The Concept of Nativism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments in Europe

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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the competitive advantage of the concept of nativism is four fold. First, nativism is a particular construction of nationalism and as such builds on a nationalist epistemology. Nativism, however, does not function as a nation-building ideology in the way nationalism worked in the modern period. Nativism emerges rather as a mechanism to modify already existing constructions of nationhood along ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ lines. Nativism cannot be equated with majority ethnic nationalism in that the construction of the ‘native’ community can be premised on ideological or cultural features, that is, along civic rather than ethnic lines. Second, nativism avoids the trap of reducing anti-immigrant sentiment and narratives to arguments of the populist radical right. Nativism highlights the processes by which left and right positioning is fading away in favour of the native/foreigner axis. Third, nativism also often has semantic overlaps with populism, but this is a contingent rather than fundamental intersection. Not all nativism is populist and not all populism is nativist. Fourth, nativism often encompasses racism and xenophobia, but these concepts are high-level concepts with a larger breadth than nativism. Nativism is often justified along racist lines, but at other times religious bigotry or ideological hatred are more salient. Nativism is a form of nationalism and xenophobia by definition, but nationalism and xenophobia can occur without necessarily amounting to nativism. I define nativism as a philosophical position, sometimes translated into a movement, whose primary goal is to restrict immigration in order to maintain some deemed essential characteristics of a given political unit.

Keywords
Nativism, Majority Ethnic Nationalism, Ethno-Nationalism, Populism, Radical Right, Racism, Islamophobia, Xenophobia, Anti-Immigrant Prejudice, Europe

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Introduction

‘As we are (semantically) prisoners of the words we pick, we had better pick them well’
Giovanni Sartori (1984: 60)

‘Nativism has been hard for historians to define’

The alarming rise of xenophobia in Europe in the post-Cold War period is no longer in doubt. For the past couple of decades, analysts have hoped that support for xenophobic populist right parties was a temporary and fringe phenomenon that would halt at around 20 per cent of the electoral vote. By 2014, it became clear that populism and xenophobia have been growing throughout Europe and have surpassed the 20 per cent electoral mark in Austria, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Norway, and Hungary.¹

Scholars trying to make sense of the resurgence of populism and xenophobia in Europe catalogue these parties and movements as extreme right, far right, radical right or right-wing populists (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Mudde 2007; Zaslove 2011; Mammone 2012) and disagree about the essential characteristics that define this family of parties (Fenemma 1997). While I think this approach yields useful results in understanding the discourse, policies, and electoral successes of xenophobic parties in Europe, it does not fully explain the widespread and growing appeal of these parties beyond their traditional constituencies. I explore the concept of nativism as a way to expand the analysis of anti-foreigner sentiments beyond the radical right.

One of the key elements of nativism is that it highlights the pre-eminence of the ‘us/them’ dichotomy that emerges in particular contexts of cultural diversity and immigration. As opposed to the various ‘right’ labels, nativism is predominant but by no means exclusively a ‘right’ phenomenon. Europe is not so much witnessing the mainstreaming of radical right policy agendas and discourses or the shifting of the political spectrum to the right, as it is entering into a nativist period in which constructions of belonging and policies regarding immigration and cultural diversity are being shaped by a new cleavage between ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives.’

Nativism also helps broaden the analysis of Islamophobia and xenophobia by highlighting the new ways in which a self-appointed ‘native’ society defines its values vis-à-vis the fundamental threat posed by a particular immigrant group or ethnic community. In defining these values, nativism can, and is, increasingly taking on civic characteristics, such as a defence of secularism, gender equality, or the rights of sexual minorities.

In this paper, I argue that the competitive advantage of the concept of nativism is four fold. First, nativism is a particular construction of nationalism and as such builds on a nationalist epistemology. Nativism, however, does not function as a nation-building ideology in the way nationalism worked in the modern period. Nativism emerges rather as a mechanism to modify already existing constructions of nationhood along ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ lines. Nativism cannot be equated with majority ethnic nationalism in that the construction of the ‘native’ community can be premised on ideological or cultural features, that is, along civic rather than ethnic lines. Second, nativism avoids the trap of reducing anti-immigrant sentiment and narratives to the populist radical right. Nativism

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highlights the processes by which left and right positioning is fading away in favour of the ‘native'/foreigner axis. Third, nativism also often has semantic overlaps with populism, but this is a contingent rather than fundamental intersection. Not all nativism is populist and not all populism is nativist. Fourth, nativism often encompasses racism and xenophobia, but these concepts are high-level concepts with a larger breath than nativism. Nativism is often justified along racist lines, but at other times religious bigotry or ideological hatred are more salient. Nativism is a form of nationalism and xenophobia by definition, but nationalism and xenophobia can occur without necessarily amounting to nativism.

By exploring the conceptual virtues, boundaries, and limitations of nativism, this paper aims to facilitate its adoption as an analytical tool to understand anti-immigrant discourse and movements in Europe and beyond. I will first discuss the conceptual boundaries of nativism and differentiate it from other overlapping concepts emerging from three different bodies of literature: nationalism studies, populist radical right studies, and critical race studies. Then I explore various definitions of nativism and propose my own. Finally, I conclude by looking at the advantages and limitations of the concept of nativism.

Genealogy and Concept Traveling
The term 'nativism' was coined by Louis Dow Scisco (1901) at the turn of the nineteenth century to describe principles advanced by the anti-foreign and anti-Catholic American Party, also known as the Know Nothing Party, in the United States of America (USA) in the 1850s. Since then, the use of the concept has been applied mostly to the American context but in an uneven way. As Tyler Anbinder’s (2006) historiographical analysis shows, Scisco’s study was a solitary attempt to study this phenomenon. It would not be until the 1920s when scholarly attention turned to the subject; the study of nativism had to wait until the late 1930s to become an acceptable subject in the top universities. The most influential academic work on nativism is historian John Higham’s Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism published in 1955. According to Higham (1988: xi), ‘[n]ativism as a habit of mind illuminates darkly some of the large contours of the American past; it has mirrored our anxieties and marked out the bounds of our tolerance’. Higham explained nativism as a complex ideology and identified three strands of US nativism directed against Catholics, radicals, and racialized groups that, between 1860 and 1925, were woven together to form the fabric of modern American nativism.

While it remained a lively academic subject, nativism did not become a popular term until it was embraced by the media in the 1990s after several conservative politicians, such as commentator Patrick J. Buchanan or the Republican California governor Pete Wilson, made immigration restriction a centrepiece of their bids for office and California voters backed nativism by adopting Proposition 187, which severely limited state assistance to undocumented immigrants. Its use subsided for a few years, only to re-emerge again with Arizona’s draconian anti-immigration legislation in 2010. Nativism has taken centre stage again in the United States with the anti-Mexican and anti-Muslim comments of Donald Trump, the billionaire businessman and 2016 Republican presidential candidate in the USA (for a historical overview, see Bennett 1990).

Giovanni Sartori’s influential 1970 article on ‘Concept misformation in comparative politics’ provided criteria for thinking about ‘conceptual travelling’ while avoiding the potential problem of ‘conceptual stretching’. Sartori differentiated between the extension and the intension of concepts. By intension, Sartori meant the meaning a concept calls forth and by extension the range of cases to which the concept can appropriately be applied. Furthermore, he differentiated between low-level, medium-level, and high-level concepts. Low-level concepts are those that are well-matched to a specific context of particular countries. A clear example would be the concept of Moorophobia, phobia or fear of the Moor, a concept that emerged out of the particular historical context and experiences of Spain.

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This concept cannot and should not travel to other European countries where other concepts, such as anti-Muslim prejudice or Islamophobia, are better suited. A medium-level concept may be suited for comparisons within world regions, and here is where I argue nativism resides. High-level concepts, such as xenophobia, are suitable for broader comparisons and the formation of general theories. Nativism is not a high-level concept because it does not apply well to countries without immigration or extensive cultural diversity caused by immigration, nor does it travel well to historical contexts of nation-building.

Despite these limitations, nativism is a useful concept to understand majority nationalism under conditions of mass migration in both imperial settler territories, such as Canadian New Brunswick in the 1840s (See 1993) and liberal democratic countries, such as the USA (Higham 1988; Tatalovich 1995; Anbinder 2006), Australia (Blackton 1958), Argentina (McGee Deutsch 1999) at various times in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, or the Netherlands since the 1980s (Lucassen and Lucassen 2015). It can also be applied to minority nationalism in regions such as Flanders since the late 1970s (Ceuppens 2006) and Quebec in the last few decades (Puttagunta 1998). Nativism can also be found in postcolonial settings, such as the Spanish cities of North-Africa in the mid-1980s (Guia 2014).

Nativism is a particular construction of nationalism that is not constrained by the size or the political structure of the unit, but rather by one of its conjunctural characteristics: Nativism appears in varied political units but always under conditions of mass immigration. It was first identified during the nineteenth century in so-called countries of immigration, the USA, Canada, and Australia, but it is increasingly being applied to postwar Europe. Nativism is one of the by-products of what Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (2009) identified as the Age of Migration, the period since 1945 that has witnessed increased migration flows, diversified origins and destinations, and a pluralization of migratory projects.

If Europe in the postwar period has experienced mass migration and growing conditions of super-diversity, – to use Steven Vertovec’s (2007) concept to refer to a high percentage of non-native born originating from multiple destinations and with various legal statuses –, and significant anti-immigrant movements and discourses, why has the concept of nativism not been applied to Europe more broadly? Part of the reason why nativism has not been identified as such in Europe, despite the fact that it has become a mainstream political position, is that the USA and Canada have created national myths of origin based on immigration from Europe, which allow their liberal elites to defend these myths against other elites banking on the politicization of immigration. These narratives, which incorporate immigration as part of the myth of origin of the country, make nativism a more controversial and contested ideology. In these countries, curtailing further European immigration had to be explained and justified on anti-Catholic or anti-radical grounds. In comparison, the national myths of European countries are based on the early settlement of peoples and their consequent rootedness. Today’s narratives of belonging still claim that there are ‘true’, ‘autochthonous’, ‘de souche’ Europeans who are the ‘natural’ inhabitants of a territory, while others cannot establish that centenarian or millenarian connection to the land. In the US, nativism needed to justify opposition to further immigration, while in Europe anti-nativist and cosmopolitan positions have been marginal and had to be justified, as opposed to the ‘naturalized’ nativists.

It is the same blindness that Leo Lucassen identifies for the lack of historical consciousness in postwar Europe about earlier migrations and the challenges of integration. The cause of present-day myopia lies in specific constructions of European national histories in which immigration does not fit. In Western Europe, ‘the idea of stable and static national populations, disturbed only by occasional refugee movements, still has the upper hand’ (Lucassen 2005: 198). The awareness of being ‘countries of immigration’ makes scholars and citizens in the United States or Australia more aware of nativist tendencies, discourses, and movements among them. The division between ‘old’ and ‘new’ members is more tenuous because, after all, most of them are immigrants as well. In Europe, the widespread narratives of European countries as ‘historical nations’, with their myths of common origin and bonds, regardless of whether they are of the ethnic and civic type, have obscured the emergence of new constructions of belonging and new cleavages between natives, who are imagined as rooted and thus non-immigrants, and non-natives, who are deemed recent arrivals. Europeans have been able to ignore
nativism and consider it a phenomenon particular to immigrant nations where older immigrants try to keep new immigrants out without realizing that European countries have become countries of immigration in the postwar period and thus they are no longer impervious to nativism in their midst.

A study similar to Higham’s, but of European nativism, still needs to be done. But a growing number of historians, political scientists, and sociologists are using the term to refer to anti-immigrant sentiments and movements in Europe (Betz and Meret 2009; Casanova 2009; Mudde 2007 and 2012; Hellström and Hervik 2014; Abu-Hayyeh 2014; Spierings and Zaslove 2015; Lucassen and Lucassen 2015; Kinnvall 2015; Smith 2016). The European study of nativism can draw on previous work by historians of anti-immigrant prejudice and the extensive work done by political scientists on the radical right (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Lucassen 2005; Mammone 2012).

**Conceptual Boundaries**

In this section, I aim to differentiate nativism from some of the similar concepts and ideologies with which it is usually conflated. I will start with nationalism, in particular its ethnic variations. I locate nativism within the duality of ethnic and civil nationalisms and separate it from patriotism, pride, and chauvinism. Then I discuss how nativism is different from the extreme right or populist radical right and how nativism often, but not always, incorporates populist elements. My final conceptual boundary is drawn by using critical race theory and disentangling nativism from racism, whiteness, xenophobia and other phobias.

**Nativism and Nationalism**

Literature on nationalism amply demonstrates how little agreement exists among scholars on the origins of nationalism and how to define ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, often alternatively understood as ideology, movements or sentiments (Hutchinson and Smith 1994; Ozkirimli 2010). Differences are also strong between those who stress the cultural rather than the political aspects of nationalism. Nationalism, Hutchinson and Smith (1994:4) remind us ‘was, first of all, a doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty.’ Nationalism involved freedom from external constraint, control of a given territory and its resources, which can only be achieved if the people is united, and dissolution of internal divisions in order to gather in a single historical territory, a homeland.

Nativism is a particular construction of nationalism that does not focus so much on ‘external’ constraints, but rather on internal minorities created by immigration. For nativists, the challenge to their freedom and sovereignty is not emerging from another state, from an internal historical minority that demands self-determination, or from the irredentist claims of a neighboring state. Rather, the challenge to their freedom of sovereignty derives from the arrival and settlement in the country of particular groups of migrants deemed dangerous for the preservation of the essence of an already existing ‘nation’. Nativists are nationalists, but not all nationalists are nativists. European countries have become internally diverse in the postwar period and this diversity has been opposed by some political agents with nativist narratives and policies. Nativism gives politicians a discursive path towards recreating unity and cultural or ethnic homogeneity. Nativists also offer a simplified rebuttal of postmodern scrutiny and criticism of the historical achievements of the ‘nation’ and a rejection of the cultural and social demands of minorities.

It is easy but unhelpful to conflate nativism with nationalism. Cas Mudde (2010: 1173) argues that a key feature of the ideology of Europe’s current populist radical right is nativism, an ‘ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the nation-state's homogeneity... Historically and ideologically, nativism is closely linked to the idea of the nation-state, a nationalistic construction that has become a cornerstone of European and global politics. The idea of the nation-state holds that each nation should have its own state and, although this is often left implicit, each state should have its own, single nation.’ In the first part of Mudde’s quote, he is equating ‘nativism’ with ‘ethnic nationalism.’ In the second part of the quote, he is conflating nativism with ‘nationalism’. While I agree with Mudde in identifying nativism as a crucial feature of today’s European populist radical right, I think these parties’ nativism is different from both traditional ethnic
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nationalism and older versions of nationalist constructions in their own countries. Nativists are redefining the ‘nation’ and not always along ethnic lines.

Nativism is often understood as ethnic nationalism, ethno-nationalism, majority ethnic nationalism, or mono-culture nationalism. All these terms are necessary to understand various types of nationalism, but none of them captures the nature of nativism and some of them may actually obscure non-ethnic varieties of nativism. Nativism can and has often involved a definition of the ‘natives’ on ethnic terms as opposed to unwelcomed migrant groups. The Italian Northern League and its increasing use of religion, whiteness, and ‘Italian’ culture to oppose immigrants is a case in point (Zazlove 2011). The real question in this case is whether the Northern League can be better understood through the lens of ethnic nationalism or nativism. Supporters of the Northern League are nationalists, but they represent a different nationalism than the one Giuseppe Mazzini endorsed. The Northern League uses ethnic elements, but they are not making irredentist claims like Gabriele D’Annunzio did against their Slav or French neighbors. The Northern League, who until very recently was premised on an agenda against Rome and Southern Italian migrants to northern provinces, now can be better understood as making nativist claims against immigrants on ethnic grounds (religion, language, ethnicity), thereby uniting again southern and northern Italians along a common ethnicity and culture.

The main reason for not conflating nativism with ethnic nationalism is that nativism can also be of the civic kind; and increasingly in Europe it merges both elements. While the duality between ethnic and civic nationalisms has been heavily criticized (Xenos 1996; Yack 1996; Özkirimli 2005: 24-26), the interpretative power of this typology has been incredibly influential. In civic nationalism, ‘the nation is defined in terms of a shared commitment to the public institutions of the state and civil society’, while ethnic nationalism emphasizes common descent and cultural sameness (Özkirimli 2005:23). Civic conceptions of the nation can be inclusive as long as new members accept the nation’s political creed, while ethnic notions of the ‘nation’ are more exclusionary.

In the Netherlands, anti-immigrant narratives use both ethnic and civic arguments. The appeal to autochthony (ethnic Dutch) as opposed to Western Allochthones, and especially non-Western allochthones, certainly falls within an ethnic understanding of nationhood. However, the growing salience of secularism, homonationalism3 (Puar 2013), and gender equality to oppose Muslim Dutch and Muslim immigration are civic arguments that go beyond ethnic characteristics. The clearer example of civic nativism emerging in Europe today is Marine Le Pen’s Front National’s embrace of republican values against those internal minorities who, regardless of their ethnicity, embrace communitarianism and thus are not considered French patriots. Despite inconsistencies within the Front National and the strength of solidarity among ethnic French, Marine Le Pen is trying to re-shape Frenchness and redefine it in its civic form. In doing so, she is enlisting a strong civic culture for nativist purposes (Mondon 2014).

Nativism should not be equated either with majority ethnic nationalism because nativism can also emerge within minority nationalist movement. The difficulty lies in that usually, within minority nationalisms, nation-building constructions of nationalism that primarily oppose majority nationalism and the state where they find themselves, predominate over nativist constructions that oppose immigrants. But as the case of Flanders and Quebec show, both strands of nationalism can coexist under conditions of cultural diversity and immigration (Adam and Deschouwer 2015; Nadeau and Helly 2016; Leroux 2014).

Nativism should be differentiated as well from the concepts of national identity and nationhood. Identity is a complex, contradictory, context-dependent and fluid concept (Bauman 2000) that cannot be reduced to national identity, even though in the modern era the national features of identity have been hegemonic and salient at various times. According to John Breuilly (1994: 110), there is no rational way of showing that nationalist ideology is an expression of national identity. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) would argue that the connection goes the other way around, that national identity is an expression of nationalist ideology. Debate on the origins and typology of

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3 Understood as the mechanism by which “acceptance” and “tolerance” for gay and lesbian subjects have become a barometer by which the right to and capacity for national sovereignty is evaluated (Puar 2013).
national identity and nationalist ideology are still unresolved and beyond our purpose here. In order to understand how nativism connects with these two concepts, suffice to say that nativism is a way to re- shape the features and contours of an already established construction of national identity in order to exclude from nationhood people who have a legitimate claim to it.

Is nativism better understood as ethnocentrism, the belief that your own group or culture is better or more important than others, or Eurocentrism for Europe, the belief and tendency to interpret the world in terms of European values and experiences? Higham (1988: 335) suggests that nativism cannot be equated to the ‘far larger subject of ethnocentrism. Obviously nativism was an inflated and nationalistic type of ethnocentrism. It was therefore related to—and surely influenced by—the myriad ways in which people of all kinds favor their own group and assert its superiority without necessarily being either nativists or racists in a strict sense.’ In the same fashion, nativism has many semantic overlaps with chauvinism, understood as excessive or blind patriotism, jingoism, or ‘undue partiality and attachment to a group or place to which one belongs or has belonged’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). Chauvinism may turn into nativism under conditions of mass migration perceived as a fundamental threat, but chauvinism may also exist in many other contexts, for instance in France in the mid-nineteenth century when the term was first coined.

John Hutchinson (2005) highlighted that ‘nations’ are zones of conflict within which various ethnic legacies and state formations vie for hegemony. Nativism is not a historical necessity of liberal and culturally-diverse democracies. Alternative forms of nationalism that oppose nativism and fight racism can emerge alongside nativist projects. Higham (1988:334) named this alternative type of nationalism ‘America’s cosmopolitan faith’, and defined it as ‘a concept of nationality that stressed the diversity of the nation’s origins, the egalitarian dimension of its self-image, and the universality of its founding principles’. In a similar fashion but for the Canadian context, philosopher John Ralston Saul (2008) has argued in favour of a Canadian national mythology that includes the contribution of first nations and thus embraces its mixed origins, its métis aboriginal-European heritage. This is but the latest, most complex, and historically informed recreation of the Canadian national myth. It comes after decades of success of the doctrine of multiculturalism Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau generated in 1971. Multiculturalism in Canada successfully shifted the nation's imagery from a nation with two founding peoples, French and English colonists, to a nation that slowly incorporated the contributions of first nations and multiple immigrant communities from all over the world.

Nativists do not describe themselves with that term. In Europe, most people would not recognize the concept, or use it. Nativists usually think of themselves as patriots, or perhaps nationalists. Nativists use concepts such as national pride and patriotism to make a claim on the ‘nation’, but their claim usually contradicts other understanding of patriotism. To use Higham’s analysis, adherents to the ‘American cosmopolitan faith’ would think of themselves as patriots at the same time as proponents of immigration restriction would also claim that title for themselves.

**Nativism and the Left-Right Political Spectrum**

There is a growing consensus that European radical right populism, extreme right populism, far right, and right wing populism, a phenomenon with many names, is nativist today (Fenemma 1997; Mudde 2007; Wodak 2015). In the interwar period, however, the Western European extreme right was racist and fascist, but not nativist. The conditions for nativism to emerge that I have outlined above did not exist in the interwar period. Nativism and right-wing populism are often linked together, but not necessarily so. Nativism is not a party family in the traditional way and cannot easily be located along the left-right political spectrum. In fact, nativism upsets, temporarily if we look at the American experience with nativist outbursts, the left-right political spectrum to privilege a different axis: us-them, natives and non-natives.

The reason for moving beyond the left-right axis is not connected to the fact that right-wing populist parties do not identify themselves as radical, or right wing, or populist and may reject the left-right wing distinction as obsolete. The Front National, for instance, would argue that they are ‘neither left, nor right, but French’ (Mudde 2015: 296). The reason for moving beyond the left-right axis is that this axis has difficulty encompassing phenomena that do not traditionally fit the radical right. The emergence of welfare chauvinism is a case in point. Since World War Two, conservative and centre
right parties, who up until then had supported economic laissez faire and opposed state planning, made a U-turn and embraced what Tony Judt (2005) called ‘the social democratic moment.’ The broad consensus that emerged after the war in favour of developing a welfare state, social rights, full employment, and good living conditions that would deter Europeans from joining Fascism and Communism again was broken by the neoliberal wave started by Margaret Thatcher in 1979. Judt (2005) calls this ‘the end of the affair’. After the 1980s, was it an anachronism that many populist right movements defended the welfare state in the form of welfare chauvinism? Defending the welfare state and social rights had been a left-wing position, but in this matter, the left and radical right agreed. They, however, disagreed about who should be entitled to social rights and benefits. How uneasily Northern populist parties are located on the left-right sides of the political spectrum has been noted by many scholars (See for Norway Marsdal 2013; for the Netherlands De Koster, Achterberg, and Van Der Waal 2013; for Finland and Sweden Nordensvard and Ketola 2015; and for Denmark Togeby 1998).

Should we ask ourselves whether the radical right is adopting social democratic positions, and thus ‘coopting’ the left, or whether the radical right is applying a nativist logic to their particular post-1989 context? Is the right turning left or the left turning nativist? Nativism is a broader term than right-wing populism in that it allows researchers to move beyond studying the right part of the political spectrum to incorporate left-wing or populist and regionalist movements more broadly, as long as they are primarily defined by a particular definition of the we/them dichotomy and their opposition to immigration.

Nativism usually starts on the right of the political spectrum and from there works its logic to the centre and left. Scholars of the populist right have talked of the ‘mainstreaming’ of the far or extreme right and of the impact of the radical right on the other parties, as if its uneven influence was mostly on the left-right axis (Camia 2012; Mondon 2013; Shumacher and Van Kersbergen 2016). I argue that one of the crucial contributions of the radical right is to naturalize a nativist logic devoid of the traditional far-right agenda (i.e. authoritarianism, anti-Semitism and laissez faire economics) that is then adopted by other parties.

The North African town of Melilla exemplifies this right-left trajectory. In Melilla, nativism was first supported by extreme right parties, and after Muslim Melillans began to demand access to citizenship and equal rights, the far and conservative right managed to convince growing numbers of ethnic European Melillans that Muslims Melillans were a fundamental threat and a fifth column speaking for the interest of the King of Morocco. At this point, the ruling Socialist party in town embraced this nativist logic and all parties and civic society organizations had to take sides: with ‘us’ (ethnic Europeans) or ‘them’ (Muslim Melillans). Most organizations sided with nativism without much damage, but the local branch of the left-wing trade union Comisiones Obreras had to expel its president and those members who refused to defend the rights of the Muslim minority. Nativism became, for a couple of years, the most salient cleavage in town and only receded and allowed other political cleavages to return once Madrid decided to disavow it by forcing the local authorities into a gradual granting of Spanish citizenship to Muslim residents (Guia 2014).

Nativism, as the Canadian example shows, is not restricted to the populist right. It can also be embraced by mainstream right and centre-left sections of the political spectrum simultaneously. During the 2015 federal elections in Canada, the incumbent conservative party led by Stephen Harper, who by that time had been 9 years in office and was facing a growing demand for change, turned to nativism to try to remain in power. Stephen Harper recruited the Australian election strategist Lynton Crosby, who had helped engineer the victory of the Conservative Party in the 2015 British parliamentary elections and had a record of moral flexibility with anti-immigrant slogans. Harper chose a cultural campaign that concentrated on Islam in Canada and Muslims as symbolizers of un-Canadianness. Harper promised to appeal a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in order to force Muslim women wearing the full veil to attend citizenship ceremonies with their face uncovered. Harper also equated Islam with barbaric cultural practices (i.e. polygamy, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and discrimination of women) and passed the

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Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act a few months before the election. Targeting Muslims was just the most obvious attempt at re-writing national history against Liberal multiculturalism (Griffith 2013) and along Anglo-French patriotic grounds, re-imagined as ‘old-stock Canadians,’ an expression that was not widely used before the 2015 federal election. For the first time, a mainstream federal politician was trying to pitch New Canadians (particularly Muslims) as a threat to the values and achievements of Old Canadians.

Harper was not the first political agent to attempt to use nativism in Canada. Constructions of nationalism in the region of Quebec have been informed by the growing visibility of devout Muslim Quebecois and demands for accommodation by all religious minorities (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). Faced with these challenges, some minority nationalists have turned towards nativism. Nativism in Quebec was championed by the centre-left Parti Québécois (PQ), which attempted to codify it with the so-called ‘Charter of Quebec Values.’ Other Quebec nationalists turned towards a growing push for interculturalism (Bouchard 2012) and a minority for a pluralistic defence of independence where the real enemy is Ottawa rather than minority religions in Quebec (Weinstock 2007).

Nativism and Populism

The electoral success of left-wing populist parties in the last few years in Europe, for instance Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain, has sparked renewed interest in populism in Europe. Until now, populism in Europe was almost exclusively linked to the radical right, leading to an incorrect conflation of populism and xenophobia, as if the left was impervious to both phenomena. Populism, in its original form, is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: a ‘corrupt’ elite and a ‘common’ and ‘pure’ people. Populists argue that politics should be an expression of the will of the people. Giovani Sartori (2005) did not see populism as forming a party family in the same way as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, fascism, communism, or Christian democracy did. Anton Pelinka (2013: 9) and others argue that populism represents a specific strategy and a specific behavior, but not a specific programmatic agenda. In fact, populism can be understood as a ‘distinct method of mobilization used by very different parties’.

Populism explains well the duality between ordinary people and elites (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). But populism per se does not define ‘who’ these people are beyond ordinary people. For these it needs to turn into nativism.

Cas Mudde (2007) argues that populism is often connected with other ideologies, such as nationalism on the right (nativism) and socialism on the left. I would counter-argue that nativism is a particular construction of nationalism that often, but not always, emerges in the form of populist movements. I believe nativism often adopts populism as a method of mobilization and can also adopt the duality of people, the ‘native’ people, against ‘elites’, who allowed immigrants or minorities to enter and pollute the country. A good example of populist nativism is Geert Wilders’s party in the Netherlands. Wilders charges against pro-Europe and pro-multiculturalism elites, accusing them of endangering the ‘real’ values of the Netherlands by encouraging Muslim immigration. I argued before that nativism is not only right wing and now I would like to show that not all nativism is populist in the same way. Limiting nativism to a combination of right-wing agenda, authoritarianism, and populism as Mudde does (2007) is rightly identifying the main figure in a photograph, but missing its shadow.

Not all nativism is populism. In my research of the nativist outburst in the mid-1980s in the North-African city of Melilla (Guia 2014: 10-40), nativist mobilization and narratives were populist only insofar as they claim to speak in the name of the ‘people’ and set to defend the survival of the


6 Bill 60’s official title was “Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and the equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests”. It was proposed by Quebec Premier Pauline Marois in 2013 and became one of the key factors in the defeat of her party in the 2014 provincial elections that were won by the Liberal Party candidate.
‘people’ in the face of what they perceived as threats to Spanish sovereignty by Morocco (warranted) and the Muslim residents in town (unwarranted). Nativists in Melilla did not use anti-elite discourse and did not separate themselves from other ordinary Spaniards in mainland Spain or from their political elites in Madrid. Nativists surely criticized the national government for its indecision and weakness during a conflict that pitched nativists, mostly Ethnic Europeans, against their Muslim neighbors – who demanded access to Spanish citizenship rather than being forced to apply for foreigners’ permits after the 1985 immigration law was passed –, but they were not populists in the strict sense of the word. My previous discussion of nativism in mainstream Canadian parties, both on the right and the left, also points to the possibility of nativism emerging in parties that are not populist. Nativism against Haitians in the Dominican Republic, spearheaded by the center-right Prime Minister Danilo Medina, is nativist, but not populist.7

Nativism and Prejudice
The study of prejudice has gone a long way since the publication of Gordon W. Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice in 1954. Allport defined prejudice as ‘thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant’ (2008: 6). This opens the door to enquire whether thinking ill of others with sufficient warrant, which nativists would argue is precisely what they are doing, is not prejudicial. Allport would remind them that in order to have prejudice ‘there must be an attitude of favour or disfavor; and it must be related to an overgeneralized (and therefore erroneous) belief’ (2008: 13). Nativists are prejudicial in that they overgeneralize the threat that a category of people inflicts on their nation.

Racism, understood as a ‘belief that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary) and nativism are different things in Higham’s view (1988: 333), though they have often been closely allied. ‘Racism, the older and more categorical of the two, divided the whole creation into hierarchized types. It was more consistently concerned with horizontal distinctions between civilization and barbarism than it was with boundaries between nation-states’. In contrast, nativism ‘always divided insiders, who belonged to the nation, from outsiders who were in it but not of it’. Nativism can and often does incorporate racism, but racism is a wider concept. Racism not only seeks to ‘exclude alien races but also to enforce indelible differences of states within one’s own society’. For Higham, nativism ‘could espouse assimilation. Racism could not.’

To which degree can the concept of nativism engage and benefit from the growing body of literature on whiteness studies? Both the study of nativism and whiteness are products of American academia. ‘Starting from the now widely shared premise that race is an ideological or social construct rather than a biological fact… [scholars] have shifted attention from how Americans have looked at blacks to how Americans looked at whites, and to whiteness as a central component of American’s racial ideology’ (Kolchin 2002: 155). And both concepts have been slow to travel to Europe. Since most of the nativist outbursts have so far occurred among people who self-identify as white, whiteness studies are extremely useful. But there is nothing intrinsic about reducing nativism to a white phenomenon. Nativism could and has happened in South Africa, India, or Zimbabwe among non-white populations as well. White nationalists are particular types of nativists, but nativism cannot and should not be reduced to white nationalism.

According to Higham, prejudice and nativism do not necessarily go hand in hand. Prejudice is always there in one form or another, but nativism remains at a low ebb unless other factors occur, such as an economic downturn or a loss of public confidence in the ability of the nation to assimilate minorities and immigrants. So, while at some point a group of people may be despised on account of their racialization, religion, or culture, there may be not be an overwhelming fear that the group is able to undermine the very essence of the ‘nation’ (Zelman 1989). We can thus identify racism or prejudice in this case, but not nativism.

According to Raymond Taras (2012: 13), ‘xenophobia may be viewed as the flip side of ethnocentrism. The first expresses a fear or dislike of foreigners, the second represents an assertion of the primacy of one’s own group in ordering the world which may become the basis of discriminatory

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practices’. I have discussed before that nativism is a form of ethnocentrism and now I should clarify that nativism necessarily implies xenophobia, but again, as in the case of racism and ethnocentrism, xenophobia is a wider and higher-up concept than nativism. Xenophobia, understood as ‘fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary), can occur under many sorts of conditions. Nativism turns xenophobia into a particular way of re-defining the ‘nation’ in the face of a constructed fundamental threat. An example that can clarify these differences lies in the Italian Northern League, it was xenophobic against Southern Italians in the 1990s and nativist against non-ethnic Italian migrants and minorities since the 2000s.

While racism and prejudice are clearly transgressions of democratic and civic norms, nativism, in particular in its more civic construction is not so obviously a challenge for liberal democratic values. Nativism, as opposed to fascism or racism, has been better able to survive as a viable political position in the postwar period. While most radical right movements in Europe attempt to separate themselves from their interwar counterparts, from blatant anti-Semitism and other forms of racism with the exception of Islamophobia, they have safely embraced nativism.

And this connects with my final point in this section. Why not speak of Islamophobia rather than nativism? All nativists in Europe are today embracing anti-Islam prejudice of one sort or another. Islamophobia, understood as fear of, hatred of, and discrimination against Muslims or Islam is one of the postwar characteristics of nativism in Europe. The difficulty with Islamophobia is that it places most of the analytical weight in the object of fear or hatred, Islam and Muslims, and obscures how important for nativists are the reasons why they fear Muslims and the reasons why they need to act to stop Muslims from joining their societies. Nativism allows for a dual focus. On the one hand, nativists focus on the values and essential features they deemed crucial to the point of requiring the restriction of immigration and of the rights of a particular minority that undermines the nation from within. On the other hand, nativists focus on their self-appointed threatening agent, which in European nativism today is Islam and Muslims.

Towards a Working Definition of Nativism
Earlier on I mentioned Giovanni Sartori’s (1984) ideas on the extension of a concept. Now I would like to look at the intension, the content of a concept, of nativism. For John Higham (1988 [1954]: 4), nativism ‘should be defined as intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e. “un-American”) connections’. While this definition was useful for the American context, it does not travel as well as other definitions that unpack the two main dimensions within nativism. Tyler Anbinder (2005) explained that ‘Some use the word to describe the movement to restrict the flow of immigrants into the United States…. Other scholars focus on mindset rather than policy goals when defining nativism, describing it as an ethnocentric ideology that seeks to maintain the racial, religious, and political status quo of the nation. I believe that both worldview and a desire to roll back the impact of immigrants are essential components of nativism’ (177). As can be seen in Table 1, I agree with Anbinder’s assessment that nativism is both a worldview and a movement with anti-immigration policy goals.

Anbinder (2005: 177), however, concludes by assigning the term ‘nativist’ to ‘describe someone who fears and resents immigrants and their impact on the United States, and who wants to take some action against them, be it through violence, immigration restriction, or placing limits on the rights of newcomers already in the United States. “Nativism” describes the movement to bring the goals of nativists to fruition’. I am not sure that equating nativism with anti-immigrant prejudice is the best way to proceed. If we were to follow Anbinder’s definition, a large contingent, if not a majority of the inhabitants of many European countries today, could be considered nativists, as immigration restriction is widely accepted as a mainstream policy position. The breadth of the concept would not allow us to differentiate between those whose worldview prioritizes ‘natives’, and thus oppose immigration as a fundamental policy measure, from those who have criticisms regarding immigration management, but do not restrict the rights of minorities or accept a wide restriction of immigration.

The main difficulty in identifying nativism is three fold. First, there is nothing ‘natural’ in the process of social construction of a ‘native’ group. True Finns, for instance, as the nativist Finns Party was called until recently, have to be established as the natural majority, as the native descendants of
the Finnish soil. In the process, alternative contenders for the position, who could claim a longer presence in Finland, such as the Sami people, traditionally known in English as Lapps or Laplanders, are necessarily denaturalized as un-Finnish.\footnote{The Finns Party English Website, https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/kielisivu/in-english/ [Last accessed on 25 November 2015].} Moreover, according to a nativist logic, being born in a territory per se does not guarantee a claim to ‘nativeness,’ rather one has to be part of the ‘native’ stock (blood in ethnic conceptions of nativism) or the ‘native’ culture (in civic or ideological conceptions of nativism) in order to make a claim to the soil, to the territory.

A second difficulty lies in how diffuse is its articulation. Joel Fetzer (2000) in his comparison of the United States, Germany, and France reminds us that nativism must be three things at the same time: anti-immigrant sentiment, anti-immigration policies, and support for anti-immigrant political movements. Since there is no nativist manifesto or foundational text, nativists are easily misidentified. Nativists in Europe are usually equated with populist radical right movements, which is not entirely accurate and conflates nativism only with its right-wing manifestation. In fact, there is no special characteristic in the definition of nativism connected to the left-right political axis. Nativism carves a different cleavage, a native/non-native axis.

Third, the concept of nativism is highly malleable, elastic, and semantically fluid. It is like scaffolding in which nativist agents introduce the context-specific content for each unit, be it a city, a region, or a country. In Table 1, I offer a conceptual map of the concept of nativism as a philosophical outlook with a range of policy indicators. In order to speak of nativism, we should be looking at a political unit necessarily under conditions of mass migration or internal cultural diversity. The essential characteristic for a discourse, party, or movement to be called nativist is that an immigrant group or ethnic minority is constructed as a fundamental threat to the ‘nation’ and thus immigration restriction of this particular group/s becomes a primary political (survival) goal. This immigration restriction is paramount in order to protect some deemed essential features or values of the ‘nation’. Unity of the ‘nation’ is crucial to protect it from this fundamental threat. Thus any alternative construction of belonging by other ‘natives’ is an attempt at encouraging pluralism and ultimately sets the stage for the demise of the ‘nation’. Since ‘natives’ are in charge of protecting native culture and values, they require priority for their rights. For nativists, culture is static and operates in a zero-sum logic, so that the more other cultures take hold of a territory, the less chance the ‘native’ culture has of surviving unscathed.

The political characteristics of a unit, imperial territory, liberal democracy or authoritarian regime, are not irrelevant though. They determine which policy implications are derived from the nativist logic and worldview. For instance, as we can see in Table 1, welfare chauvinism is a potential feature of nativist demands, but that feature is a postwar European phenomenon. Nativists use the social democratic consensus that emerged after World War Two to determine who should be entitled to social benefits and rights. Welfare chauvinism was not a policy implication during the British Empire for the obvious reason that those rights and benefits were non-existent at the time.

I propose to define nativism as a philosophical position, sometimes translated into a movement, whose primary goal is to restrict immigration in order to maintain some deemed essential characteristics of a given political unit. The essential characteristics, i.e. the cultural, racial, religious, or political status quo, will be contingent on the time and place where nativism emerges. As for the size of the political unit, I have identified nativist movements in dependent colonial territories, sovereign countries, minority nations, and postcolonial cities.

For a nativist logic to become hegemonic, it requires a clear external or internal enemy, the erasure of internal cleavages within the ‘native’ population, and a compelling and dominant narrative of belonging. Nativism thus should be understood as a philosophical outlook and an eclectic collection of policies that redefines who the ‘real’ people of a political unit are and who consequently should have more rights and decision-making power to determine the characteristics of that society vis-à-vis a group considered exogenous and incapable of assimilating.
### Table 1 – Constitutive Elements of Nativism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical Worldview</th>
<th>Policy Implications</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fundamental Threat</strong>*</td>
<td>– Restrict immigration*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Or restrict particular groups of immigrants*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– And/or restrict the political rights of minorities*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Essential Features and Values in Need of Protection</strong>*</td>
<td>– Preserve native cultural values*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Preserve religious values</td>
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<td></td>
<td>– Preserve racial composition</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Preserve ideological hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture as a Zero-Sum Concept</strong>*</td>
<td>– Support only native culture*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Minimize non-native cultural uses of the public sphere~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Restrict cultural rights of non-native minorities~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Avoid Multiculturalism and Interculturalism~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priority for Natives’ Rights</strong>*</td>
<td>– Welfare Chauvinism: Social rights should be restricted to natives +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Eliminate policies that guarantee or promote equality between natives and non-native groups~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Single Narrative of Belonging</strong>*</td>
<td>– Nativists embody the real nation and thus ‘Natives’ who embrace cultural diversity, cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism are traitors~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Natives who defend a civic nation with limited levels of mandatory acculturation are also endangering the nation~</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sine qua non components for nativism / + Postwar European characteristics / ~ Post-1989 European multiculturalism backlash

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### Conclusion: Advantages and Limitations of the Concept of Nativism

One of the main difficulties with the concept of nativism is whether or not it is an ideology. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (2016: 8) define ideology as ‘a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values’. Moreover, following Mullins (1972), Wodak and Meyer highlight that ideologies must have four central characteristics: An ideology must have power over cognition, must be capable of guiding an individual’s evaluations, must provide guidance through action, and must be logically coherent. Nativism is a bizarre ideology if it is indeed an ideology. First, while nativism fulfills the four main characteristics mentioned above, it is extremely contingent on place and time and thus can hardly be considered a coherent set of values and beliefs. Second, nativism is not relatively stable as a set of beliefs or values. Third, nativism is also not easily identified by reference to a founding text (such as Capital: Critique of Political Economy or The Communist Manifesto for Socialism and Communism) or by its emergence as a social movement and subsequent praxis in government, as can be done in the case of Fascism. The normative and conceptual advantages of considering nativism an ideology are unclear.

Wodak and Meyer (2016: 9) consider it important to distinguish between ideology, which comes from the Marxist tradition, and discourse, which has gained significance in the linguistic turn in modern social theory. Conflating discourse and ideology could lead to an inflationary use of both concepts to the point of becoming empty signifiers by simultaneously indicating texts, positioning, and subjectivities, as well as belief systems, structures of knowledge and social practices (Wodak 2012). I believe discourse analysis is necessary to identify nativist logic in unusual places of the political spectrum where nativism is not predominant.
These difficulties in identifying nativism as a fully-fledged ideology bring me to consider nationalism as the underlying ideology and nativism as a particular construction of nationalism, which often incorporates elements of populism into a specific nativist Manichean logic. Nativism is a mechanism to re-draw boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and justify the maintenance of privilege for a particular group. Nativism is a particular narrative logic that creates a representation of the world that contributes to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination, and exploitation. Rather than focusing on whether nativism is or is not an ideology, I think it would be more useful to consider it a type of logic and often a practice that is diffuse and flexible, and thus amenable to incorporating country-specific content.

Another difficulty in the concept of nativism is that it has been used both to refer to anti-immigrant discourse and movements by self-appointed ‘natives’ but also to refer to ‘the revival or perpetuation of an indigenous culture especially in opposition to acculturation’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). Indigenous claims to sovereignty and self-determination, as well as cultural revival, have often been studied and understood as nativism (Weisman 2007). Things can get really complicated when nativism is applied not only to the claims of Afrikaners in South Africa, but also to the Native Club created in 2006 by Black South Africans (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). Despite some unhelpful over-stretching, nativism is overwhelmingly used in the way I defined it early on to refer to a worldview primarily based on anti-immigrant attitudes that often translate into policies and movements by a self-appointed ‘native’ majority.

One of the advantages of employing the concept of nativism is that it reflects the importance the dichotomy between us, natives, and them, immigrants or minorities, takes at particular times of perceived or real economic and cultural crisis. It helps us overcome outdated European twentieth-century divisions between left and right. Nativism by definition speaks of the dynamics that emerge at times of mass immigration and saliency of anti-immigrant sentiment. Another advantage is its global reach. The concept of nativism has moved beyond the Americas and imperial settler contexts in Canada and Australia to be increasingly applied to Africa, in particular South Africa and Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009), Asia, and Europe.

Nativism encompasses a particular worldview and construction of nationalism that can potentially become a political movement with stark policy implications, but remains an elusive and highly malleable and diffuse phenomenon. The concept of nativism allows us to re-engage with theories of nationalism and national identity construction and highlights the constructive elements of how humans arrive at perceptions, attitudes, and social bonds. Anti-immigrant attitudes are not limited to the radical populist right, but we have studied this phenomenon too often limiting it to this side of the political spectrum, thereby obscuring how easily these attitudes can travel. The concept of nativism allows us to identify it throughout both poles of the left-right political spectrum. Nativism is not a whitewash term for racism or Islamophobia. Nativists are often racists and Islamophobes, but nativism as a logic has historically not been constrained to a particular ‘ism’ or ‘phobia’. Nativism is intrinsically xenophobic, but not always with the same groups. Moreover, nativism in my view is a mid-level concept, while racism and xenophobia are high-level concepts.

Beyond the current conceptual exploration of nativism there remains a lot of work to be done on how European nativism is currently being articulated. What are its novel cleavages and defining lines? Many scholars have rightly identified the existence of new cultural wars in Europe (Bornschier 2010) that are fought on new terrain, such as gender equality (Hamel 2005; Zine 2006) and gay rights (Puar 2013). Scholars of Europe need the concept of nativism today probably as much as Europeans themselves could do away with it.
References


The Concept of Nativism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments in Europe


