Sovereigntists and Associationists: Explaining the Origins of National Movements’ Political Orientation

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This article seeks to explain why certain substate national movements tend to develop as “association-seeking” national movements, while others develop a “sovereignty-seeking” orientation. An association-seeking national movement is a national movement that has developed a strong autonomist or federalist orientation. I illuminate the causal mechanisms that help to explain across-case variation in national movements’ political orientation by contrasting the origins of the associationist tendency of the Puerto Rican (1930s–1950s) and Catalan (late 19th century–1936) national movements with the origins of the sovereigntist tendency of the Québécois (1960–1980) and the Basque (late 19th century–1936) ones. Substate national movements tend to develop as association-seeking movements if they are framed by a mode of development that creates structural incentives for maintaining close political and economic ties with the central state. Sovereignty-seeking national movements tend to occur if a mode of development has resulted in displacement or dislocation, and the substate nationalists perceive that this poses a threat to the national or cultural integrity of their society.

ACROSS-CASE VARIATION IN SUBSTATE NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

This article seeks to explain why certain national movements tend to develop as “association-seeking” national movements, while others develop a “sovereignty-seeking” orientation.¹ By contrasting cases of national movements that have developed a strong association-seeking direction with other...
national movements that have evolved with a strong sovereignty-seeking orientation, the article seeks to illuminate the causal mechanisms that help to explain across-case variation in national movements’ political orientation. Generally, these association- or sovereignty-seeking national movements have been instances of “peripheral nationalism,” expressed by “stateless nations” or “minority nations” within a larger state.2

An “association-seeking national movement” is a national movement that seeks group-differentiated rights and a special status as a distinct society for its people, but within a larger multinational state. Thus, it is a movement that is “national” in the sense that it identifies its people as a “nation,” but yet it does not seek to achieve independence.

The general expectation is that nationalists would want to have congruence between their national unit and a state. Accordingly, comparativists working on nationalism have generally focused on “secessionism,” that is, the independentist component of national movements, and have paid little attention to “non-secessionist” nationalism.3 Previous studies in this area have failed to recognize the distinction between sovereignist and associationist national movements.4 My focus, by contrast, is precisely on distinguishing between these two, and on exploring the causal mechanisms that explain the origins of the diverse orientations of national movements. Thus, “association-seeking national movements” are a relevant—yet undertheorized and understudied—subject of study.

The national movements of “minority nations” are internally differentiated, and the political tendencies (that is, political parties) making up substate national movements are subdivided into two or three basic political orientations: proindependence, proautonomism, and, in some cases, profederation. Moreover, the internal currents within national movements can vary over time, experiencing moments of foundation, growth, development, and decay.5 However, national movements experience periods during which it can be said that one tendency within the national movement has been hegemonic over the other, and, thus, these are periods in which the national movement has adopted a strong (and often majoritarian) orientation that is either prosovereignty or proassociation. This article focuses on across-case variation, using the “national movement” as the unit of analysis, and contrasts cases of national movements that have developed a strong internal current that is sovereignist with those that have a strong current that is associationist (that is, nonsecessionist), in either its proautonomism or profederation varieties.

A limited number of previous studies have focused on across-case variation but have been largely limited to paired comparisons of the Basque Country and Catalonia, within Spain.6 Another notable effort in this general area is Michael Hechter’s 1975 work on internal colonialism, which sought to explain the origins and development of peripheral ethnic solidarity in Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.7 However, one fundamental problem with
Hechter’s model is its limited applicability, given that it presupposes a relationship of “internal colonialism,” which does not apply to Catalonia or the Basque Country.

Across-case variation in national movements is therefore an undertheorized area in the study of nations and nationalism. The association-seeking national movements examined here are the Catalan and Puerto Rican ones. The majoritarian tendency in Catalan nationalism has generally been strongly association-seeking (that is, autonomist or federalist), especially when this tendency first originated (late 19th century–1936) but also in the post-1978 period up to the present. Similarly, a national movement that has a strong association-seeking component has developed in Puerto Rico (PR) since the late 19th century, ultimately culminating in the founding of the association-seeking *Partido Popular Democrático* in 1938 and the creation of the current *Estado Libre Asociado* political status in 1952, and the establishment of a clearly hegemonic proautonomy tendency within its national movement (during the 1930s–1950s), which has remained hegemonic to date. This article compares these to the Basque case, which is considered a sovereignty-seeking national movement (especially during its foundation phase), and to the Quebec case, which during the 1960–1980 period blossomed into a fully fledged national movement with a strong sovereignty-seeking component (in fact, one of the strongest in my universe of cases). By contrasting the origins of the associationist tendency of the Puerto Rican (1930s–1950s) and Catalan (late 19th century–1936) national movements with the origins of the sovereigntist tendency of the Québécois (1960–1980) and the Basque (late 19th century–1936) ones, the article isolates the factors that may influence whether a national movement develops a strong association-seeking hegemonic component or a strong sovereignty-seeking hegemonic component.

**EXPLAINING THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS’ DIVERSITY OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS**

In this article, I engage in comparative historical analysis and, in developing my explanatory framework, give balanced consideration to historically constituted structural factors (socioeconomic patterns of development, etc.) and the role of political factors (internal movement struggles between elites and nonelites and between social classes, political coalitions, etc.). A structural logic explains the conditions that facilitate the development of a national movement in an association- or independence-seeking direction. However, a political logic explains how political actors respond to structural conditions and how hegemony within a national movement is established, and, hence, what orientation the movement ultimately adopts. Thus, my approach neither assumes that structural factors dictate future political outcomes
mechanistically nor that political actors form political movements on the basis of will alone.⁸

Existing theories on nationalism and secessionism can be seen as different frames that social scientists have used to understand secessionist nationalism. Theorists have emphasized the role of cultural factors in explaining how secessionism arises,⁹ the role of material interests and instrumental rationality in general,¹⁰ and the role of macrolevel structural factors.¹¹ None of these have attempted to explain the origins of the associationist orientation of some national movements, while others develop a prosovereignty orientation, in a cross-regional comparison.

My argument is that substate national movements tend to develop as association-seeking movements if they are framed by a socioeconomic pattern (or mode) of development that creates structural incentives for maintaining close political and economical ties with the central state. In the face of these structural constraints, if the social groups that form the political coalition that is dominant within the national movement come to believe that it is imperative that the peripheral region maintain stable economic links with the core state, then the national movement will develop a strong association-seeking orientation. On the other hand, independence-seeking national movements tend to occur whenever there has been a mode of development that has resulted in displacement or dislocation, and the substate nationalists perceive that this poses a threat to the national or cultural integrity of their society. If a mode of development causes displacement of a significant segment of the population, who are left out and marginalized by a social process (for example, modernization), or who are subject to pressures by massive immigration and who feel culturally threatened by the impact of such processes, these groups may channel their discontent into a sovereignist nationalist program. Similarly, substate nationalists may respond to a mode of development that causes dislocation and peripheralization (especially if these are perceived to have a negative impact on the culture of the substate national society) by channeling their energies into an increasingly independentist nationalist program of consolidation and recuperation.¹²

Structural factors are very important, but they are not absolutely determinative by themselves alone. “Some facets of the political process act as powerful and fundamental causal variables in social life and provide the basis for an underlying ‘political logic’ that animates change.”¹³ Thus, we need to be attentive to how political coalitions are formed and how a given coalition comes to dominate a national movement, which then formulates the programmatic agenda to address the challenges posed by structural conditions.

For each of these four cases, I will first present an account of the timing and sequencing of the evolution through time of these national movements. Second, I explain why these national movements originally developed their independence- or association-seeking orientations.
According to Eric Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch’s work “opened the new era in the analysis of the composition of national liberation movements.” Hroch is well known for his study of 12 nationalist movements in 19th-century Europe, and for his distinction between three phases of national movements, according to the character and role of those active in it. In Phase A, the energies of the intelligentsia are devoted to scholarly inquiry and dissemination of linguistic, cultural, social, and historical attributes of the nondominant group. In Phase B, a new set of activists emerge, who by patriotic agitation seek to “awaken” national consciousness and get their compatriots to join the project of creating a fully fledged nation. Phase C emerges when a large part of the population comes to value their national identity, and a mass movement is formed. In Phase C, the full social structure of the nation comes into being. Hroch’s typology regarding the three phases of national movements will be useful in this article, helping to delineate key phases in the development of these national movements.

THE ASSOCIATION-SEEKING NATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF CATALONIA AND PUERTO RICO

The Origins of the Strong Association-Seeking National Movement in Catalonia (late 19th century–1936)

In the “mid-19th century a vibrant cultural and linguistic renaissance occurred in Catalonia, in consonance with the romantic and nationalist movements elsewhere in Europe and sparked by the great economic changes in Catalonia, which Catalanists juxtaposed to the political and economic stagnation in Madrid.” The Renaixença had its precursors in the early 19th century when a number of Catalan intellectuals started to elaborate the basis for the economic, literary, and political history of Catalonia, starting with the medieval epoch. This period of the Renaixença corresponds to Phase A of Hroch’s typology of stages for national movements.

Phase B of the Catalan national movement developed during the late 19th century. Valentí Almirall was the founder of the first political Catalanism. In 1879, he founded the first Catalan daily newspaper and, in 1880, organized the first Catalan Congress. In 1891, the Unió Catalanista was founded, and it elaborated the first proposal for a project of autonomy for Catalonia. It is absolutely clear that it did not propose a break with the Spanish state. In 1901, just before the general elections of that year, a splinter group from the Unió Catalanista formed the Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya, which was able to win Catalanism’s first electoral victory in 1901. Between 1892 and 1918 Catalanism evolved following a strategic logic: to offer the autonomous route as the solution to the Catalan quagmire, but as a model for all of Spain.
Phase C of the Catalan national movement developed at two junctures. The first was during the short-lived Spanish Second Republic of 1931–1936 during which the first Catalan Statute of Autonomy was passed in 1932. With the defeat of 1939, the further development of Phase C of the Catalan national movement was interrupted until it could be fully reinitiated in the post-1975 period.

In 1977, the Generalitat (the Catalan government) was reestablished. In the first Catalan elections in 1980, a coalition led by Jordi Pujol, Convergència i Unió (CiU), became the first ruling party of Catalonia within the newly created Spanish democratic state. After its 1989 Congress at Lleida, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) transformed itself into an independentist party, but it has been the minority component in the national movement throughout the contemporary period, garnering 16 percent and 14 percent of the vote in the 2003 and 2006 elections, respectively.

In contrast, CiU (currently a federation composed of two parties: Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya [CDC] and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya [UDC]) was in power during 1980–2003 in the Generalitat and has been hegemonic in the national movement. It offers a nationalist discourse that does not propose independence from Spain.

As the distinguished historian Joan B. Culla remarked, the Catalan national movement since the late 19th century to the present has historically had a very weak independentist component. It has instead oscillated between two associationist orientations: federalism and autonomism. As the distinguished political scientist Isidre Molas also remarked, the Catalan national movement has not had, and does not have, the explicit purpose of forming an independent state. “The weak force of the politically organized Catalan separatism is the most constant characteristic in the history of Catalanism, and, undoubtedly too, of the Republican period [1931–1936].” Yet, neither has it been able to reshape the Spanish state in the form of a plurinational federation, which would make possible a more appropriate recognition of the distinctiveness of the Catalan nation. There have been two visions of the prospects for self-government: federalist and autonomist. As González Casanova wrote, federalism and the vision of a federal and multinational Spain has been the other face of political Catalanism, when it was not putting forward proposals for autonomism, throughout 1868–1938.

The origins of the association-seeking orientation of the Catalan case lie in the late 19th century, when its industrial bourgeoisie turned away from the struggle for power in the Spanish state when it realized it was impossible to gain power at the core within the oligarchic liberal democracy of the Restoration.

Instead it aimed to secure power at the local and regional level and to build up support on the basis of cultural nationalism to bargain more effectively with the central government on economic issues, particularly
protectionism. Without this conflict of economic interest ... the emergence of Catalan nationalist would be difficult to understand. Certainly the intellectuals, the poets and writers, the defenders of traditional legal institutions, contributed very much to the formulation of the nationalist idea but the organizational resources and the money were provided by the bourgeoisie.27

Other scholars have stressed the importance of how patterns of development shaped Catalan nationalism, in particular in contrast with Basque nationalism. These modes of development created constellations of class and ethnic interests that determined both center-periphery relations and class relations in these regions.

Díez-Medrano’s explanation pays particular attention to two contrasts: between combined development and endogenous development and that between capital-goods development and consumer-goods development. The concept of combined development rests on the coexistence, within a country or region, of an advanced and highly concentrated industrial sector and an economy that remains largely traditional. The development of a small capitalist class linked to the capital-goods production sector antedates and stunts the development of a commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, sweeps away small-scale manufacturers and artisans and leads to the rapid proletarianization of the peasantry. Endogenous development, by contrast, stems from capital accumulated in agriculture, which is then invested in industry. This pattern, which generally takes form over a longer time span than does combined development, facilitates the emergence of a large bourgeois class and the gradual integration of preindustrial classes, including the peasantry, into the process of capitalist industrialization.28 Accounts of European economic development generally show that industrialization passed through two major initial phases: consumer-goods industrialization (mostly textile production) and capital-goods industrialization (mostly the production of iron and steel). “The textile industry ... did not depend on investment by banks ... [while] the steel industry, historically, required large sums of capital for its expansion.”29 In Euskadi, iron and steel production were the main industrial sector, while in Catalonia it was textile production. Catalonia experienced endogenous development based on the consumer-goods sector, while the Basque Country experienced combined development based on the capital-goods sector.

Catalan nationalism reflected the frustration of the Catalan bourgeoisie over its inability to shape Spanish policies according to its own interests. Although a large bourgeoisie emerged during industrialization, its economical and political power was much weaker than that of the Basque capitalist elites. “Exchanges between the Catalan consumer-goods industry and the Spanish state were much smaller than those between the Basque capital-goods sector and the Spanish state. Catalan industry produced for
the Spanish market rather than to satisfy state demand, and Catalonia’s financial sector was too weak to meet the state’s borrowing needs.”

The bourgeoisie’s decision to adopt a nationalist agenda resulted from three factors: the endogenous character of Catalan development, the specialization of Catalan industry in consumer-goods production, and their pro-Catalan cultural and political orientations. Because endogenous development and specialization in consumer-goods production facilitated the assimilation of the Catalan preindustrial elites and the peasantry into the nascent capitalist society, mobilization against social change by these social groups was minimal.

Thus, the “Catalan industrial and commercial bourgeoisies had to rely on nationalist political mobilization to achieve their economic and political goals.” These elites developed a form of peripheral nationalism, but one which was (and is) association seeking, because they “would not have gone as far as endangering the unity of Spain and with it their access to a protected market for their products.” For the Catalan bourgeoisie, maintaining access to the Spanish consumer market and securing protectionist policies from the central state were essential objectives. Hence, their preference was for a national movement that had an association-seeking direction.

The Origins of the Strong Association-Seeking National Movement in Puerto Rico (1930s–1950s)

In the 19th century, the Puerto Rican sense of nationhood coalesced. In 1806, the printing press was introduced in Puerto Rico (PR), and newspapers, such as La Gaceta de Puerto Rico, El Diario Económico, etc., started to give shape to the imagined community of Puerto Rico. Phase A of the Puerto Rican national movement corresponds to this early stage in the early and mid-19th century when intellectuals took the first tentative steps to discover the nation.

Phase B of the Puerto Rican national movement can be said to date from the 1860s and 1870s. By this point, the first patriotic political organizations had been founded, some seeking separation from Spain and others seeking accommodation within an autonomous arrangement. Since the late 19th century, there has been a strong current of “autonomist” ideology in the Puerto Rican political culture. Phase B of the Puerto Rican national movement was interrupted by the war of 1898 but was reconstituted after the end of U.S. military rule in PR in 1900, with the passage of the Foraker Act.

Phase C of the Puerto Rican national movement dates from the late 1930s and the 1940s, when for the first time one tendency within the Puerto Rican national movement became a mass movement. In 1938, the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) was founded by Muñoz Marín and his cohorts. By the time the PPD met in a formal Constituent Assembly in July 1940, its leaders had made a decision not to emphasize the status question in the forthcoming campaign but to concentrate instead on economic issues.
particular interest to us is the PPD’s slow shift from a party sympathetic to the idea of independence to one favoring greater local autonomy and permanent association with the United States.

The PPD recognized the existence of a “nation” in PR but refused to see the need for secession. It argued that it should concentrate on solving PR’s social and economical problems, before tinkering with its political status. The PPD seemed to emphasize a “social” sense of nationhood as opposed to a “political” sense of nationhood. The PPD, therefore, conceptualized the nation in an unorthodox way, eschewing independence. Instead it sought local self-determination (autonomy) by improving the people’s social and economical conditions.

The PPD won the 1944 and 1948 elections by a landslide and catapulted Muñoz to the height of his personal powers, first as leader of the Senate and then as PR’s first elected governor in 1948. Thus, for all practical purposes, the PPD was able to set PR’s political agenda from 1948 onwards, culminating in the adoption of “Estado Libre Asociado” status for PR in 1952. The PPD, the hegemonic party for most of Phase C of the Puerto Rican national movement, is a good exemplar—just as CDC and UDC are in Catalonia—of a party that has led a national movement with a strong association-seeking direction.

The origins of the association-seeking orientation of the Puerto Rican national movement can be explained by focusing on the socioeconomic conditionings that framed the political development of this movement and by showing how internal hegemony within the movement was achieved by a group espousing an association-seeking preference. After 1898, the United States came to exert unprecedented economical and political control over Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, “and the Spanish Caribbean as a whole became a sphere for U.S. direct investment, a colonial region dominated by the decisions of U.S. capitalists. Although U.S. capital flowed into all economic sectors, sugar production became the primary locus of investment, the premier economic activity of the islands . . . [and] the principal export.”

Thus, the first three and a half decades of the 20th century were the high period of sugar monoculture dominated by U.S. capital. To borrow a term used by Eric Williams, the “American Sugar Kingdom” was established:

The combined sugar production of the three islands doubled from 433,000 tons in 1900 to 1,127,000 tons in 1902. Sugar output then doubled again between 1902 and 1910, reaching 2,470,000 tons . . . At the end of World War I the three islands produced close to one-third of the sugar sold in the world market.

Sugar plantations were not new to the Caribbean. However, the “American Sugar Kingdom” did not merely reproduce old patterns of economic organization associated with the previous European colonizers in the region. Instead, it represented a new pattern of development: A radical social and
economical transformation took place in the islands as a result of U.S. imperial expansion, including the development of a free labor market, new forms of corporate organization ("trusts"), the introduction of the latest technological advances in the sugar mills, and the fast-paced economic integration to the U.S. economy.

In 1897, coffee was the principal export of PR, having surpassed sugar in the closing decades of the 19th century. This process was reversed after 1898. Products protected by the U.S. tariff system, such as raw sugar and tobacco, received a tremendous boost. Sugar quickly regained the position of principal export and largest sector of the economy. Puerto Rican sugar gained a privileged market in the United States, while foreign sugar producers were subject to a tariff. Puerto Rican sugar was thus protected, like mainland-produced sugar, from the full impact of foreign competition. Production of raw sugar in PR rose from 81,526 tons to 866,109 tons. Four large sugar corporations dominated the economic life of the island by the early 1930s. "The Aguirre, Fajardo, South Porto [sic] Rico, and United Porto Rico companies produced approximately 60% of the sugar on the island by the late 1920s." Sugar, in effect, is what made U.S. colonization profitable. "PR began to take many of the properties that characterized sugar monocultures in the West Indies ... as a result of U.S. policies and the actions of U.S. sugar producers and investors." In addition, "the provisions of the [1900] Foraker and [1917] Jones Acts also guaranteed that Puerto Rico would trade almost exclusively with the United States." Foreign-owned and foreign-controlled capital became dominant in the Puerto Rican economy. Aside from sugar, U.S. tobacco companies controlled some 85 percent of the cigar-manufacturing industry. Moreover, by the 1920s, about 50 percent of public utilities were foreign owned; railroads were 60 percent foreign owned; shipping, nearly 100 percent. Four banks that were 95 percent foreign owned held 50.2 percent of the banking assets in 1929. "More than a quarter of PR's total wealth, and substantially more of its productive wealth, was owned by foreigners, primarily U.S. businessmen ... U.S. capital investments reoriented the economy. There were some local capitalists—in sugar, for example—but U.S. dominance in political, economic, educational, and judicial affairs was unquestionable." For Muñoz Marín and those who would establish the PPD in 1938, sugar was the Gordian knot tying the economic life of PR. Beginning in 1934, for Muñoz Marín and his followers, "the forces of privilege against which the country had to struggle were the gigantic sugar corporations ... in this sense he started defining his economic project: the definitive liberation of the people of PR from the inexorable cycle of sugar cane; the abandonment of the land because, in the last instance, it was incompatible with modernity." Although in 1932, initially, Muñoz Marín expressed a preference for independence in order to reject the economic determinism of sugar, the PPD
soon abandoned this stance (after 1943) and adopted an association-seeking position.

On 9 May 1934, Congress passed the Jones-Castigan Act, which provided quotas on the imports of sugar in order to reverse the price decline for U.S. sugar producers resulting from the glut of sugar in the world market. Puerto Rico’s quota for 1934 was based on the proportion of total U.S. sugar purchases it had supplied during 1925–1933. In 1934, actual production levels exceeded the quota by 37 percent. The developing crisis in the sugar sector made it increasingly clear to the PPD leaders that sugar would not be a viable basis for long-term economic development.

After 1943, Muñoz Marín and the PPD started searching for suitable forms of autonomy. A number of factors accounted for this political evolution. Primary among these was the impact of the constraints imposed by the mode of development implanted since 1898 on the island. These constraints led the leadership of the PPD to reconsider the possible economic consequences of independence. In the 1940s, the island’s socioeconomic conditions were deplorable. Muñoz Marín came to believe that the economical and political ties with the United States were indispensable to institute a program of socioeconomic development. The ties with the United States “made it possible to implement a series of economic incentives that would . . . motivate U.S. capital to establish on the Island manufacturing enterprises that would generate employment . . . would give access to federal programs that would help develop the Island’s infrastructure . . . and would let products from the Island enter the US market.”

Puerto Rico’s pattern of development since 1898 exhibited the colonial and dependent pattern of the “American Sugar Kingdom” period in the Caribbean. For the PPD, the Gordian knot of sugar was constraining PR’s development, and the foreign-owned sugar plantations were very visible antagonists. After the Jones-Castigan Act, it became clear that sugar’s possibilities were limited. “The PPD’s populist program and rhetoric were anti-imperialist and anti-expansionist; they were not, however, anti-American or anti-capitalist.” The PPD’s efforts to redirect the economy were based on the attraction of U.S. manufacturing concerns, which tied its destiny ever closer to the United States. The PPD also clearly accepted the “colonial restrictions on local power that were institutionalized by the [1917] Jones Act.”

In order to explain the ideological transformation of the PPD, some have argued that the original populist ideology of the PPD (in 1938) was elaborated by a professional sector that was interested in creating its own State in order to become its hegemonic class. Moreover, this class was intent on inserting itself in the economic arena in order to execute a comprehensive reorganization of the social sphere. After 1940, a political coalition composed of this class, plus the emerging proletariat, and the middle class was able to establish hegemony within the national movement. But it was the development of a strategy of economic development (in the 1940s) that depended...
on a series of economic incentives to U.S. transnational corporations that created a dilemma for this coalition. There was a fundamental contradiction between the separatist ideal of creating a new sovereign state out of the colonial past and the program “for the modernization of the economy and the abolition of misery. This political coalition found an answer to this dichotomy in the Estado Libre Asociado: a local autonomous government inside a common market, a common monetary system, a common defense, and a common citizenship with the United States.”

The PPD, therefore, supported and developed an association-seeking national movement and ideology because it sought to break the Gordian knot tying PR’s development (the foreign-owned sugar plantation economy) by attracting the direct investment of U.S. industrial corporations. This strategy was incompatible with an independentist national movement, and, therefore, an association-seeking national ideology was invented and promoted.

**THE SOVEREIGNTY-SEEKING NATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY AND QUÉBEC**

The Origins of the Strong Sovereigntist National Movement in Euskadi (late 19th century–1936)

The Basque national movement was born in the late 19th century. The father of Basque nationalism was Sabino Arana Goiri (1865–1903), who disseminated his ideas in his pamphlets, *Bizcaya por su Independencia* (1892), *El Partido Carlista y los Fueros Vasko-Nabarros* (1897). But, his most enduring legacy has been the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV), which he founded on 31 July 1895.

Phase A of the Basque national movement, therefore, dates from the late 19th century, with the precursors of Sabino Arana and the PNV. Phase B of the national movement can be traced to the founding of the PNV by Sabino Arana in 1895 and lasted until it became a truly mass movement in the 1930s. During these early years, the projection of Basque nationalism was insignificant, ignored by other movements or political groups.

Electorally, Basque nationalism did not get to have real parliamentary force until the years of the Second Republic (1931–1936). Until 1918, it had not sought representation in the Spanish parliament. The PNV, in effect, did not become a mass movement until the 1920s, which inaugurated Phase C of the Basque national movement. The PNV has always been the dominant party within the Basque national movement; almost the only one until 1930, hegemonic in the Second Republic, and clearly majoritarian in the contemporary period. The PNV has never considered autonomy as its final objective and has never renounced independence. In fact, its ambiguity towards the autonomy-independence dilemma has been one of its most conspicuous characteristics. By 1936, Basque nationalism had become the
most powerful political force in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, and its most radical members advocated independence.57

The second moment of Phase C of the Basque national movement has been characterized by the coexistence of a moderate sovereigntist PNV majoritarian tendency and a radical independentist izquierda abertzale minority current. “The majoritarian sector of Basque nationalism has always been the PNV, characterized by a hybrid of tradition and modernity, of independentism and autonomism.” However, the PNV remains a party that has not renounced its theoretical predilection for “the attainment of independence in an indefinite future.” Moreover, in the contemporary period, under the leadership of lehendakari Juan J. Ibarretxe, the PNV has reasserted its sovereigntist orientation, culminating in the sovereigntist Ibarretxe Plan of 2005. The dominant position in the Basque national movement of PNV and the persistence of the izquierda abertzale sector demonstrate the persistent sovereignty-seeking nature of that movement.

Why has “Basque nationalism ... tended to be more separatist than Catalan nationalism?” Both the Basque and Catalan nationalisms were born at the end of the 19th century in response to “socioeconomic transformations and political- and cultural- homogenization policies undertaken by the Spanish state.” The political orientation of the Basque national movement was shaped by the pattern of development of the region and by the traditionalism of its regional elites. The social structure of the Basque Country provided a very different background for the birth of peripheral nationalism (vis-à-vis the Catalan case). The region is not dominated by a cultural and economic metropolis. The local intelligentsia was small and Bilbao retained an element of provincialism.

Basque nationalism found support in this provincial, semi-industrial, semi-rural Basque country and only a few of the big businesses of Bilbao identified with it. The movement therefore acquired very soon a strong populist component, an element of reaction of a peasant and provincial traditional society against an immigrant labor force, a denationalized upper bourgeoisie, and the representatives of a central state. It also felt hostile to the class conflict being introduced by a growing socialist party.

Basque nationalism grew out of the frustration of preindustrial Basque elites with the transformations wrought by industrialization and centralization, and against the industrial bourgeoisie. The displaced preindustrial elites would form a political alliance with the discontented peasantry, and they would reject the whole modernization process. Euskadi experienced a combined form of development, leading to the decline of agriculture, which did not facilitate the agrarian population’s adaptation to capitalism. Combined development based on the capital goods sector excluded large sectors of the
Basque population from the benefits of capitalism and led to the emergence of a very small local bourgeoisie and a powerful capitalist elite. Furthermore:

Basque capitalism and the Spanish state developed a close economic relationship based on the pivotal role played by the Basque capital-goods sector in the state’s plans to promote economic development in Spain, and on the Spanish state’s dependence on loans from Basque financial institutions, and on Basque capitalism’s dependence on state contracts and the Spanish market... Consequently, the Basque economic elite, which had become Castilianized, was never nationalist in its outlook.

Given the Basque mode of development (combined and specialized in capital-goods production), the impact on the Basque social structure included: a marginalized preindustrial elite and peasantry, a close-knit capitalist elite that became well integrated into the Spanish power elite, and a small and divided bourgeoisie. The economic interests and cultural preferences tied the capitalist elite to Spain and the small bourgeoisie had strong pro-Spanish cultural and political predilections, turning them into opponents of Basque nationalism. Therefore, the social base of Basque nationalism was formed by the social groups displaced by industrialization (the preindustrial elites and peasantry). A strong traditionalist nationalism developed, including in its ranks very few members of the local bourgeoisie. These groups, because of their greater numbers, were able to form a hegemonic political coalition and were able to impose their separatist and anticapitalist ideological discourse on the PNV’s program.


From the Conquest in 1759 to the 1820s, the collective identity of the people of Lower Canada had not yet coalesced into a proto-national movement. By the 1830s, a new middle class had emerged ready to cloak their political ambitions in nationalist garb. As the power of the seigneurs and the clergy declined, this new middle class began to imagine itself as a nation. By the 1820s, political contention in Québec was channeled into two opposing political groups. On one side was a loose grouping calling itself the English Party and on the other a slightly more coherent grouping calling itself the Parti Canadien. The people gathered around the Parti Canadien, led by Louis-Joseph Papineau, slowly began to call themselves members of the Parti Patriote. In November–December 1837, a number of patriotes staged a short-lived rebellion, which was unsuccessful. Phase A of the Québécois national movement, therefore, lasted from the 1830s until the mid-19th century.
Confederation in 1867 was the sixth attempt at having French and English live together in the same territory. Certainly by this time, Phase B of the Québécois national movement was in full course. The French Canadian elite were divided between bleus and rouges. The rouges (Liberals) opposed Confederation. The bleus (Conservatives), led by George Etienne Cartier, thought the arrangement would protect French Canada’s distinctiveness. During the first 30 years of the 20th century there was a growing emphasis in Québec on provincial autonomy thanks to the leadership of Québec premiers Gouin (1905–1920) and Taschereau (1920–1936), and Henri Bourassa, who was a Liberal member of Parliament during the early years of the 20th century. The latter was a cultural nationalist concerned with the cultural distinctiveness of Québec, but also a Canadian nationalist, and thus opposed to political sovereignty for Québec. This quest for provincial autonomy within Confederation was also continued by Premier Maurice Duplessis of the Union Nationale from 1936–1939 and 1944–1959. Yet during all these years between Confederation in 1867 and the mid-20th century, the national movement in Québec exhibited a conservative nationalism. Essentially, Anglophone and Francophone elites worked out a system of elite accommodation that became an elite “nonaggression pact.” Wedded to this conservative, rural, and clerical forms of nationalism, the French-Canadians had yet to develop a systematic strategy for addressing their grievances. During all this period covered by Phase B of the Québécois national movement (1860s to 1960)—in which elites worked out a system of elite accommodation and “linguistic détente”—the national movement in Québec was conservative and seemed to have an autonomist orientation.

The national movement in Québec did not become massified until the 1960s, as a result of the “Quiet Revolution.” Until 1960, nationalism in Québec was mostly characteristic of a small elite, and the masses remained indifferent to the whole phenomenon. Thus, Phase C began after 1960. This new political phase was inaugurated by the Liberal government of Premier Jean Lesage, which shifted from its earlier stance of promoting equality of all the provinces, to one of promoting a special status for Québec. During the Union Nationale administration of 1966–1970, a strong binational autonomist theme was emphasized. In 1968, the first successful separatist party, the Parti Québécois (PQ), was formed under the leadership of René Lévesque and won the 1976 provincial elections. Since the transition period of the 1960s, the national movement in Québec has increasingly taken a strong independence-seeking orientation.

The Québécois national movement developed a strong independence-seeking component in the 1960s. As discussed above, from the 1830s to 1960, the movement was part of an interelite attempt to achieve “linguistic détente” between Anglophones and Francophones. It was a quiescent, Church-centered, defensive, isolationist, traditional, and rural movement. Then, in the 1960s, a period of rapid and deep change occurred in Québec,
and initiated a period of strong nationalist effervescence. The Quiet Revolution occurred due to the conjunction of several circumstances. First, a new pattern of development was established: Massive changes were occurring in the Canadian and continental economies, including the thorough integration of the Canadian economy to the United States. Continentalism included Québec’s economic peripheralization, so that English-Canadian and U.S. capital left Québec, especially for Toronto, which had become the dominant city in Canada in an economy fully integrated with the United States. It should be emphasized that Québec’s economic peripheralization began much before any threat posed by Québec’s resurgent nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s became salient. Second, the Quiet Revolution also emerged due to the cultural and demographic changes within the French-speaking community. Montreal, not rural Québec, was now the center of French Canadian culture. Third, the resurgent neonationalism of the post-1960s era was animated by a new and self-assertive middle class.

Since the 1960s, the independentist orientation has grown considerably. The strong independence-seeking component in Québec’s national movement is in the first place a response to the new pattern of development that appeared after 1959, which had a number of repercussions. First, there was the economic peripheralization of Québec, as the center of economic vitality shifted to Ontario and Toronto. “The independence movement is seen then as a reaction to the dislocation and as a proposal for obtaining sufficient power to ensure that economic dislocation can be managed and eventually reversed.”

Second, with Québec’s economy becoming increasingly integrated into the continental economy, and the increasing predominance of large corporations that dominated and shaped continental markets, there was pressure for the homogenization of social conditions and social relations. This created considerable frustration among the francophone community, due to its inability to define and maintain its distinctive culture while adapting to this new pattern of development. During the Quiet Revolution, the strategy was to obtain significant control over production in Québec for the francophone business class and to create institutions parallel to the foreign corporations and with the help of the state to strengthen these institutions to the point where they could be competitive. Thus, since 1960, successive Québec governments have pursued strategies trying to shore up the strength of the Francophones within the provincial economy, and at shoring up the economy in the face of continentalism and peripheralization.

The Quiet Revolution coalition—organized labor, the francophone business class, and elements of the traditional middle class—proposed the formation of a viable capitalist class within the francophone community, using the provincial government and the economic base of the province’s natural resources. This was the strategy inaugurated in 1960 by the PLQ government of Premier Lesage. However, when this Quiet Revolution coalition
unraveled, in the ensuing confrontation between these three social groups, the idea of independence became a tool in the battle. Organized labor became disenchanted because the instability and insecurity of their situation did not change, and the middle class became disaffected because of insufficient sensitivity to the culture of the francophone community. Meanwhile, the business class continued to support the strategy inaugurated in 1960. The technocratic middle class was influential in the initial mobilization of the separatist movement. Moreover, the disaffection of the middle class and the working class was channeled into the political movement in favor of independence, and they were joined by elements of the intelligentsia who were disgruntled due to their negative perception of the norms and cultural values that came with the expansion of capitalism after 1959. The capitalist class (both francophone and anglophone) was largely against independence. The pressures brought on the francophone community by the large-scale dislocation caused by the pattern of development initiated after 1959 gave birth to the independence movement and fed its spectacular growth. The transformations wrought by dislocation and peripheralization were perceived by the francophone community as having “fundamentally shaken the culture of French Canada, that ... left the traditional bases of that culture almost in ruins.” For many Québécois, these changes were perceived to be “contradicting that inner quality of what it means to be a Québécois and what the future might be for the Québécois.” Many in the francophone community came to believe that they needed to have greater control over their own affairs.

The neonationalism of the middle class, the working class, and the intelligentsia led them to form a political coalition, which fed the growth of the PQ after 1968 and which has played an increasingly hegemonic role within the Québécois national movement.

CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS’ DIVERSITY OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

The Catalan national movement and the Puerto Rican one are the quintessential examples of movements that develop a strong association-seeking orientation. In order to understand the origins of the orientation of such movements, one must focus on modes of development and examine the socioeconomic processes that framed their political development. One must also focus on how political coalitions are formed and how a given coalition comes to dominate a national movement, which then formulates the programmatic agenda to respond to the challenges posed by structural conditions. In the case of the Catalan national movement during the late 19th century to 1936, the endogenous character of Catalan development and the
consumer-goods orientation of Catalan production help to explain the rise of associationist (autonomist or federalist) substate nationalism. Furthermore, the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie’s need to maintain access to the protected Spanish market accounts for the association-seeking orientation of the movement. Similarly, the Puerto Rican national movement during the 1930s–1950s was influenced by the pattern of development that was evident after 1898, that is, a foreign-owned sugar plantation economy controlled and dependent on U.S. capital. Facing this constraint, and when the sugar economy entered a period of crisis in the 1930s after the Jones-Castigan Act, the leadership of the PPD, which was becoming increasingly dominant in the national movement, opted to shed its independentist ideology and transformed itself into an autonomist party, in order to provide a political formula that would suit its strategy of industrialization, which was its only option in light of the evident limitations of a sugar-based economy.

In sum, substate national movements develop a strong associationist orientation if they are framed by a mode of development that creates structural incentives for maintaining close political and economic ties with the central state.

The Quèbècois and the Basque cases also show that it is important to focus on socioeconomic modes of development that frame the political development of nationalist movements. In the Basque case during the late 19th century to 1936, combined development (specialized in the capital goods sector) created displacements among the provincial, traditional, agrarian masses, and elites (who perceived a threat to their national and cultural integrity), and they channeled their discontent into a secessionist movement, becoming a hegemonic group in it. A strongly traditionalist nationalism developed, including in its ranks almost no members of the local bourgeoisie. These traditionalist groups, because of their numeric superiority, were able to form a hegemonic political coalition and were able to impose their separatist ideological discourse on the Basque national movement. The origins of the Quèbècois strong prosovereignty movement can also be explained by focusing on the new mode of development that crystallized in the 1960–1980 period (continentalism and peripheralization), which channeled the energies of the newly emerging middle class, the working class, and the intelligentsia in an increasingly prosovereignty direction. An alliance of these three classes was able to form a hegemonic political coalition within the national movement.

The pressures brought on the francophone community by the large-scale dislocation caused by the pattern of development initiated after 1959 acted as a catalyst for the impressive growth of the independentist movement. The social transformations caused by dislocation were perceived by the francophone community in the province as having a deleterious effect on Quèbècois culture. The reaction among Quèbècois nationalists was “a cry of fright from the people of which these groups were a part, a people that
remembers having some sense of self and of being a community and that feels that both are now virtually gone.82

In sum, substate national movements develop a strong prosovereignty orientation if they are framed by a mode of development that has resulted in displacement or dislocation, and the substate nationalists perceive that this poses a threat to the national or cultural integrity of their society. Displacement or dislocation are transformative socioeconomic processes that have a large-scale impact on societal cultures. Displacement occurs when a significant segment of the population is left out and marginalized by a mode of development. Dislocation occurs when a mode of development has a transformative effect on economic structures. Displacement or dislocation are perceived by substate nationalists as having a negative impact on substate societal cultures. Substate nationalists have notions about what obligations emerge due to common membership in the same state, and these expectations are frustrated by the social trauma of displacement or dislocation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the National Science Foundation for NSF Grant No. SES-0706689 during 2007–2009. Also, I thank the European University Institute in Florence for its institutional support during 2007–2009, the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) for hosting me in 2009, and the Collegio Carlo Alberto (URGE) in Turin for the postdoctoral fellowship it offered me for 2009–2010. I also thank James C. Scott (Yale University) for his comments on a previous version of this article.

NOTES


2. The universe of cases included within my scope conditions encompasses stateless nations’ national movements, located within or belonging to states with a high level of socioeconomic development, with longstanding liberal democratic regimes (30-year minimum duration), where the minority nation-majority nation relationship has lasted for at least one century, and where the principal cause for the differential between majority and minority nations is language, culture, history, and institutions. A nonexhaustive list of my universe of cases would therefore include: Catalonia, Scotland, Euskadi, Wales, Galicia, Corsica, Québec, Puerto Rico, South Tyrol-Alto Adige, etc.


22. Personal interview with Joan B. Culla, 13 July 2004, at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 111.

31. Ibid.

32. Linz, “Politics in Multilingual Societies,” 381.
38. Ibid., 5.
43. Ibid., 119.
44. Ibid., 133.
47. Álvarez-Curbelo, *Del Nacionalismo al Populismo*, 181.
50. Ibid., 180.
51. Ibid., 219.
52. Three social actors were instrumental in giving the PPD its electoral victories in 1940, 1944, 1948, and so on. First, there was the emerging proletariat of the 1930s, which threw their weight behind the PPD in 1940, through the Confederacion General de Trabajadores. Angel Quintero Rivera, “La Base Social de la Transformación Ideológica del Partido Popular en la Decada del ‘40,” in Gerardo Navas Davila, ed., *Cambio y Desarrollo en Puerto Rico: Transformación Ideológica del PPD* (San Juan: Editorial UPR, 1980), 83–84. A second sector of importance was the class of “modernizing professionals.” Many engineers, economists, chemists, etc., found jobs in the “parallel bureaucracy” created by the U.S. federal government in PR and therefore embraced the PPD ideology, which favored permanent association with the United States. A third sector that backed the PPD in 1940 (and onwards) was composed of numerous nuclei of militant nationalists, mainly of petty-bourgeois extraction.
53. Ibid., 101–102.
55. Ibid., 36.
59. Ibid., 145.
60. Substate nationalists may put forward proposals that are sovereigntist variants of the classic independence route. These include proposals for Sovereignty-Association, for the establishment of an Associated Republic or Free Association relationship, and proposals for the founding of a model of Confederation.
62. Ibid., 191.
64. Díez Medrano, *Divided Nations*, 50, 55.
65. Ibid., 110.
70. Dion, *Quebec: The Unfinished Revolution*, 170.
72. Ibid., 340.
74. Levine, *Reconquest of Montreal*, 44.
76. Ibid., 65, 104.
77. Ibid., 213.
78. Gagnon and Montcalm, *Quebec: Beyond the Quiet Revolution*, 63.
80. Ibid., 225.
81. It is clear that autonomist nationalist parties such as the ADQ (after 1994) need to be included as part of the national movement, but it is less clear that federalist parties (the PLQ) need to be included. According to Claude Bariteau, more than 50 percent of the supporters (“partisans”) of the ADQ were favorable to sovereignty. Claude Bariteau, *Pour Sortir de l’Impasse Référendaire* (Montréal: Les Éditions des Intouchables, 2005). The militant base of the PLQ is borderline nationalist at best. Jaime Lluch, “Shades of Stateless Nationhood: Explaining Internal Variation in the Political Orientation of the National Movements of Québec and Catalunya (1976–2005)” (PhD Dissertation, Political Science Department, Yale University, 2007). However, the party itself, including its leaders, from the Jean Lesage years to the current Charest leadership, has inserted itself into the arena of national politics in Quebec. They have articulated a discourse and an official party line that is national in its tone and character.

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