caminal 1998: 49). All national parties insist on the political sovereignty of the party, at the state- as well as at the sub-state level. In Catalunya, for example, Miquel Caminal, in his study of national parties and nationalism, has written

Nation	Pro-Independence Parties	Pro-Autonomy Parties	Pro-Federation Parties
Catalonia	Esquerra Republicana De Catalunya	CDC UDC	PSC IC-V
Quebec	Parti Quebecois	ADQ	PLQ
Galicia	BNG		PSG
Flanders	Vlaams Blok	Christen Democ Liberals	Flemish Socialist
Corsica	Corsica Nazione	Unione Naziunale	
Scotland	SNP	Labour	
Euskadi	PNV-EA		Ezker Batua
Wales	Plaid Cymru	Welsh Labour	
Puerto Rico	PIP	PPD	PNP

Table 1. Within-Case Variation in National Movements

Of the universe of cases presented in Table 1, I have chosen to study the national movements of Quebec and Catalunya because these two stateless nations share similar sociocultural, political, and economic backgrounds.⁸ Specifically, they share the following important similarities: (1) these nations are examples of stateless nationhood, (2) they promote a form of peripheral nationalism, (3) all of the parties I am studying in these two cases are nationalist in the sense that they affirm and defend the existence of their nation as a foundational commitment, (4) all the nationalists are currently split up into three political orientations (independence vs. autonomy vs. federalism), (5) within the political party systems of these two nations, the identity axis often predominates over the left-right axis, (6) Quebec and Catalunya are comparable in socio-economic terms and levels of development, (7) Quebec and Catalunya are comparable in terms of their relative economic importance and demographic weight within their respective states (Canada and Spain), (8) both the Quebecois and Catalan national movements promote at present a civic form of nationalism, renounce to the use of violence to promote their goals, and emphasize the importance of the democratic process.

Both societies emerged out of a period of quiescence in their national movements in the last third of the 20th century. In 1976, the PQ won its first elections in Quebec, initiating a new political age. Also, in 1976 the national movement in Catalunya began a period of democratic normalcy. In sum, both societies were in the same stage of development of their national movements during the 1976-2005 period.

Scholars who have studied the Québec case extensively seem to agree that all of the political parties that are present in the province's National Assembly are "nationalist." Both francophone and

(Contd.) _____

that all of the parties (except the *Partido Popular de Catalunya*) in that nation are "national parties," fundamentally committed to catalanism, and they all share in the affirmation and defense of Catalunya as a nation. (162)

⁸ The comparability of Québec and Catalunya has been previously noted by other academic analysts. For example, at a conference held in May 1985 dedicated to the comparison of these two nations, jointly sponsored by the *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* and the *Université du Québec à Montréal*, it was noted that the Québec case offered one of the most appropriate and interesting political situations for comparative research with Catalunya (Manuel Pares and Gaetan Tremblay 1988: 9).

anglophone political scientists agree on this point. On the francophone side, Alain Gagnon has written: “Quebec’s competing minority nationalism,... is represented across the board by all the political parties in Quebec’s National Assembly, and singlehandedly by the Bloc Québécois in Ottawa...” (Gagnon, Guibernau, and Rocher 2003: 298). Politicians such as Bernard Landry, former prime minister of Quebec and chef du parti of the PQ when I interviewed him, confirm this. Landry said that “all the political parties in Quebec are nationalist. This is why it is called the National Assembly... Well, there is a consensus in our society about the national fact but some think that we can exist within Canada and some do not.”⁹ On the anglophone side, Hudson Meadwell has written: “Nationalism dominates Québec politics. Indeed, since the formation of the Parti québécois (PQ) in 1968, one single question has increasingly defined political discussion and action: how much decentralization should govern relations between Québec and Canada? Unlike most other cases in which movements have produced a single ethnoregional party (for example Scotland, Wales, and Brittany), both the provincial Liberals and the Parti québécois are nationalist parties that differ fundamentally on how much decentralization is desirable. This is a luxury that other movements do not often enjoy” (Meadwell 1993: 203-4). Paul Hamilton, writing about Québec, in comparison with Scotland and Wales, also agrees. “As in Scotland, all of Québec’s political parties are nationalist, albeit with different visions of Québec’s relationship with the Canadian federation” (Hamilton 2004: 666). In Catalunya, Miquel Caminal, in his study of national parties and nationalism, has written that all of the parties (except the *Partido Popular de Catalunya*) in that society are “national parties,” fundamentally committed to catalanism, and they all share in the affirmation and defense of Catalunya as a nation (Caminal 1998: 162).

The Tripartite Taxonomy, National Parties, and Nationalists

I have studied the leaders and militants of the eight national parties of both nations. In Québec, they are: the *Parti Québécois* (PQ), the *Parti Libéral du Québec* (PLQ), and the *Action Démocratique du Québec* (ADQ). In Catalunya they are: *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC), the federation of *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) -- consisting of *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC) and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (UDC) -- the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC), and *Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds* (IC-V).¹⁰

The national movements at issue are trifurcated into independentists (ERC and PQ), autonomists (CDC/UDC and ADQ), and federalists (PSC, IC-V, and PLQ). I wish to finesse this taxonomy and to highlight the further refinements that arise in it as a result of our examination of the pro-autonomy and pro-federation parties.

The PQ was founded in 1968 and ERC de facto re-founded in 1989 as independentist parties. The *Action Démocratique du Québec* (ADQ) was founded in 1994, when the more nationalist wing of the PLQ, which subscribed to the proposal embodied in the Allaire Report of January 1991, left the PLQ. The ADQ was part of the coalition in favor of the pro-sovereignty option in the 1995 Referendum. After the pro-independence option lost, the party has developed with more consistency its autonomist political program.

In regards to *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC) and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (UDC) (officially federated together since 2001), it should be noted that their position statements that have the most sovereigntist tone are all internal documents of these parties, typically

⁹ Personal interview with Bernard Landry, May 25, 2005, at the National Assembly in Quebec City.

¹⁰ I have conducted 42 interviews with top-level leaders of each of these parties. Also, I conducted 15 focus group interviews with base-level militants of each of these parties. In some cases, I made direct contact with the militants, and in other cases, the party referred me to the contact persons. The focus group interviews were conducted in French and Catalan. In all cases, I made the arrangements for the focus group interviews myself. I distributed a questionnaire among the militants of these parties, and received their responses directly. This questionnaire was qualitative and open-ended in nature, designed to let me understand what they thought about their motivations, their ideology, the national movement, their party, and their political orientation. In total, I received 370 answered questionnaires. Two techniques were used to distribute the questionnaire. Whenever possible, I went to party congresses or assemblies and, with the permission and cooperation of the party, I distributed my questionnaire in person and received the responses the same day directly from the militants. In other cases, the party distributed the questionnaire by email to an email list of their militants. I also interviewed 18 academics.

produced at their National Congresses, and mostly for the consumption of their militants. Furthermore, it is important to note that CDC and UDC present themselves to elections within the federation of CiU, and the public face of the federation is even more decidedly autonomist in its orientation than the individual positions of the two parties in their internal documents and position statements. The recent electoral programs of CiU are clearly autonomist in their political orientation. I concur with Aguilera de Prat, who writes that CiU cultivates a studied ambiguity and often evades clear definitions, but, in the end, it is an autonomist formation, although it reserves the right to make rhetorical references full of sovereigntist flourishes (Aguilera de Prat 2002: 254). In any case, CiU has repeatedly stated that its project of nation-building can be plainly accommodated within Spain, and, hence, its strategy is not independentist, preferring to orient itself toward the construction of a plurinational Spain. Thus, its strategy is useful for both Spain and Catalunya (256). CiU is a nationalist formation more in an ontological sense, and it maintains its non-separatist stance (Guibernau 2004: 151) (Culla 2001: 159). In sum, CiU is a nationalist, yet autonomic, federation that proposes an asymmetric autonomism, without renouncing to a certain dose of supplemental sovereigntist rhetoric (308).

Within the category of autonomist parties, important sub-categories exist. One of the key distinctions that should be made among autonomist parties is whether they are instrumental or teleological autonomists. *Instrumental* autonomist parties tend to see autonomy as a valuable vehicle for achieving their self-determination objectives, but in the long run they also consider autonomy as a way station, as a stepping stone towards some other political alternative, closer to the ideal of sovereignty. *Teleological* autonomist parties, in contrast, tend to see autonomy itself as the end result of their political quest, and, even if they may make rhetorical appeals to sovereignty, they ultimately settle for autonomy as an end in itself. A good exemplar of a teleological autonomist party is the *Partido Popular Democrático* in Puerto Rico. Both CDC and UDC are instrumental autonomist parties.

The *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC) was founded in July, 1978. In the 2nd Congress of the PSC, held on July 4-6, 1980, the party's Position Statement declared it was the heir of the contributions of the federalist movement and the workers' movement.

Within the category of federalist national parties, one must distinguish between traditional federalist parties like the PSC and *instrumental* federalist parties like *Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds* (IC-V). The PSC is a more traditional federalist national party than IC-V. The party does not invoke the right to self-determination as frequently as the other national parties of the principate. It is more likely to invoke dual identities than the other national parties in the principate. Very few or none of its militants express sympathy towards the pro-sovereignty cause, as is the case with IC-V. The PSC's values and proposals seem to be closer to a relatively traditional conception of federalism, than to a radically asymmetric one.

In its electoral program for the election to the Catalan Parliament of 2003, *Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds* (IC-V) stated that "to reach the full recognition of the national rights of Catalunya, while maintaining the links of solidarity and fraternity with the rest of the peoples that compose the Spanish state, it is necessary to search for innovative formulas that will adapt themselves to the plural composition of the State. Plurinational federalism can tie together the differential recognition of the nations that compose the State and the co-responsibility for the management of the common affairs, as a base for a federal pact" (202).

IC-V is a party that originated in 1987 from the fusion between the PSUC, the old eurocommunist Catalan party, and the *Entesa dels Nacionalistes d'Esquerra*, an independentist extra-parliamentary party. The party in its programmatic statements makes reference to the right to self-determination. A significant portion of its militancy declares itself confederalist. Its leaders do not seem to reject independence if it were realized one day, even though they advocate a form of asymmetric federalism. It is an "instrumental federalist" party located on the asymmetric federalism end of the continuum of federalist national parties.

The PLQ is the oldest established party in Quebec, and the latest official position of the party on the constitutional question is found in the Final Report of the Special Committee of the PLQ on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec society, published in October 2001 (known as the Benoît

Pelletier Report). The party is still putting forward proposals for renewing Canadian federalism, but certainly less decentralizing than what, say, the ADQ or IC-V propose.

I have sought to draw a composite portrait of the attitudes and opinions of the members of these eight parties by conducting in-depth interviews with the top level leadership of these parties, and also by doing focus group interviews with the base-level militants of these parties and obtaining direct questionnaire responses from them. Through these interviews and questionnaires, I sought to understand how these nationalists think, their motivations, their ideology, their views on nation and identity, how they view their party's place in the national movement, how they see the other components of the national movement, how they define their political orientation, and what factors explain their orientation. In other contexts, one may be concerned about the political or situational bias or unreliability of one's interviewees (Jones-Luong 2002: 21). In the multinational liberal democracies where I have developed my work, the risk of bias is minimal. I set out to interview leaders and militants who were articulate and prototypical exponents of their political/constitutional orientation (independence, autonomy, or federalism).

I was successful in interviewing the individuals who were the best exponents of their political orientation. I achieved this by selecting my interviewees according to the orientation of the political party they militated in, by interviewing key figures in the recent political history of these societies, by conducting focus group interviews with randomly chosen groups of militants from various neighbourhoods, and by attending key party congresses and assemblies where the most militant activists could be found.

According to modernists, nationalism is an elite-driven phenomenon, while ethnosymbolists, perennialists, and primordialists would point to the importance of widely held sentiments among the masses of nationalist activists. I have therefore sampled both upper echelon party leaders and base-level militants who do not have positions of leadership within the national parties. This two-fold approach provides us a view of nationalism from below and from above, allowing me to cross-check the responses from elites and militants and to present a cross-strata portrait of the nationalists' discourse.

National Identity and the Discourse of Stateless Nationalists

Independentists, autonomists, and federalists all have a strong sense of national identification with their sub-state national society, and this can be demonstrated empirically.

Independentist Nationalists and their National Identity

The militants of the PQ and ERC are strongly nationalist in their discourse.¹¹ Pere Aragones, for example, the leader of ERC's youth wing (JERC) when I interviewed him, expressed the following in response to my question about how the nation was defined by Catalans: "It goes beyond the language and the culture. In ample sense, it is not only culture, it is the way of doing things and an economic mode, a set of values. It is all this ensemble of elements that define what is a nation in other countries as well. A key element here...[though] is the language, which is a symbol of our identity."¹² As Tables 2 and 3 show below, the militants of the PQ and ERC are unambiguously nationalist, consonant with their independentist orientation. The militants from these two parties are virtually indistinguishable in their degree of nationalist sentiment, except that ERC militants expressed slightly more unfavorable views of Spain, than PQ militants of Canada.

¹¹ I would argue that a militant is a nationalist if she fulfills the four criteria that follow: (1) identifies her stateless society as a nation, (2) reflects this choice in her answer to a question about the nature of the majority nation, (3) professes a strong national identification with her stateless society, even if accompanied by a weak form of dual identity, and/or (4) affirms directly that she is a nationalist.

¹² Personal interview with Pere Aragones, October 26, 2004, at JERC headquarters, Carrer Canuda, Barcelona.

Quebec is a Nation?	National Identification	Identifies as a Nationalist?	Cultural ¹³ or Political ¹⁴ nation?	Opinion of the Central state
Yes-99%	Only Quebecois-95%	Yes- 95%	Political- 91%	Negative- 51%
Other- 1%	More Quebecois Than Canadian- 3%	Other- 3%	Political and Cultural- 9%	Neutral- 28%
	French-Canadian 2%			Positive- 21%

Table 2. Who is a nationalist? PQ Militants' Responses (N=77)

Catalunya is a Nation?	National Identification	Identifies as a Nationalist?	Cultural or Political nation?	Opinion of the Central state
Yes- 100%	Only Catalan- 100%	Yes- 83%	Political- 95%	Negative- 80%
Other- 1%	Also European- 43%	Other- Catala- nist 17%	Political and Cultural- 5%	Neutral- 20%
				Positive- 0%

Table 3. Who is a nationalist? ERC Militants' Responses (N=40)

Autonomist Nationalists and their National Identity

Carme Vidal was vice-secretary of CDC for welfare, identity and culture when I interviewed her, and became a member of Parliament. During the course of my interview with her, she discussed her views on the nation and identity: "I would never ask a Spaniard not to look out for the interests of her language and culture, etc., but I ask the same for my own language and culture...What I don't understand is why a Spaniard does not respect my will to be, which can't be that of a Spaniard, because we have a different language, our own imagery as a people, and our culture is different."¹⁵

Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida is the President of UDC, and with Artur Mas of CDC, part of the top leadership that currently leads CiU. During the course of my interview with him, he explained his party's views on nation and identity. He said: "What is a nation? It is a natural community that in our judgment has a language in common, a set of rights in common, and above everything else that has a will to be, and that will to be is configured by persons. For us there is no nation if there aren't people. Therefore our nationalism is personalist...[Moreover] our nationalism is profoundly cultural. There are national movements in the world that are based on ethnic or religious proposals, [but not ours...]"¹⁶

As Tables 4-6 show below, the militants of the ADQ strongly identified Québec as a nation or as a distinct society and their own party as a nationalist party. Compared to the independentist parties, however, they were less inclined to identify their nation as a political nation. Most were inclined to identify strongly with Quebec, but they were less monolithic than the independentists in their self-identification, given that some were willing to express a dual identity. But, still the number of ADQ militants expressing a strong Quebecois identity were a majority. The militant base of the two Catalan parties, CDC and UDC (joined together within CiU), were strongly nationalist in their responses, on all the criteria. In essence, their responses are virtually indistinguishable from the independentists' responses. In fact, many of them identify as unorthodox independentists. In addition, I would argue that the difference in terms of national self-identification between autonomists and independentists is

¹³ Defined as one presenting the distinctive traits of a people, like customs, language, or culture.

¹⁴ Defined as one presenting a political will combined with a national consciousness.

¹⁵ Personal interview with Carme Vidal, October 4, 2004, at CDC headquarters.

¹⁶ Personal interview with Josep A. Duran i Lleida, December 2, 2004, at UDC headquarters, Barcelona.

negligible or small, and, thus, the difference in political orientation between these nationalists cannot be explained by reference to a simplistic, deterministic argument about the correlation between self-identification and choice of political orientation. Most autonomists, in sum, are not any less nationalist than most independentists. That is, most autonomists are nationalists, but they reject the secessionist alternative.

Catalunya is a Nation?	National Identification	Identifies as a Nationalist?	Cultural or Political nation?	Opinion of the Central state
Yes- 100%	Only Catalan- 100%	Yes- 99%	Political- 36%	Negative- 36%
	Also European- 29.5%	Other- Catala- nist 1%	Political and Cultural- 52%	Neutral- 54.5%
			Cultural- 4.5%	Positive- 9%

Table 4. Who is a nationalist? CDC Militants' Responses (N=44)

Catalunya is a Nation?	National Identification	Identifies as a Nationalist?	Cultural or Political nation?	Opinion of the Central state
Yes- 100%	Only Catalan- 56.8%	Yes- 83%	Political- 22.7%	Negative- 25%
	More Catalan than Spanish 31.8%	Other- Catala- nist 15.9%	Political and Cultural- 68%	Neutral- 61%
	Also identified As European 11%		Cultural- 6.8%	Positive- 13%

Table 5. Who is a nationalist? UDC Militants' Responses (N=44)

Quebec is a Nation?	National Identification	Identifies as a Nationalist?	Cultural or Political nation?	Opinion of the Central state
Yes-68%	Only Quebecois- 15%	Yes- 68.7%	Political- 22.5%	Negative- 23.7%
Other-Distinct Society 16%	More Quebecois Than Canadian- 37.5%	Other- 22%	Political and Cultural- 20%	Neutral- 41%
No- 18%	Equally Quebecois & Canadian 23.7%		Cultural- 53.7%	
	More Canadian than Quebecois 5%			Positive- 32.5%
	Only Canadian- 2.5%			

Table 6. Who is a nationalist? ADQ Militants' Responses (N=80)

Federalist Nationalists and their National Identity

Benoît Pelletier was the Minister responsible for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs and one of the most prominent members of the PLQ government of premier Jean Charest when I interviewed him. He explained: "First of all I think there is no doubt that Quebec is a nation by itself, and the question is whether the PLQ agrees with that principle, and the answer is yes. We believe Quebec is a nation. Second, how do we define a nationalist in Quebec? We define nationalist as someone who

agrees with the fact that Quebec is a nation and who wants the blossoming of that nation. Of course, there are different ways to make that nation blossom. One of the ways is full sovereignty which is what the PQ is promoting, blossoming through state sovereignty. In our case we are promoting the blossoming of Quebec as a nation through its adhesion to the Canadian federal system. So, I would describe myself as being a nationalist federalist. And the supporters of the PQ would be nationalist sovereigntists. [Being a nationalist] is not pejorative here. It is something that is seen as a very legitimate option. Being a nationalist here is someone who is very sensitive to, I would say, the strengthening of Quebec as a political entity...Now is the PLQ a nationalist party? I think it is. Is it a party that accepts all the dimensions of Quebec identity? The answer is yes.”¹⁷

Jaume Bosch, the vice-president of IC-V, explained the nature of his party as follows: “We define ourselves as a national party, which is a meaningful self-definition. Within IC-V there are militants that define themselves as nationalists, even as independentists, and there are others that are federalists. We as a party have elected to call ourselves a national party because Catalunya is a nation and we are a sovereign party. We define ourselves as catalanists and with respect to nationalism, we don’t reject it. After all one of our founding organizations was Entesa, [an independentist formation]...CiU has overused the theme of nationalism and we believe it is better to define ourselves as a national party. In colloquial terms, to define ourselves as nationalists does not make us uncomfortable, but we believe the term “national party” describes us better.”¹⁸

As Tables 7-9 show, the militants of the PSC and IC-V overwhelmingly identified their society as a nation, and their parties as catalanist-nationalist formations. The IC-V militants strongly identified with Catalunya, and the PSC ones slightly less so. Of all the party militants examined here, the PLQ militants expressed the weakest national identification, even though an overwhelming number of them identified their society as a nation or a distinct society and their own party as a nationalist party. However, the party itself and its leadership, from the Jean Lesage years to the current Charest-Pelletier leadership, has inserted itself into the arena of national politics in Quebec. They have articulated a discourse and an official party line that is most definitely national in its tone and character. Moreover, I am certain that the other federalist parties studied here, the PSC and IC-V, are national parties, with the majority of the militants in these parties strongly identifying as nationalist/catalanist. In addition, the responses of the majority of IC-V militants show that federalists can have a strong sense of minority nation national identification, which is not significantly different from the degree of national identification expressed by militants in the autonomist and independentist parties.

Quebec is a Nation?	National Identification	Identifies as a Nationalist?	Cultural or Political nation?	Opinion of the Central state
Yes-61%	Only Quebecois-0%	Yes- 66%	Political- 11%	Negative- 0%
Other-Distinct Society 16.6%	More Quebecois Than Canadian-0%	Other- 33%	Political and Cultural- 16%	Neutral- 50%
No- 22%	Equally Quebecois & Canadian 98%		Cultural- 66%	
	More Canadian than Quebecois 5%			Positive- 50%
	Only Canadian-2%			

Table 7. Who is a nationalist? PLQ Militants’ Responses (N= 18)

¹⁷ Personal interview with Benoît Pelletier, June 9, 2005, at the National Assembly, in Quebec City.

¹⁸ Personal interview with Jaume Bosch, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters, Carrer Ciutat, Barcelona.

Catalunya is a Nation?	National Identification	Identifies as a Nationalist?	Cultural or Political nation?	Opinion of the Central state
Yes- 88.5%	Only Catalan- 0%	Yes- 68.7%	Political- 37%	Negative- 0%
Other- 3%	More Catalan than Spanish- 42.8%	No- 22%	Political and Cultural- 28.5%	Neutral- 82.8%
	Equally Catalan as Spanish- 42.8%		Cultural- 21%	Positive- 17%
	More Spanish than Catalan- 8.5%		None- 8.5%	
	Only European-17%			
	Dual identity w/o Preference- 5.2%			

Table 8. Who is a nationalist? PSC Militants' Responses (N=35)

Catalunya is a Nation?	National Identification	Identifies as a Nationalist?	Cultural or Political nation?	Opinion of the Central state
Yes- 97%	Only Catalan- 32.3%	Yes- 17.5%	Political- 23.5%	Negative- 29%
Other- 3%	More Catalan than Spanish- 38.2%	Catalanist/ Nationalist- 26.4%	Political and Cultural- 64.7%	Neutral- 58.8%
	Equally Catalan as Spanish- 20.5%	Catalanist 44%	Cultural- 8%	Positive- 11%
	Other- 8%	Non-nationalist 2.9%		
		Other- 11.7%		

Table 9. Who is a nationalist? IC-V Militants' Responses (N=35)

The evidence shows that the difference in political orientation between these nationalists cannot be explained by reference to a deterministic argument about the correlation between self-identification and choice of political orientation. Most autonomists, in sum, are not any less nationalist than most independentists. The same is true for a federalist formation like the IC-V, vis-à-vis independentists or autonomists. Moreover, most militants of traditional federalist parties (PSC and PLQ) have the discourse and attitudes that is typical of militants of “national” parties.

Political Identities and the Stateless Nationalists' Dilemma

I have shown that independentists, autonomists, and most federalists all have a sense of national identity and belonging in common. How then do nationalists go about resolving their fundamental political dilemma, given that -- as nationalists -- they must choose among three political orientations?

Independentist Nationalists and their Political Identity

As Pere Aragones, the ex-president of the youth wing of ERC and now a member of the Catalan Parliament, explains his rejection of federalism: “I believe it is impossible for Spain to become a federal state because all federal states tend to be of two types: either they are homogenous in national terms, such as the U.S.A., or they are heterogeneous in national terms but the different

nations have a comparable weight within the state. In the Spanish state, there is one nation (Spain) that has a much greater demographic weight and power, and that has traditionally exercised a form of domination over the rest of the nations and thus has made it impossible for Spain to be federal. I would add that the deputies in the Spanish Parliament of the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalunya would not be able to oppose homogenizing efforts by the Spanish majority.”¹⁹ Regarding autonomism, the 23 years of the government of CiU (1980-2003) led by Jordi Pujol was an occasion for the construction of the institutions of the principate. Until the 1980s, leaders such as Aragones would say that it was a useful period of nation-building. “If we had not experienced this period, we would be much worse off.” But that stage has now been almost exhausted, and the next stage will be the self-determination phase, and ERC should only be forming alliances with parties that agree with this line.

Echoing some of the sentiments of his Catalan counterparts, during my interview with Bernard Landry, former prime minister of Quebec and chef of the PQ when I interviewed him, he stated that federalism “can work only when there is only one nation. It works well in the USA, in Mexico, in Germany, but the moment one has more than one nation, the nations have to be free and equal. I don’t think the government in Ottawa should be able to dictate to Quebec what it should do. You have mentioned some Canadian intellectuals writing about a multinational Canada. But there are 25 million people in Canada and maybe there are two people thinking about asymmetry and plurinationalism like those intellectuals. The government of Canada does not recognize Quebec as a nation. Even in Spain, now Madrid is about to recognize Catalunya as a nation [in the preamble] of their new Statute of Autonomy. But, in spite of this recognition, the Catalans have the problem that they are about to become a demographic minority in their own nation. [Our situation is different,] and this is why we will win in the next Referendum, and we may have won in the last one (1995). But there were some illegal federal maneuvers, period.”²⁰

The responses by ERC and PQ militants to my questionnaire give us some indication of some important patterns in the attitudes and opinions of independentist nationalists. The last section of my questionnaire asked the militants to evaluate the relative impact of various factors (using a 10-point scale) on his/her decision to opt for her/his preferred political orientation. These various factors generally represented *cultural/social*, *political*, and *economic* considerations, as can be seen in Table 10.

I observe that for *independentist* nationalists, considerations of language, culture, and identity weigh most heavily in their adoption of the secessionist cause. A very high proportion of militants indicated these are important factors in making them choose independence. This is a consistent finding in the case of the independentists of Catalunya and Quebec. Concerns about economic development and the industrial structure of the internal nation are also a key factor. But, clearly independentists indicate they also form their preference in response to majority nation/central state nationalism. They also form their preference by reference to a perception that the political structures of the central state are either unable or unwilling to accommodate their society as a national community.

Interestingly, in studying the political attitudes and the discourse of stateless nationalists, we have discovered that their perceptions about the impact of central state nationalism and the political structures of the central state on their society are an important factor explaining their preference for secession. But, what exactly is “central state nationalism” or what is it about the political structures of the central state that upsets these nationalists? The militants in the focus group interviews and in their questionnaire responses specified as follows. One militant wrote: “In the last 500 years, Castille (which dominates the Spanish state) has never respected us, why would it do so now.” Another wrote: “ERC is a nationalist and catalanist party, from an independentist premise. Once we have achieved independence, this party will stop being nationalist and catalanist, because we will be living in a normalized society. In our case, a party is “nationalist” because there is a Spanish nationalism which is much stronger (4 to 1) that does not respect catalan society, and one is a “catalanist” to defend the

¹⁹ Personal interview with Pere Aragones, October 26, 2004.

²⁰ Personal interview with Bernard Landry, May 25, 2005, at the National Assembly in Quebec.

catalan culture, which is frankly given a minority treatment by the Spanish state.” Yet another militant expressed it this way: “I am an independentist because after 290 years of Franco-Spanish occupation, the only possibility of surviving as a collectivity, is by controlling all the social, political, economic, and cultural instruments. Reality and history have shown us that the Spanish state only considers us a colony, and that regarding plurinationalism, not even they believe in it.” Finally, another wrote: “I am an independentist because the Spanish state, both when the Left and the Right are in power, has shown that it does not want us to exist as a people or as a culture, they are only interested in the fruits of our labor, and in our successes.” Militants in the ERC Focus Group #2, performed in the ERC party office in the neighborhood of Horta-Guinardo in Barcelona, were very responsive.²¹ I asked them if it was possible to transform Spain into a decentralized, asymmetric federation. One militant responded “it is not possible, because centralization forms part of the Spanish mentality. It goes against the Spanish tradition to be for federalism. After the Reconquest [against the 800 year long Muslim presence] the Castillians started annexing territories. Their mentality has always been one of homogenizing everything. On the other hand, the crown of Aragon created a confederation of the kingdoms of Valencia, Catalunya, and Aragon, with their separate courts and languages. The only ones that have believed in a federal Spain have been the Catalans.”²² These responses illustrate the fact that independentist nationalists opt for the ‘exit’ alternative in large part because they interpret the history of relations with the central state as one of non-recognition and non-accommodation.

			Independentists	Autonomists		Federalists	
	Variable		ERC, PQ	CDC, UDC	ADQ	IC-V	PSC, PLQ
Cultural	Culture, identity language		81.5%	70%	45%	73%	53.5%
Economic	Economic or industrial development		56.5%	40%	76%	50%	58.5%
	Fiscal Considerations		45.5%	33.5%	58%	50%	46%
	European Union/NAFTA		16%	20%	26%	47%	46%
	Globalization		25%	12%	40%	29%	36%

²¹ ERC Focus Group #2, in Horta-Guinardo, November 29, 2004.

²² ERC Focus Group #2, in Horta-Guinardo, November 29, 2004.

Political	Political Structures of Spain/Canada		53.5%	41.5%	45%	38%	49%
	Spanish/Canadian centralist nationalism		61%	53%	55%	58%	28%
	Past History of minority-majority nation relations		51%	33.5%	37%	67%	PSC- 65% PLQ- 17%

Table 10. Analysis of the Political Orientation of Stateless Nationalists (N=370)²³

Autonomist Nationalists and their Political Identity

Artur Mas is the successor to Jordi Pujol at the helm of the party and CiU under his leadership has won the last two Catalan elections in 2003 and 2006, only to be left in the opposition, given that a coalition composed of the PSC, IC-V, and ERC has had a majority in the Parliament. During my interview with Artur Mas he reflected CDC's latest official position, fruit of the party's last Congresses held in 2004 and 2008: "We at the European level are federalists because we believe in a UE of a federal sort that is a union of the European nations, and we of course aspire to be a European nation. At the level of the Spanish State, we could say that we are confederalists, that is, within the Spanish State we opt decidedly for a recognition of the ensemble of nations and we thus support a plurinational state. This is not *de facto* independence because we believe that today classic independence has ceased to exist and been replaced by co-sovereignties and co-dependencies."²⁴ The leader of CDC had this to say about how the party's founder viewed autonomism: "I believe that President Pujol has never been a federalist. He always tried to make the most of the statute of autonomy and the Constitution of 1978, interpreting it in a Catalanist and autonomic note. It was logical that he should do that given that this was the only way available. He lived within that framework, within a Spanish Constitution that he helped to create." About the possibilism and pragmatism that has characterized CDC: "The majoritarian Catalan nationalism that we represent seeks to have our political project evolve at the same pace as our society...I don't see our society at this point ready to pronounce itself in favor of independence or free association, because of our demographic reality and our general structure. We do politics for our present situation, not for the situation in 20 years from now."

Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida is the President of UDC, and with Artur Mas, part of the duo that currently leads CiU. During my interview with him he explained his views on catalanism and nationalism: "For me nationalism is not an ideology. Nationalism is a political current that groups together those who understand that Catalunya is a nation but that its rights are not being respected and we aspire to have them respected. The maximum right of a nation is to express itself freely, and thus to recognize its sovereignty. And from this point on, in the exercise of its sovereignty, which is the exercise of its right to self-determination, there will be different options. Some will opt for independence, some for the present State of autonomies, and some for reformulating the current State of autonomies [in a federalist direction]..."²⁵ What does UDC aspire to, according to Duran i Lleida? "Not to separate ourselves from Spain...In 1931 when UDC was founded it had a confederal proposal

²³ % of responses of militants that indicated this factor was "important" in their choice of political orientation. "Important"= answered 8,9,10 on the 10-point scale in the questionnaire.

²⁴ Personal interview, Artur Mas, November 19, 2004, at CDC headquarters, Carrer Corsega, in Barcelona.

²⁵ Personal interview with Josep A. Duran i Lleida, December 2, 2004, at UDC headquarters, at Travessera de Gracia, in Barcelona.

for all the Spanish state. Once there is a recognition of the sovereignty of Catalunya, which is our ambition as nationalists, then we decide what is it that we want for our country ...”

According to Eric Duhaime, a political counselor of Mario Dumont (*chef du parti*) when I interviewed him at the National Assembly, the general idea behind the autonomist nationalism of the ADQ is to “obtain more power for Quebec, but within Canada, yet taking into consideration that Quebec is a nation. Our position is not necessarily against sovereignty nor against Canada...[After two failed referendums,] our position is that the people don’t want another referendum but neither do they want the status quo. We want to see Quebec recognized as an “autonomous state” given that we are unlike the other ten provinces. We are different...and we want more powers in fields such as immigration and health...In a certain sense, we are more confederalists than federalists.”²⁶ I asked Jean Allaire, the co-founder of the ADQ, if he, as an autonomist, would necessarily reject independence if it is realized. He answered: “No. But the main obstacle is the PQ itself. In Ottawa, they are not fools there. But maybe it could pass by one or two points this time [in the next referendum]. But I think if Ottawa keeps on this way, independence is inevitable.”²⁷ I asked Duhaime what is the difference between the autonomist proposal of the ADQ and the proposals for a decentralized federalism coming from certain quarters in the PLQ. He said: “The liberals [PLQ] want piecemeal agreements. We want a completely new [political and] social model.” Duhaime stressed that autonomist nationalism has historically been much stronger in the province than independentism. He personally supported the “Yes” option (pro-sovereignty) in the 1995 referendum. But there have already been two referendums in which the people rejected the independence option, and enough is enough. Hence the need for an autonomist third way.

Two significant findings need to be highlighted in the case of CDC and UDC. First is the instrumental autonomism of both parties, as noted above. The second important set of findings is that the militants of both CDC and UDC, but especially CDC -- which has a strongly independentist militant base -- show a pattern of attitudes and opinions that is very similar to that of the militants of the independentist parties examined above. CDC and UDC militants indicated in their questionnaire responses and during the focus group interviews that considerations of culture, language, and identity are the primary reason accounting for their choice of political orientation. As I have argued in the case of the independentist parties, this is naturally a given. But, the second most important bloc of factors influencing their choice were political factors. Especially important was the impact of Spanish centralist nationalism on their decision to opt for instrumental autonomism. The second most important political factor was their perception of Spanish political structures and the likelihood these could accommodate their imagined community. One CDC militant wrote that “our experience with the Spanish state has shown us that it makes us feel like second-class citizens.” This is echoed in the responses provided by UDC militants: “It is an oppressive centralism, of conquerors.” Another wrote: “We can’t keep on carrying the burden of a Spain that neither understands us, nor respects us.”

With respect to the ADQ, as can be gleaned from Table 10, its militants indicated that after the bloc of economic factors, which weighed the most in their decision to opt for autonomism, the second most important factor was Canadian centralist nationalism. This is interesting because even in the case of a party such as the ADQ, which has made of its center-right economic and social program a pillar of its *raison d’être*, the impact of political factors on its militants’ choice of constitutional orientation as nationalists can be felt strongly. The importance of political factors in terms of their impact on the political orientation of independentists in both Quebec and Catalunya and autonomists (CiU and ADQ, for example) is a key finding. This is illustrated by the following response from an ADQ militant: “The best thing that could happen to Quebec is that the powerful centralizing liberal [i.e., Liberal Party of Canada] government of Canada be forced to revisit its role, and its relation with the provinces. If the government were to decide to respect the competences of the provincial governments..., it may be possible to re-found this federation on more equitable principles.”

²⁶ Personal interview with Eric Duhaime, June 10, 2005, at the National Assembly in Quebec City.

²⁷ Personal interview with Jean Allaire, June 22, 2005, at UQAM, in Montreal.

Federalist Nationalists and their Political Identity

Jaume Bosch was the vice-president of IC-V when I interviewed him and is now a member of the Catalan Parliament. He stated that Catalunya “is a nation and thus has a right to define itself and the Spanish state as an ensemble of nations and we defend our right to self-determination. We have a right to define our future freely. If it opted for independence we would accept it. Because it has a right. But we believe the best option, in the present conjuncture, is genuine federalism. Many people would say the Spanish state is a federalizing system but in reality it is not...Our option is for a federalism... that has a lot in common with the ideas of Miquel Caminal on pluralist federalism. Our starting point is the recognition of Spain as a plurinational and plurilingual state, and thus sovereignty is not in the Spanish state, but in each of the different peoples that compose the state...The PSC (and the PSOE), on the other hand, would argue that sovereignty resides in the Spanish state...In a certain way our model is more confederal than federal.”²⁸ I asked Bosch what were the chances that the Spanish state would evolve towards a model of asymmetric federalism. He answered: “It is evident that history demonstrates it is difficult that it will change, but on the other hand, by a calculus of possibilities, we believe the independentist option is utopian...It is clear that Catalunya has its right to independence, but a referendum on independence would not be successful...Maybe some day Catalunya will be independent, but not in the short term.”

According to the responses by militants of the PSC, federalism is seen as the best political orientation because “it combines national identity with self-management without prejudicing the right to difference vis-à-vis the Spanish national identity.” Another phrased it this way: “It is more practical to add people. For me, nationalism is irrelevant if that is not translated into better schools, health, and life.” Another put it this way: “It is not only better for Catalunya, but it is also for Spain. Federalism makes institutions more efficient and better respects the sovereignty of peoples.” Another said: “I believe in the cohabitation of different nations that have the same territorial, social, political, and economic reality.” Or, as one wrote: “because being vinculated to a higher level entity does not have to be negative (for example, Europe)...” Or, as another added: “the Spanish state should be modernized and should go in the direction of federalism, because it is the best way of accommodating the historic nationalities.”

With respect to the discourse of federalist nationalists, two key findings need to be underscored. The first is that one needs to distinguish between an instrumental federalist party such as IC-V and more traditional federalist political parties such as PSC and PLQ, as previously noted. The second important finding is that the militants of traditional federalist parties, such as the PSC and the PLQ,²⁹ indicated that the existence of majority nation centralist nationalism was basically irrelevant in accounting for their decision to opt for federalism. In other words, of all the militants of all the national parties examined here, the militants of traditional federalist parties seem to think that Canadian or Spanish centralist nationalism is negligible and has no influence on their choice of orientation. Therefore, it would seem that traditional federalists do not see Canadian or Spanish nationalisms as significant political forces influencing the political structures of the central state. Traditional federalists, it would seem, not only believe that federalism per se is a superior political orientation (versus autonomy or independence), but, in addition, their interpretation of the openness and pluralism of the political institutions of the central state is much more generous than that of independentists or instrumental autonomists. One consequence of this finding is that central state managers, if they want to encourage the proliferation of traditional federalists -- and vice versa, the containment of independentists and instrumental autonomists -- should encourage institutional and political developments that promote plurinationalism and recognition. By comparison, an instrumental federalist party like IC-V has a militant base with attitudes and opinions that resemble those of independentist and instrumental autonomist parties. In the case of IC-V, 58% of the respondents wrote that the existence of Spanish centralist nationalism was an important factor

²⁸ Personal interview with Jaume Bosch, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters in Ciutat Vella.

²⁹ Only 22% of PLQ respondents and only 34% of PSC respondents indicated that Canadian or Spanish centralist nationalism is a significant factor to take into consideration in order to explain their option for federalism. In addition, 50% of PLQ respondents and 57% of PSC respondents stated that considerations of language and culture were important in explaining their decision.

accounting for their preference for asymmetric federalism, and 73% wrote that considerations of language, culture, and identity were important in their decision to opt for asymmetric federalism.

Conclusion: How Nationalists Resolve their Political Dilemma

All stateless nationalists pursue nation-affirming and nation-building goals, but yet they have three fundamental orientations to choose from: independentist, autonomist, or federalist.

My findings show the importance of political factors in explaining how stateless nations' nationalists resolve their dilemma. The findings point us towards a revalorization of the primacy of political factors in understanding the origins of the contemporary internal variation in the political and constitutional orientation of stateless nations' national movements. Nationalists adopt these various orientations as part of an overarching political strategy, in the course of performing a balancing act between economic, political, and cultural factors.

Nationalists' political strategies. The first general conclusion in this article is that within the categories of *autonomist* nationalism and *federalist* nationalism there are important sub-categories, with significant political consequences. *Instrumental autonomist* parties such as CDC and UDC (especially the former) instrumentalize their autonomist orientation, in order to maximize their electoral potential. The current leadership of CDC (and UDC) express a preference for a confederal model, but which falls short of seeking the independence of their nation. They explain their instrumental autonomism by adopting *sovereignty* as one of the pillars of their ideology, and their goal is to attain greater quotas of sovereignty. Some CDC (and even UDC) leaders may even acknowledge that independence is their ultimate goal, but their political strategy for now is to maximize sovereignty in the short to medium term. They also stress CDC's (and UDC's) fundamental commitment to action, and not just theoretical or semantic consistency. The militant base of CDC (less so UDC) is strongly independentist, as one can see from the questionnaire responses and the focus group interviews.

In the federalist camp, one needs to distinguish between an *instrumental federalist* party such as IC-V and more traditional federalist political parties such as PSC and PLQ. IC-V has leaders that favor radical decentralization, and many of their militants would seem to be for a very ambitious project of asymmetric federalism, or confederalism, in their own terms. Both instrumental autonomist and instrumental federalist parties have a militant base that in its opinions and attitudes resembles in some key aspects (not all) the independentist parties' militant base.

Nationalists' balancing act. The evidence from the interviews with the top level leaders and the focus group interviews with militants illustrates how nationalists balance cultural, political, and economic factors, confirming the findings from the questionnaire responses. Independentists take as their starting point their cultural and linguistic identity and the perceived need to promote that identity. This confirms that nationalism is the political expression of a collective sense of identity, which is not a surprising finding. Concerns about economic development and the industrial structure of the internal nation are also a prominent factor, although it seems a considerable proportion of nationalists do not even do a cost/benefit analysis of the economic/material consequences of their preferred political orientation. But, what is most remarkable is the important role played by political factors. Clearly independentists indicate they form their preference in large part in response to "majority nation/central state nationalism." We have cited above numerous statements by the militants in the focus group interviews and in their questionnaire responses that illustrate their intersubjective attitude with respect to "central state nationalism." They also form their preference by reference to a perception that the political structures of the central state are either unable or unwilling to accommodate their society as a national community. The same is true for a considerable proportion of instrumental autonomists and instrumental federalists.

On the other hand, the militants of traditional federalist parties, such as PSC and PLQ, seem to think that majority nation/central state nationalisms are negligible and have no influence on their choice of orientation. They do not see Canadian or Spanish nationalisms as significant political forces influencing the political structures of the central state. It would seem, thus, that traditional federalists not only believe that federalism itself is the best possible alternative for their society, but, in addition, their interpretation of the openness and pluralism of the political institutions of the central state is

much more positive than that of independentists or instrumental autonomists. Thus, in a political system where the political structures and the animus of the central state are unaccommodating, traditional federalist nationalism is less likely to thrive, and to compete successfully with independentist and autonomist nationalisms. Central state managers should encourage institutional and political developments that promote plurinationalism and recognition if they wish to promote state stability.

Jaime Llach
Max Weber Programme
Visiting Fellow
2008-2009

References

Books, Journals, and Newspapers

- Aguilera de Prat, Cesario R. 2002. *Partidos y Estrategias Nacionalistas en Cataluña, Escocia, y Flandes*. Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch.
- Bariteau, Claude. 2005. *Pour Sortir de l'Impasse Référendaire*. Montréal : Les Éditions des Intouchables.
- Beissinger, Mark. 2002. *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bernier, Robert, Maurice Pinard and Vincent Lemieux. 1997. *Un Combat Inachevé*. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1998. "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism." In *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the theory of Nationalism*, ed. John A. Hall, 40-90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1997. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Caminal, Miquel. 1998. *Nacionalisme i Partits Nacionals a Catalunya*. Barcelona: Editorial Empuries.
- Culla, Joan B. 2002. *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya: el llarg camí (1931-2001)*. Barcelona: Unió Democràtica de Catalunya.
- _____. 2001. "De la primera victoria al vintenni en el poder (1980-2000)." In *El Pal de Paller: Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (1974-2000)*, ed. Joan B. Culla, 127-160. Barcelona: Pòrtic.
- Díez Medrano, Juan. 1999. *Naciones Divididas: Clase, Política, y Nacionalismo en el País Vasco y Cataluña*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Gagnon, Alain, Montserrat Guibernau and Francois Rocher. 2003. *The Conditions of Diversity in Multinational Democracies*. Montréal: Institute for Research and Public Policy.
- Guibernau, Montserrat. 2004. *Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition, and Democracy*. London: Routledge.
- Guibernau, Montserrat and Rex, eds. 1997. *The Ethnicity Reader*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gurr, Ted R. 2000. *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace.
- Hamilton, Paul. 2004. "Converging Nationalisms: Quebec, Scotland, and Wales in Comparative Perspective." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10: 657-685.
- Hroch, Miroslav. 2000. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- _____. 1998. "Real and constructed: The Nature of the Nation." In *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the theory of Nationalism*, ed. John A. Hall, 91-107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1994. *The Social Interpretation of Linguistic Demands in European National Movements*. Florence: European University Institute.
- _____. 1993. "From Nationalist Movement to the Fully Formed Nation." *New Left Review* 198 (March-April).
- Jung, Courtney. 2000. *Then I was Black: South African Political Identities in Transition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lévesque, René. 1968. *Option Québec*. Paris: R. Laffont.
- Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz. 2004. "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research." *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 653-670.

- McRoberts, Kenneth. 2001. *Catalonia: Nation Building without a State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 1997. *Misconceiving Canada: the Struggle for National Unity*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Meadwell, Hudson. 1993. "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec." *World Politics* 45 (2): 203-41.
- O'Leary, Brendan, Ian Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds. 2001. *Right-Sizing the State: the Politics of Moving Borders*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pares, Manuel and Gaetan Tremblay, eds. 1988. *Catalunya-Quebec: dues nacions, dos models culturals. Ponències del I Simposi Barcelona, maig 1985, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.
- Pelletier, Benoît. 2004a. *Présentation du monsieur Benoît Pelletier, ministre délégué aux Affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes et aux Affaires autochtones à l'occasion d'une visite au Parlement de Catalogne, 17 Novembre 2004*.
- _____. 2004b. *Présentation du monsieur Benoît Pelletier. L'Avenir du Québec au sein de la Fédération Canadienne*. Montréal, 1er octobre 2004.
- Ragin, Charles C. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- _____. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*. New York: Routledge.
- Smith, Rogers M. 2004. "Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(2): 301-12.
- _____. 2003. *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Primary Documents of the Political Parties

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya

- Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. 1980. *Declaració Ideològica d'Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*. Approved at the Extraordinary Congress of December 16, 1979 to January 20, 1980.
- _____. 1987. *XVè Congrés Nacional d'ERC. Objectius de l'Acció d'ERC pels propers dos anys*. January 24-25.
- _____. 1987. *XVè Congrés. Política d'Esquerra a la Catalunya d'Avui*. January 24-25.
- _____. 1989. *XVIè Congrés. Ponència Nacional*. November 4.
- _____. 1991. *XVIIè Congrés. Ponència. La Catalunya que Volem*. December 15.

Parti Québécois

- Parti Québécois. 1969. *Programme*.
- _____. 1970. *Programme*.
- _____. 1987. *Programme du Parti Québécois. Grandes Orientations*.
- _____. 1989. *Programme du Parti Québécois*.
- _____. 1996. *La Volonté de Réussir. Programme et Statuts du Parti Québécois*.

Parti Libéral du Québec

- Parti Libéral du Québec. 1979. *Choisir Le Québec et le Canada*.
- _____. 1996. Comité sur l'Evolution du Federalisme Canadien. *L'Identité Québécoise et le Federalism Canadien. Reconnaissance et Interdependance*. Decembre.

_____. 2001. *Un Projet pour le Québec : Affirmation, Autonomie, et Leadership. Rapport Final*. Benoît Pelletier, président. Octobre.

Action Démocratique du Québec

Action Démocratique du Québec. 1994. *Un Québec Responsable. Document du Participant. Congrès de Fondation, Laval*. March 5-6.

_____. 1997. *Un vent de changement*.

_____. 2004. *Vé Congrès des Membres. Cahier du participant*. 25-6 Septembre.

_____. 2004. *L'ADQ : La Voie autonomiste. Corvée Place du Québec*.

_____. 2005. *XIVe Conseil general. Autonomiste, fier et prospere*. 23-24 avril.