

# **What do voters want? Dimensions and configurations in individual-level preferences and party choice**

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## **Abstract**

In this paper, we map the political space of individual-level voter preferences throughout European capitalist regimes, and we assess both its socio-structural determinants and its impact on party choice. We argue that both the cultural and the economic conflict dimensions need to be reconceptualized, and their respective impact on party choice combined in order to understand the electoral dynamics in contemporary capitalism. Based on ESS-data, we show that cultural conflict in Europe today involves not only issues of cultural liberalism, immigration and EU integration, but also distributive questions regarding welfare chauvinism and welfare misuse. Hence, the boundaries between economic and cultural conflict are blurred. At the same time, the economic-distributive conflict has become heterogeneous, since preferences regarding issues such as redistribution, social investment and social insurance do not simply align on a single dimension. We then show that despite stark differences in the average levels of voter preferences regarding economic and cultural conflict, their configuration and socio-structural determinants are very similar across Europe: education is the main determinant of cultural preferences, while economic preferences are structured by income and a new class conflict dividing the middle class.

Finally, we assess the impact of cultural and economic preferences for party choice. It appears very clearly that the vote choice for green and radical right-wing populist parties (the challenger parties) is explained by cultural attitudes. Economic preferences, by contrast, are relevant for voters' choice of the mainstream parties of the moderate right and left. Overall, our findings show that the culturally mobilized challenger parties alter the dynamics of party competition throughout Europe, even with regard to the moderate parties that still distinguish themselves with regard to economic issues. Therefore, an analysis of contemporary capitalist politics needs to take into account both cultural and economic dimensions of political conflict.

## 1. Introduction

There is a contrast in the way voter preferences are conceptualized in two strands of current literature: while most of the comparative political economy literature implicitly or explicitly theorizes voter preferences and their relevance for party choice in terms of – mostly unidimensional - economic/distributive conflict (see e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981, Iversen and Soskice 2006, Anderson and Beramendi 2008, Pontusson and Rueda 2010) the literature on political parties and elections that deals with the determinants of party choice has always emphasized the importance of alternative, non-economic conflicts (see e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Rokkan 2000, Bartolini 2000, Hooghe et al. 2002, Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, De la O and Rodden 2008). To be sure, in the literature on political parties and elections there has always been another strand, which argued that in West-European countries, the behavior of parties and voters alike has been structured by one single ideological dimension – left-right (e.g. Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996; Van der Eijk et al. 1999, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Klingemann, et al. 1994; Hix 1999). In this alternative strand, left-right is sometimes seen as the equivalent of a socioeconomic dimension. However, some representatives of this strand allow for the substantive meaning of left-right to vary across countries and over time. They argue that the left-right dimension has assimilated new political issues so that the left-right position of parties summarizes their positions on a large number of specific issues, both economic and non-economic (e.g. van der Brug and van Spanje 2009, Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990).

We argue in this paper that both strands of literature should integrate each other's insights. More specifically, we contend that in order to understand the challenges political parties face in contemporary capitalist democracies, the findings from both strands of literature need to be combined for several reasons.

First of all, the European political space cannot be reduced to a single dimension, but has always been and still is structured by at least two dimensions – an economic and a cultural one. The coexistence of two (or more) dimensions of conflict fundamentally alters the way we ought to view the electoral landscape and has critical implications for the way preferences shape party choice. The CPE-literature always struggled with the existence of parties based on religion – the Christian-democratic conundrum (see Manow 2009). As de la O and Rodden (2008) have confirmed once again, the poor do not necessarily vote for the left and this influences the whole micro-logic of politics in democratic capitalist countries. Even if, under the impact of the structural transformation of European societies, religion has been losing some of its structuring capacity for politics, this by no means implies that the cultural dimension has lost its power.

Second, the boundaries between distributional (economic) and cultural conflicts have become blurred: issues such as welfare chauvinism or the unequal effects of welfare states on men and women have a strong cultural connotation and are related to issues such as immigration or universalism/particularism. Cultural conflicts interfere in economic, distributive struggles (see e.g. Manow 2002, Manow and van Kersbergen 2009, Kitschelt and Mc Gann 1995, Kitschelt and Rehm 2005, Häusermann 2010), which means that some economic issues cannot be analyzed exclusively in terms of economic left-right conflicts.

Third, the traditional left-right economic dimension (state intervention vs. market liberalism) itself needs to be reconceptualized in the context of welfare state maturation (Pierson 2001) and post-industrialism (Esping-Anderson 1999), and in the light of new

theories on the institutional configuration and rationale of capitalist regimes, the Varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001). The economic conflict dimension can no longer be analyzed in terms of "more vs. less welfare spending", since post-industrial capitalism faces a range of different and distinct challenges, such as the conflicts between social insurance and redistribution, or between social protection and social investment.

The goal of this contribution is to map the structure of the political space of individual-level preferences throughout democratic Western capitalism. We address three questions. First, we ask what are the key conflict lines in contemporary capitalism? We shall argue that there are at least two fundamental dimensions of conflict structuring the individual level preferences in European societies – an economic and a cultural one. We shall analyze and discuss the meaning of each one of these dimensions under contemporary conditions, and discuss possible explanations for cross-country differences in the composition and relevance of these dimensions. Second, we turn to the question of the socio-structural factors determining the individual level preferences with regard to these two conflict dimensions. We shall analyze and discuss the usual suspects (education and class in particular) and show the pattern of factors, which account for the polarization on each of the two fundamental dimensions. Third, we address the question of the consequences of these preferences with respect to party choice. To what extent do the preferences on these two dimensions allow us to explain the election outcomes in European societies.

For our empirical analyses, we shall use the most recent version of the European Social Survey (ESS 2008). This survey includes no less than 29 countries from all parts of Europe and beyond (Israel, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia). These data will allow us to compare the

preference formation, its social structural origins and its political implications in different types of capitalist production regimes – liberal market economies (LMEs), continental coordinated market economies (CMEs), Nordic coordinated market economies (NMEs), state market economies (SMEs), and Central and Eastern European market economies (CEEs). In the next section, we elaborate our theoretical ideas, before we turn to answering our three questions based on the comparative survey data.

## **2. Theory**

Religion and class have traditionally been the two conflicts structuring European politics. Arguably, both have been losing much of their structuring capacity as a result of the large-scale processes of secularization, value change, rising standards of living and the pacification of industrial relations. In line with this societal transformation, many observers have declared the decline of cleavage politics and the rise of individualized political choices (e.g. Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Inglehart 1990, van der Brug 2010). Others, among whom we count ourselves, have argued that the cleavages have not disappeared. While the large-scale transformations of European societies may have weakened traditional cleavages, we argue that new cleavages have risen in their place – cleavages related to fundamental value conflicts on the one hand and to transformed economic conflicts of class on the other hand. The new structuring conflicts that have developed since the late sixties have been embedded into the two-dimensional traditional preference structure, and have thereby fundamentally transformed the meaning of both original dimensions.

## **2.1. The cultural dimension**

The cultural dimension has been profoundly transformed in two waves of political mobilization (see paper by Hutter and Kriesi). The first wave reaches back to the late 1960s and is the result of a set of large-scale processes that started to profoundly transform European societies in the post-war era: secularization, the educational revolution, rising living standards, tertiarization and the establishment of the welfare states. These processes have been driving the profound value change, which has been theorized above all by Inglehart (1977, 1997) and his collaborators (Baker and Inglehart 2000, Inglehart and Welzel 2005), but also by others such as Flanagan and Lee (2003) or Kitschelt (1994). As a result of this set of processes, ‘self-expression’ values, as Inglehart has come to call them, have become central. The value priorities shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being and quality-of-life. Flanagan and Lee (2003) describe the same kind of shift as a change from authoritarian to libertarian values, implying an erosion of both clerical and secular authority. The individual has become fully autonomous and views others primarily as instruments in achieving maximum self-actualization.

In the aftermath of the ‘cultural revolution’ of the late 1960s, throughout the 1970s/80s, these new values have mainly been expressed politically by the so-called new social movements. They mobilized in the name of human rights, peace, the emancipation of women, solidarity with the poor and the oppressed of the world, and the protection of the environment. Their vision was one of cultural liberalism and social justice/protection.

These were movements of the left, which, in due course, spawned a new set of parties – the New Left and Green parties and often found close allies in the established parties of the left (thereby deeply transforming them). It is very important to keep in mind that the mobilization of these new social movements and the parties that they spawned did not add

any fundamentally new dimension to the political space, but transformed the meaning of the cultural dimension.

The second wave of political mobilization, the wave of the 1990s/2000s, is linked to yet another set of large-scale processes which have been conveniently summarized under the term globalization or denationalization. In addition to its economic implications, globalization is responsible for a significant increase in *cultural* diversity within European societies. Since the 1960s, West European societies in particular have seen massive immigration of groups that are in many respects distinct from the already resident population. These migration processes may have various causes, including the dissolution of colonial empires, civic wars and the decline of statehood, scarcity of national resources, or political persecution, but they all contribute to a strong increase in socio-cultural diversity in European societies. One of the crucial questions then is how these societies cope with immigration and the resulting new, culturally defined diversity.

Immigration might intensify economic competition over scarce jobs and shrinking welfare benefits. However, a growing body of empirical research shows that the actual effects of immigration flows on income, employment, and unemployment are quite small (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). One might argue that the actual economic effects of immigration are less relevant than people's perceptions of those effects. But, as Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007: 406) observe, this type of assertion begs the question of how and why individuals misperceive the threat posed by immigration. They find that 'anti-immigration sentiments are far more powerfully associated with cultural values that have more to do with conceptions of national identity than they do with concerns about personal, economic circumstances' (p. 437).<sup>1</sup> As a result, cultural diversity has the

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<sup>1</sup> This confirms the results of studies of racial group competition in the United States, which show that economic self interest constitutes only a weak foundation for perceived threat by other racial groups (Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

potential to activate traditional, and above all nationalist values and to create new political conflicts.

The groups in the resident population who feel threatened by the increasing cultural diversity seek to defend their traditional way of life. Feelings of competitive threat from members of other ethnic or racial groups have complex determinants. Among these determinants are the individuals' values and beliefs such as ethnic and racial tolerance and the preference for cultural diversity. Crucially, such values are more widespread among the more highly educated. Education has a 'liberalizing' effect, i.e. it induces a general shift of political value orientations towards cultural liberalism, cosmopolitanism and universalism. It contributes to cultural tolerance and openness; it provides the language skills, which give access to other cultures. Thus, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) show that across Europe, there is a correlation between higher education and higher skill levels with support for all types of immigrants and vice versa. These findings show that conflict over immigration is related to larger cultural, rather than economic conflict lines. Nevertheless, its emergence is crucial for the understanding of (distributive) political dynamics in contemporary capitalism, because it depends so closely on education (i.e. the distribution of human capital), and because it transforms the electoral constituencies and policy profiles of political parties.

Yet another source of conflicts related to globalization is *political integration*, i.e. the transfer of political authority to institutions beyond the nation-state (Grande and Pauly 2005). This is particularly true for cases in which such a transfer jeopardizes national political sovereignty. This is obvious in the European context, where the transfer of economic policy competences to the Union level is increasingly limiting the manoeuvring space of national governments. Individuals who possess a strong identification with their national community and who are attached to its exclusionary norms will perceive a

weakening of the national institutions as a loss. Conversely, citizens with universalistic or cosmopolitan norms may perceive this weakening as a gain, if it implies a strengthening of a specific type of cosmopolitan political institutions, rather than a mere 'retreat of the state' (Mau 2007).

Crucially again, across most advanced industrial countries, the lower classes attach greater value to the nation than the upper classes (Shayo 2009). As is argued by Shayo (2009: 156), there are two factors at work here: first, the lower classes have a lower status than the upper classes<sup>2</sup>. This means that for them, the identification with the nation serves to compensate for their low social status, a compensation, which the upper classes do not need. In line with this argument, Greenfeld (1999: 52) maintains that the national identity has the remarkable quality, which distinguishes it from other identities that it 'guarantees status with dignity to every member of whatever is defined as a polity or society'. Tamir (1995) refers to four aspects of the national identity, which all bestow dignity on the individual member of a nation, among which is equality with other members. Second, most of the members of the nation belong to the lower classes, which means that the lower classes are in general more similar to the national prototype than the upper classes. As a result of their greater identification with the nation, the lower classes are bound to lose more when their nation-state loses parts of its sovereignty to supra- or international institutions.

As Greenfeld (1992: 10) has also pointed out, the idea of democracy is intimately bound up with the idea of the nation-state. It is at the level of the nation-state that democratic rights are most fully developed today. To the extent that the decision-making authority shifts to the supra-national level, the individual's democratic rights at the national level are at risk.

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<sup>2</sup> Shayo refers to the 'poor' and the 'rich' instead of lower and upper classes.

Therefore, such shifts are bound to incite nationalist reactions among those who feel that their democratic rights are hollowed out.

The same type of nationalist reactions may also be provoked by domestic factors, which lead to a malfunctioning of democracy. Such factors are above all at work in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). To be sure, CEE is also deeply affected by denationalization: foreign companies own the bulk of the industry and of the financial sector in the region, a growing part of agricultural land is in the hands of foreigners, and many home owners have been severely hit by the financial crisis, because they had indebted themselves in foreign currencies. As a result of the regime transition, domestic factors are, however, of particular relevance here. The democratic experience of CEE countries is still relatively short, large parts of their populations have lived through traumatic economic upheavals in the course of the transition and the recent economic crisis, they have been faced with political crises in the newly democratic states, many may perceive the status of their formerly communist states as diminished (akin to military defeat), and the abrupt change in the official ideology (from Marxism to liberalism, from authoritarian control to democracy) is likely to have created a great deal of ideological disarray and/or political cynicism. Faced with such a conjunction of factors, it is the *'transition losers'* (similar to the globalization losers in Western Europe) who experience a sense of insecurity, are frustrated with the democratic experience, and seek refuge in nationalist values.

A similar line of reasoning may also apply to Southern Europe. Some countries in this region (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Spain) have also made their transition to democracy rather late, and it is precisely these countries, which have been most severely hit by the recent economic crisis. In the aftermath of this crisis, their governments found their manoeuvring space severely limited by supranational institutions (the Troika of IMF, European commission and European Central Bank).

We would like to suggest that globalization is politically more consequential in its cultural and political dimension than in its economic dimension. First of all, as is observed by Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (2007), there is a shift from an economic to a cultural basis of stratification, worldwide. As countries modernize, cognitive skills and cultural resources become more important for an individual's place in society. Education thereby becomes a more important source for politically relevant attitudes, not only in the domain of ethnic relations. Second, as we have argued previously (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), the political actors who mobilize the globalization losers mainly do so in cultural and political, and not in economic terms. Most importantly, the new groups of 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization are not ideologically pre-defined. The parties of the new populist right have been the key promoters of the cause of the globalization losers. Third, the transformation of the economic dimension, to which we turn now, also contributed to the increasing relevance of the cultural and political aspects of globalization.

## **2.2. The economic dimension**

Compared to the cultural dimension, the economic dimension of voter preferences and party choice has always occupied an important place in the literature on democracy and capitalism. However, there have been major controversies about the relevance and the substance of this dimension.

With regard to the *relevance* of the economic dimension of voter preferences, the question is whether the positions of parties with regard to macro-economic policies are still sufficiently distinct to structure voter preferences and party choice. Structural factors such as deindustrialization, reduced transportation- and communication costs and the exposure of a growing number of economic sectors to international competition, the growing

internationalization of finance and the higher mobility of capital (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 445-8) might suggest that macro-economic policies of advanced capitalist democracies tend to converge on a neoliberal consensus (Streeck 2009). Irrespective of the actual pressure towards convergence, parties might use globalization or the economic liberalization pressure as a tool to blame poor domestic economic performance on factors beyond their control. Hence, the public may perceive the economic manoeuvring space of the national governments as being heavily constrained. This could remove macroeconomic issues from the electoral arena, since voters would refrain from making party choices based on attitudes towards issues they think their governments do not control anyway<sup>3</sup>. As a matter of fact, Hellwig and Samuels (2007) provide empirical support for their ‘government constraint hypothesis’, which suggests that greater exposure to the world economy reduces electoral accountability in the world’s democracies. They find that voters in more open economies are less likely to evaluate incumbents on the basis of fluctuations in economic growth. Similarly, Duch and Stevenson (2008) argue that voters are attentive to the constraining implications of economic openness for the government’s economic policy choices, and they find that economic voting is less pronounced in situations, where the government’s competence in economic policy making is constrained by economic openness.

However, for at least two reasons it would be premature to argue that the economic dimension of voter preferences and party competition has become irrelevant to the electoral dynamics of democratic capitalism: first, the convergence argument has been theoretically and empirically challenged. Structural and institutional factors support continued, if altered, divergence in macro-economic policies (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 449-57; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Most prominently, the Varieties of Capitalism approach has stressed the stability of

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<sup>3</sup> This is the core of the *convergence hypothesis*, which argues that in a world where centre-right and centre-left parties, i.e. the parties that habitually govern, converge over economics, voters become indifferent to them and increasingly vote for parties clearly distinguishable on cultural grounds (Kitschelt 2007).

different production regimes, which precisely draw economic viability and efficiency from distinct sets of institutional coordination mechanisms, which are interdependent and complementary (Hall and Soskice 2001: 56-60, Hall and Gingerich 2009). Second, even if macro-economic policy-making was indeed removed from the national electoral arenas (because of convergence, or because of its transfer to the supranational level), this would not imply that preferences and attitudes on economic issues in general have become irrelevant to voters and electoral dynamics. Contrary to what some have argued (Mair 2008, Hardin 2000), a world without (perceived) macro-economic alternatives is not characterized by a generalized lack of alternatives. It may be true that issues related to market liberalization, industrial policy, as well as monetary and fiscal policy are increasingly taken out of the hands of national governments in Europe, and that the policies of left- and right-wing governments are therefore converging on these issues (as Boix (2000), e.g. has demonstrated for fiscal and monetary policy). Nevertheless, important alternative economic issues such as labor market regulation and the distributive design of welfare policies remain within the discretion of national governments, and on these issues, both party policies and voter preferences continue to diverge (Allan and Scruggs 2004). This implies that, in *substantive* terms, the conceptualization of the economic preference dimension today should focus on labor market and welfare issues, rather than on macro-economic policies. However, if we only analyze economic conflict with regard to the extent of welfare spending, we might underestimate its polarization, since the overall welfare effort is driven so strongly by structural factors (Huber and Stephens 2001). In the wake of welfare state maturation, post-industrialism and denationalization, the economic conflict dimension itself has been transformed. Pierson (1996, 2001) has shown that welfare state maturation has transformed the issues at stake in post-industrial capitalism: the main conflict concerns no longer the extent of welfare state expansion. In times of financial

austerity, when cutbacks are difficult to implement and the room for expansion is limited, distributive conflict becomes more complex and the dominant issues are shaped by the institutional regime in place (Pierson 2001: 455; see Esping-Andersen 1999 for a similar argument): while in continental Europe, e.g., retrenchment, societal modernization and insider-outsider conflicts are supposed to dominate the agenda, welfare reform in liberal countries is expected to focus on activation policies and cost containment. The upshot of this argument is that the substance of the economic conflict dimension is altered: from the size of the welfare state (the generosity of the overall benefit levels) to its actual distributive design (who gets what in times of limited resources). Hence, similar to the transformation of the cultural dimension from religious issues to cultural liberalism and integration/demarcation, the economic dimension is also being transformed.

A range of theoretical work in comparative political economy and welfare state research deals with this redefinition of economic conflicts. Three concepts are particularly relevant for our discussion of voter preferences in contemporary capitalism: redistribution, social insurance and social investment.

The first relevant distinction is between *redistribution* and *social insurance*. As the major works on the institutional design of different welfare regimes have consistently shown, the size of the welfare state does not predict its redistributive effect (see in particular Esping-Andersen 1990, Bradley et al. 2003), because the continental social insurance regimes – despite being “big” welfare states – typically distribute benefits for old age, unemployment, sickness or disability on the basis of contributions, rather than on the basis of need. This implies that social insurance schemes tend to stabilize and reproduce income stratification, rather than redistributing resources from the rich to the poor. In continental Europe, eligibility to social insurance benefits is still typically tied to labor market participation,

contributions are paid by pay-roll taxes and benefits are earnings-related (Palier 2010). The micro-foundations of preferences for social insurance vs. redistribution have been developed with regard to the literature on varieties of capitalism. Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), as well as Iversen and Soskice (2001) and Mares (2003) show that the preferences of both high- and specifically skilled workers and employers in coordinated market economies converge on social insurance as a means of rewarding investment in human capital formation. In that sense, preferences for social insurance differ from preferences for overall income redistribution or income equality. While the former are structured by the level and specificity of individuals' skill profiles, the latter depend on people's situation in the income distribution. Until the 1980s, both issues could be subsumed under the level of welfare generosity, since both redistributive and insurance programs were expanded. In the era of austerity, however, welfare conflicts tend to become a zero sum game, with expansions for some groups coming at the expense of cuts for others (Häusermann 2010). In this context, social insurance for labor market insiders competes with needs-based benefits for outsiders and low-income workers, and this "dualization of benefits" (Palier 2010, Palier and Thelen 2010, Emmenegger et al. forthcoming) becomes politically relevant, especially in the social insurance regimes of continental Europe.

Financial transfers are, however, only one aspect of the distributive profile of welfare states. Services – which have been strongly developed in the Nordic countries from the 1960s onwards already (Huber and Stephens 2001) – play an increasingly important role in all post-industrial economies, because they typically allow and enhance overall labor market participation, an issue that has become crucial for the economic performance of liberal and continental welfare regimes (Iversen and Wren 1998). Esping-Andersen's (1999b) analysis of the structure of social risks in post-industrial economies has emphasized the importance of active labor market policies, investment in human capital

and care services for current welfare reform. In a similar vein, Bonoli (2005) has shown that the “new social risks groups” of young labor market participants, single-parent household and working parents have welfare needs in terms of services that are very different from the “income insurance needs” of the standard workers, for whom the industrial welfare state was built (see also Armingeon and Bonoli 2006). Rather than income insurance, these risk groups need services that help them participate in the labor market. Such *social investment policies* (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002) have become important on the reform agendas of both liberal and continental regimes, and the socio-structural factors driving individual preferences for them again differ to some extent from those driving preferences for passive income replacement or redistributive policies. Rueda (2007) has shown that workers tend to be divided on the issue of passive vs. active labor market policies, with insiders privileging employment protection and earnings-related income replacement, while outsiders prefer active labor market measures. As with the distinction between redistribution and social insurance, social investment policies have the potential of dividing the working class, whose support for “general welfare expansion” was supposed to be homogenous in the industrial era. In this sense, economic conflict has become more heterogeneous and potentially cross-cutting, which needs to be taken into account when measuring economic voter preferences in the electoral arena.

Finally, in line with the idea that intra-labor heterogeneity has increased in the post-industrial era, welfare conflicts in advanced capitalist democracies also increasingly involve debates on distributive deservingness, i.e. on the scope of beneficiaries who should be entitled to benefits and services. Predominantly, this debate takes the form of welfare chauvinism (Kitschelt 1995; Andersen and Björklund 1990), i.e. the idea that welfare benefits and services should be granted only to nationals, who are considered “deserving”, because they are part of the community of solidarity and/or because they have contributed

to social security schemes. Hence, the issue at stake here is not the level or structure of benefits or services, but the *entitlement*. If entitlement is mostly discussed with regard to immigrants, as van Oorschot (2000, 2006) has shown, narrow conceptions of welfare deservingness (what he calls “conditionality”) also exist with respect to the disabled or unemployed. Education turns out to be the single most important factor explaining attitudes on welfare chauvinism and narrow definitions of deservingness or welfare misuse (van der Waal et al. 2010, van Oorschot 2006): the lower the education level of respondents, the more they want to narrow down welfare entitlement to a limited circle of “deserving” citizens. The authors consider this finding paradoxical, because the lower classes (in terms of education, income and class) also tend to be the ones supporting welfare generosity most strongly.

It seems that welfare deservingness follows a different logic from preferences over redistribution, social insurance and social investment more generally. Indeed, such preferences – even though relevant for economic policies in the realm of welfare and labor market regulation – may primarily be structured by cultural, rather than economic mechanisms. This hypothesis is closely related to Gilen’s (1995) widely cited finding, according to which opposition to welfare in the US is driven by racial prejudices.

Van der Waal et al. (2010) empirically test three mechanisms that might explain the link between low levels of education and attitudes on welfare deservingness: political competence, i.e. the lower educated do not understand the ideological incoherence of their pro-redistribution and welfare chauvinistic attitudes; ethnic competition, i.e. the lower educated “rationally” fear for their own scarce resources; and cultural capital; i.e. the lower educated are more culturally insecure and experience cultural diversity as a threat, triggering feelings of distrust. The evidence they find on the basis of Dutch data clearly

points to the importance of the third, cultural mechanism, whereas the cognitive and economic mechanisms are disconfirmed.

Derks's (2004) concept of 'economic populism' supports their findings. He conceives of this 'syndrome' as a specific reaction against feelings of social deprivation that are prevalent among the underprivileged. Economic populists reject social achievements such as the welfare state not for their content, but because of their elitist origin. Derks shows for Flemish data that economic populism is particularly widespread among low-income groups, manual workers and people with low educational attainment. He tries to explain this phenomenon by existential insecurity and moral disorientation. Little equipped to deal with the societal changes which we have described, and morally disoriented, these groups not only turn against the unresponsive elites, but also against undeserving welfare recipients, such as the long-term unemployed, ethnic minorities and asylum seekers, who become targets of their resentment. 'From this point of view, anti-welfare statism does not reflect a belief in neo-liberal market capitalism, but rather a radical expression of welfare chauvinism, inspired by a rigid form of social conservatism and a profound distrust of current social policy arrangements' (Derks 2004: 519).

Eger's (2010) and van Oorschot's (2006) finding of a strong correlation between immigration, anti-immigration attitudes and narrow conceptions of welfare deservingness point in a similar direction: in a context of increasing cultural diversity, people with low levels of cognitive and educational resources develop feelings of insecurity and distrust, which become manifest in their beliefs that "others" i.e. outgroup members take advantage of undeserved benefits and privileges.

All these findings provide a final argument why studies on the development of democratic capitalism should take cultural preferences into account when explaining change in economic and social policies. The distinction between the realm of economic and cultural

politics becomes increasingly blurred, since cultural beliefs drive preferences on economic policies. This in turn influences party choice and party competition, thereby altering the partisan dynamics in contemporary capitalism.

### **2.3. Regime differences**

We expect that the importance of the economic and cultural preference scales, as well as the mean level of attitudes on these dimensions vary across countries and across specific capitalist regimes. In line with Inglehart's (1990) arguments based on modernization theory, one might expect that the "new" cultural dimension becomes both more coherent and more important in more advanced economies relative to more developing regions, because economic conflict becomes "pacified" and preoccupations shift to more cultural issues. Hence, we would expect the cultural dimension in liberal, nordic and continental Europe to be more clearly consistent (i.e. the different items should load on a same factor) than in southern and eastern Europe. A similar reasoning applies to the economic dimension, but in the reverse order. Here, the ongoing post-industrialization of economies in the northern and western part of Europe would lead us to expect an economic dimension of somewhat less importance and of a somewhat less coherent composition. The heterogeneity of the economic dimension that we have elaborated above should be most advanced and most developed in the clearly post-industrial countries.

We also expect that the mean levels of country preferences on these scales differ across countries and across capitalist regimes. Again reasoning with modernization theory, the mean level of universalism or progressive values may depend on the level of economic development. Inglehard and Welzel (2005: 61) argue that post-industrialization leads to a rise in self-expression values, a concept relatively close to our idea of cultural liberalism. The underlying mechanism could be that the growing share of people who are employed in

the service sector tend to be highly skilled and in an interpersonal work logic (Oesch 2006). Both factors contribute to/depend on the development of liberal self-expression values, and they also enhance these people's resources and opportunities in their countries (which contributes to their liberalism, since they do not experience structural change as a threat). Hence, we would expect that the more post-industrialized countries on average display higher levels of cultural liberalism and universalism. Thus, on the cultural dimension, we expect more liberal attitudes in the West European countries, relative to eastern and southern Europe.

Country level differences are more difficult to theorize with regard to the economic dimension. On the one hand, one might expect that high levels of affluence, economic regulation and welfare state development shape people's attitudes towards economic liberalism and state interventionism in the sense that they become generally more supportive of the principles of state intervention, regulation and redistribution. Svallfors (1997) has, for example, shown that the welfare regime affects people's ideas of social justice in the sense that they become supportive of the regime they experience themselves. On the other hand, one might expect some kind of a "saturation effect", which implies that, with growing affluence and welfare, people adopt more economically liberal positions: the "main battles" have been fought and won, and people feel less strongly about the further development of economic regulation and social welfare. This hypothesis would suggest that the more people are satisfied with the state of the economy and welfare in their country, the more economically liberal positions they defend. One would again expect the differences to separate most clearly the western from the eastern and maybe southern European states.

Even though we expect relative differences with regard to the importance and mean level of the two dimensions across different capitalist production regimes, we nevertheless

basically expect the same substantive configuration for both of these dimensions and similar trends with regard to their impact on party choice across Europe.

### 3. Empirical analysis

#### 3.1. Dimensions

For the empirical analysis, we use the data of the ESS4, which, depending on the country, went into the field between fall 2008 and spring 2009. The file includes random samples for 29 European countries<sup>4</sup>, which, for the purpose of our analyses, we categorize into five types of capitalist production regimes<sup>5</sup>. For our analyses, the ESS4 data has the advantage that it includes a rotating module on attitudes towards the welfare state.

To operationalize the *cultural* dimension, we create indicators for the most important issues of the two steps that have profoundly transformed the cultural dimension over the past five decades. For the concerns of the new social movements of the seventies and eighties, we build a scale for cultural liberalism. We use five items to build this scale (for the formulation of the items, see Table in Appendix I): two items referring to women's emancipation, one item dealing with rights of homosexuals, and two items with authoritarianism (in school and in criminal law). Exploratory factor analysis reveals that the five items constitute a weak uniform scale (Eigenvalue of 1.23) across all countries. The women's emancipation items are most closely associated with the overall scale. We also tested the scale for each regime, and found the same pattern, although the scales are even weaker in individual regimes.

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<sup>4</sup> The countries included are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine.

<sup>5</sup> The categorization is done with regard to the relevant literature on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001, Schmidt 2009.) For the Eastern European countries, we base our categorization on Bohle and Greskovits (2007), who show that Slovenia must be included with the continental CMEs, because of its strong neo-corporatist character.

For the concerns of the new populist right and the globalization losers, we chose to operationalize two issues – their opposition to immigration and their Euroscepticism. For immigration, we build a scale based on six items (see Appendix I), which form a strong uniform scale (Eigenvalue of 3.40). The scale is equally strong across all five regime types. In addition, we try to operationalize that aspect of welfare conflicts in advanced capitalist democracies, which we expect to be mainly associated with the cultural dimension – the question of distributive deservingness. We use two indicators for this question. First, an individual item is chosen to operationalize welfare chauvinism. This item asks whether immigrants receive more or less (in terms of social benefits and services) than they contribute (in terms of taxes). Second, we also use a set of three items to measure economic populism, welfare deservingness, or welfare misuse. These items measure negative attitudes with regard to welfare dependents, many of whom are conceived as undeserving (unemployed people not really trying to find a job, people managing to obtain benefits to which they are not really entitled to, and people pretending to be sick to stay at home). Although the three items only form a very weak uniform scale (Eigenvalue=.83) and equally weak regime-specific scales, we still use this scale for lack of a better alternative as an indicator of attitudes towards welfare state misuse. The empirical analysis (below) confirms that these issues (welfare chauvinism and welfare misuse) are part of the cultural dimension structuring people's attitudes, rather than of the economic dimension.

To operationalize the *economic* dimension, we create indicators for all aspects of economic distributive conflict that we have discussed above: redistribution, social insurance and social investment. We measure preferences on redistribution with two items from the ESS survey: the question whether governments should reduce differences in income levels and the question asking respondents whether they think that for a society to be fair, the difference in standards of living should be small. This second item measures preferences

for egalitarianism, but it can be read as a measurement of income redistribution preferences. In order to measure social insurance, we use two questions of the ESS survey that precisely ask respondents how welfare benefits should be distributed – according to needs or according to the contributions they have made. The two items refer to unemployment insurance and pension insurance respectively and they measure whether people think that higher benefits should go to those individuals who have contributed most to the insurance scheme (instead of those who have the greatest financial needs). For social investment, we also use two items, which relate to policies promoting participation in the workforce. The first item asks respondents whether they think that governments should be responsible to provide a job to everyone who wants one and the second item asks preferences on government responsibility for providing sufficient childcare infrastructure.

In an exploratory factor analysis across all countries, it becomes clear that, as expected, the six items, all of them related to welfare politics, do not form a single dimension, but at least two separate components of economic preferences. As is shown in *Table 1*, the redistribution and social investment items form a first weak factor, while the social insurance items load on a different, very weak factor<sup>6</sup>. The same pattern emerges for each and every regime time. It relates to the distinction between size and design we made earlier: whereas all social investment and redistribution items measure some sort of welfare generosity, the social insurance items measure the distributive logic, not the level of benefits. Given that the social insurance items are empirically clearly different from the other items, we include only the four redistribution and social investment items for our final operationalization of the two scales.

<Table 1 >

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<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that even the indicators of redistribution and social investment are only weakly related. If one constrains the factor analysis to three instead of two factors, these items load on different factors. However, none of the resulting three factors achieves an EV higher than 1.

With the five items designed to operationalize the cultural dimension, and the four items designed for the economic dimension, we have then performed an exploratory factor analysis both including all countries, and per regime. The results are presented in *Table 2*. Most importantly, we find the expected two dimensions – a cultural and an economic dimension. Apart from two exceptions, the pattern of correlations of the original items with the two factors is very similar across all regime types: the five cultural items all load appreciably on the cultural, but not on the economic scale, and the four economic items all load on the economic, but not on the cultural scale. Note that, as expected, welfare chauvinism and welfare misuse/deservingness are part of the cultural, but not of the economic dimension. The two exceptions concern the CEE countries, which we labeled Eastern European Capitalism. First, in these countries, cultural liberalism surprisingly is more closely associated with the economic dimension than with the cultural dimension, where it goes together with economic liberalism and not with redistributive or social investment concerns. Second, welfare misuse or deservingness is not associated with any of the two dimensions in CEE countries. The CEE regime also differs from the rest of the regimes insofar as, in these countries, the economic scale is stronger than cultural one, while the reverse is true for the LMEs, the CMEs, and the Scandinavian CMEs.

<Table 2 >

In addition to the regime-specific scales, we also have constructed uniform scales, which are identical for all five regime types. The advantage of such uniform scales is that they allow a comparison of corresponding levels across regime types. While these uniform scales are not exactly identical to the regime-specific scales, the two are nevertheless very highly correlated in each and every case, as is indicated in *Table 3*. This means that we do not lose much information by opting for the uniform scales. Although these scales are weak, their pattern is remarkably similar across European societies, which means that the

cultural and economic preoccupations of the Europeans are quite similar across the continent. The cultural preference scale is dominated everywhere by immigration – the most important issue of the demarcation-integration conflict of the 1990s/2000s. The economic preference scale is more equally determined by its two components – the redistributive and the social investment issues.

<Table 3 >

### 3.2. Preference levels across countries

We start by comparing the mean levels of economic liberalism and cultural liberalism/openness across all countries in our sample. *Figure 1* shows strong country differences, as well as a rather strong bivariate correlation between mean levels of economic and cultural openness ( $r=0.63$ ). Where people are on average more culturally open, they also on average defend more economically liberal (i.e. economically conservative) positions.

<Figure 1 >

*Figure 2* shows that mean country levels differ across capitalist regimes. The clear differences between CME, LME, SME and CEE countries tend to validate the categorization in different regimes.

<Figure 2 >

Nordic and continental CME are the most culturally open countries, whereas the SME, LME and CEE countries are on similar levels of cultural traditionalism/nationalism. Economically, the differences are even more striking. Here, CMEs and LMEs display clearly higher levels of economic liberalism than the countries of southern and Eastern Europe. One can also see that Turkey fits in neither of the regimes, because it is both

culturally and economically more conservative (also, there are no clear factors identifiable in the Turkish case, which is why we leave this country out of the further analyses).

We do not intend to explain these country level differences in detail, but since they are so striking, we propose to explore a few macro-level explanations. With regard to the economic preference dimension, we have argued that the link between economic and welfare development, on the one hand, and preferences on the other, could go either way: with economic development, we may either see people becoming economically more interventionist (because they experience the benefits of affluence and economic security), or they may become more economically liberal (because they take economic security for granted). We explore these links first with bivariate analyses. *Figure 3* correlates the level of economic affluence in a country (GDP/capita) with the mean level of economic liberalism and shows a very strong link between the two. The Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK have the highest level of economic development and – this may come as a surprise – the on average most economically liberal population.

<Figure 3 >

In order to test the mechanism linking affluence and economic liberalism, we have constructed an indicator of individual satisfaction with the economic and welfare performance of a country. This indicator includes items measuring people's evaluation of pension provision, unemployment benefits, childcare infrastructure, opportunities for young people to find a first full-time job, poverty and also people's evaluation of the present state of the economy (see Appendix I for the precise operationalization). A factor analysis shows that all items form a single factor (factor loadings between 0.46 and 0.67, EV=2.17), which we use as an indicator of economic satisfaction. *Figure 4* shows the very strong link of mean economic satisfaction with economic liberalism at the macro-level. In countries, where people on average evaluate the standard of living and economic conditions

positively, they are economically less interventionist when it comes to preferences for redistribution and social insurance. We have also tested this link at the micro-level, including socio-structural controls<sup>7</sup> and country dummies (results not shown). Throughout all capitalist regimes, the individual economic satisfaction has a positive and clearly significant effect on economic liberalism.

<Figure 4 >

With regard to the determinants of country levels of cultural openness, we referred to modernization theory, which postulates a link between post-industrialization and the development of self-expression values. We choose the difference between the share of the new middle class (the typically post-industrial workers, including socio-cultural specialists, managers and technical experts) in the workforce and production workers (the typically industrial workers) as an indicator of post-industrialization. *Figure 5* documents the strong link between this indicator of post-industrialization and the level of cultural openness, which confirms the hypothesis of modernization theory. The more the new middle class outnumbered production workers, the more culturally open people are on average. The Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland form the “post-industrial pole”, whereas, at the opposite end of the scale, Turkey and Hungary are both more industrial and conservative.

<Figure 5 >

Modernization theory is not that clear on the link between structure and values, but education certainly plays a role. At the level of attitudes, we think that the higher cognitive and material resources of the middle-class workers (as the “winners” of modernization) imply that they experience structural change less as a threat. By contrast, industrial workers

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<sup>7</sup> Controls are the same variables we use in the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 below, i.e. age, gender, education, income public sector employment, class, trade union membership, religiosity and catholicism.

whose qualifications are in diminishing demand, may become frustrated with the direction of structural change, therefore developing feelings of disempowerment and alienation. We try to capture these feelings with an indicator measuring the satisfaction of a respondent with the way democracy works in his or her country. We assume that structural “losers” develop more generally negative attitudes towards political institutions and processes. The link shown in *Figure 6* seems to confirm this hypothesis. In countries such as the Ukraine, Hungary, Latvia, Turkey or Russia, people are generally more dissatisfied with democracy, and these countries also show lower mean levels of cultural liberalism. In the most post-industrial country group (Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Switzerland), by contrast, people are on average both happier with democracy and culturally more open. Again, we have tested this mechanism at the micro-level, predicting cultural openness with individual satisfaction with democracy (including socio-structural controls<sup>8</sup> and country dummies (results not shown)) and the results are unambiguous: satisfaction with democracy consistently and strongly predicts cultural openness in all countries.

<Figure 6 >

In order to see whether our hypothesis of an indirect effect of structural change (economic development, post-industrialization) on attitudes and thus on economic and cultural liberalism holds, we have included both sets of variables in a simple macro-level regression shown in *Table 4*. When economic satisfaction is introduced in the model, the direct effect of economic affluences disappears. The results are similar, although not exactly the same for cultural openness: post-industrialization retains a small, but still significant direct effect on average levels of cultural openness, even when we control for satisfaction with democracy.

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<sup>8</sup> Controls are the same variables we use in the regressions in tables 5 and 6 below, i.e. age, gender, education, income public sector employment, class, trade union membership, religiosity and catholicism.

<Table 4 >

In sum, the analysis of country means with regard to economic liberalism and cultural openness shows strong differences in the average levels, which can be linked to structural development. However, despite the different levels, we expect similar configurations of socio-structural determinants of the two types of preferences.

### 3.3. The social-structural determinants of political preferences

*Tables 5 and 6* present the results of OLS-regression analyses, predicting individual levels of economic and cultural liberalism with a range of variables related to people's socio-economic status and socio-demographic characteristics. Country dummies are included, but not shown in the tables. The overall explanatory power of our models is relatively weak (R<sup>2</sup> between 0.12 and 0.21), with preferences appearing least socially structured in those regimes where the coherence of the preference scales is weakest (the cultural scale for CEE countries and the economic scale for LMEs, see *Table 2*).

<Table 5 >

Age, education and class have clear and consistent direct effects on cultural openness in all five capitalist regimes, with younger people, the highly educated and members of the middle class (socio-cultural specialists, technicians and managers), as well as the self-employed and office clerks being more open. We use Oesch's (2006) class scheme, because it allows differentiating between different sections of the middle and the working class. The reference class in our analysis is the production workers, who constitute the most conservative class in all regimes, together with service workers in state market economies, i.e. southern Europe. Since the class scheme entails a skill-component, too, *Table 5* clearly reveals the very strong effect of *education and training*. The less cognitive and human

capital resources people have, the more they reject openness with regard to immigration, EU integration, universalism and welfare state chauvinism. Apart from this dominant effect that we see in *Table 5*, a few other variables have strong effects but not in all regimes.

*Women* are more open in Scandinavia, southern and eastern Europe, but – surprisingly so – more conservative in anglo-saxon countries. *Income* has no effect on cultural values, when we control for education and class, nor has the interaction of income and education any effect at all. Finally, *religiosity and Catholicism* still determine people's cultural values in all regimes, except for Eastern Europe, with surprising variation. While in SME's, religious practice and Catholicism have a similar effect (which makes sense, since these are mostly catholic countries), catholics are also more conservative in LME's but apart from them, religious people display more culturally open values. Overall, the effect of education and skill is the most important finding in this table, since it is so consistent.

Things look different when it comes to economic preferences. As *Table 6* shows, *education* levels do not explain preferences for redistribution and social investment, when we control for other class indicators such as income and class. Only when education goes together with a high income do people display economically more liberal (i.e. right-wing) preferences.

The second striking difference to the social structuration of cultural preferences is to be found in the class analysis. Contrary to what we saw in *Table 5*, the upper classes are not consistently more liberal than production workers when it comes to economic liberalism.

The *socio-cultural specialists*, i.e. high-skilled workers in interpersonal service occupations (see Oesch 2006) are not consistently more liberal, even though they have higher positions in the vertical stratification than production workers. In Scandinavia and in southern European SMEs, they do not differ from production workers in their economic preference, while they are only moderately more economically liberal in continental Europe. The self-employed, the technical experts, small business entrepreneurs and managers, however, are

economically more clearly to the right than production workers, which corresponds to the old industrial class conflict, opposing labor and capital. This result demonstrates that the new middle class has become heterogenous with regard to the economic dimension of political conflict. We also find that *trade union members* have more interventionist attitudes in all regimes and that *religiosity and Catholicism* drive economically more interventionist values in LMEs and CEE's but not in other regimes.

Country differences are interesting with regard to public sector workers, who have more economically liberal preferences in continental and southern Europe. This could be due to the fact that those regimes have more regulated labor markets, which lead to strong employment protection for public sector workers (insider-outsider divides), who therefore depend less on welfare state generosity.

<Table 6 >

Let us point out again: throughout the different capitalist regimes, we find similar structural determinants of individual preferences, with education and class showing the strongest and most consistent effects. *Figures 7 and 8* locate the relevant socio-structural groups in the political space and illustrate how important they are for voter preference formation.

<Figure 7 >

Despite differences in levels, education structures cultural openness in all regimes. In LMEs and CMES, the polarization on the cultural dimension between different educational groups is clearly stronger than on the economic dimension. This adds evidence to the hypothesis of a liberating effect of education, driving the development of universalistic values. In SMEs, educational groups differ on both the cultural and the economic dimension, whereas in CEEs, education structures economic values more strongly than

cultural ones. However, in all regimes, there seems to be a linear relationship between education level and cultural openness.

With regard to class, differences between the economic and cultural dimensions become visible, too. *Figure 8* shows only three classes: production workers (the “old” working class), as well as technicians and socio-cultural professionals as the two representatives of the new middle classes<sup>9</sup>. When looking at the triangles per capitalist regime type separately, one detects a common pattern: the economic conflict is between production workers and technical experts, whereas the “new class conflict” between production workers and socio-cultural specialists differentiates these groups mainly on the cultural dimension, much less so on the economic one. With regard to economic conflict in post-industrial societies, this finding is crucial, since it shows that the middle class has become divided with regard to distributive justice (redistribution and social investment). Therefore, economic conflict can no longer be portrayed simply as a conflict between the upper and the lower classes (even though income continues to play a role in differentiating the highly educated among each other). The upper classes have become very heterogeneous with regard to economic preferences, and this has important implications for party choice and the electoral landscape in general, to which we turn now.

<Figure 8 >

### **3.4. The electoral implications of political preferences**

In this section, we analyze the electoral implications of political preferences on the economic and cultural dimension. We want to explore what drives party choice in the post-

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<sup>9</sup> We also calculated the configuration of class interests with managers instead of technicians as the second part of the new middle class. Results are largely the same. The economic distance between socio-cultural professionals and managers is somewhat larger in Nordic and continental European countries and smaller in southern European countries and CEE countries.

industrial capitalist democracies. As we have shown in the socio-structural analysis above, characteristics such as class and education, which have traditionally shaped vote for economically left- and right-wing parties are increasingly associated with cultural preferences, rather than economic ones. If this translates into party choice – and it does, as we will show below – it changes not only the socio-structural profile of the constituencies these parties are supposed to represent, but it also changes the entire underlying dynamic of party competition in contemporary capitalism. Hence, our guiding question in this section concerns the relative importance of cultural and economic preferences as determinants of party choice in different capitalist regimes: which parties and party families are elected for economic reasons, and which are elected for cultural reasons?

The analysis and comparison across countries is complicated by the fact that each country has a party system of its own. To allow for cross-country and cross-regime comparisons, we have classified the parties into party families. We shall analyze preferences for the following families: the radical left, greens, social democrats, liberals, conservative/christian democrats, radical populist right, based on the party the respondents voted for in the last national elections, or, if they did not participate in the last elections, the party they feel close to (see appendix I for the operationalization). We include only parties with at least 50 respondents in our country-specific ESS samples. Conservatives and Christian-democrats have been put into the same category, since they are functional equivalents in most, although not quite all countries. The liberal party family only includes conservative liberal parties, while social liberals have not been analyzed (except for the Liberal Democrats in the UK). The classification of the parties into families has been particularly challenging for CEE countries. In these countries, the party systems have not yet been institutionalized to the same extent as in Western Europe, parties disappear and new parties arise in every election and it is particularly difficult to classify the parties on the right in ideological

terms. We have established the classification on the basis of party-specific information on their programs, but it must be kept in mind that these party families are more volatile than in the other regimes.

There are different methods to analyze the electoral choices in multi-party systems. Given the great differences in the party systems of the European countries, we have opted for a rather simple methodology. For each party family, we analyze the contrast with the group of the non-voters/non-partisans. This means that we have made binary regressions for each party family (up to 6) in each of the 5 regime types, 28 regressions altogether. In each regression, our key independent variables are the two preference scales, plus an interaction between the two scales. The interaction term is added to take into account possible reinforcement effects. In addition to these scales, which are of primary interest to us, we add a set of control variables – age, gender, education, income, public sector employment, class, union membership, religion (catholics) and church attendance – and a set of country dummies<sup>10</sup>.

*Table 7* presents the detailed results for continental CMEs in the form of odds ratios (i.e. how much more likely an individual is to choose a certain party type rather than not voting/not feeling close to any party). It includes the effects of the preference scales and of the controls, but not of the country dummies. For the continental CMEs, the table shows the strong effects cultural preferences have on the choice of the green parties and the parties of the new populist right, i.e. of the main protagonists of the last two waves of political mobilization. The more culturally liberal or open a voter, the greater her chance to vote for the Greens. The more culturally conservative or nationalistic a voter, the greater her chance to vote for the radical populist right. The corresponding effects are among the strongest we find in all our 28 regressions. In these countries, culturally liberal or open voters are also

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<sup>10</sup> For the CEE countries, we had to leave out income and public sector employment, because it was not available for all the countries.

much more likely to vote for the social democrats and for the radical left. By contrast, culturally conservative voters are not more likely to vote for moderate parties on the right. In continental CMEs, the effects of the economic preferences are considerable, too, even if more limited than the effects of the cultural preferences. As we would expect, economic preferences mainly distinguish between, on the one hand, voters of the radical and moderate (social democratic) mainstream left, who favor more redistribution and social investment, and, on the other hand, voters of the moderate (liberal and conservative) and radical right, who want less of both. The more economically liberal an individual is, the more likely he or she is to choose a party of the moderate right. There is one significant interaction effect between the two types of preferences – for the Greens: this effect implies that the combination of an economically left preference with a culturally liberal/open preference enhances the vote for the Greens beyond the additive effect of the two types of preferences.

<Table 7>

For the continental CME countries, this table also presents the effects of the control variables. While not our main preoccupation, some results are worth reporting. First of all, *age* is a key factor for the choice of the mainstream parties – social democrats, liberals, and conservatives/ christian democrats. The older the citizens are, the more they participate in the vote and choose mainstream parties. The age effects are of the size of magnitude of the preference scales. Younger voters (younger than 40) are more likely to abstain or to choose new challengers from the left or the right<sup>11</sup>. *Religion* (church attendance for the conservative/ christian democratic parties) is the only other control variable with a similarly strong effect in CMEs. This means that the classic cultural cleavage has not faded away completely yet. Independently of the cultural preferences as we measure them here, religion

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<sup>11</sup> In a separate analysis (not shown here), we have looked at the pattern of effects in the younger generation: overall, this pattern is not all too different from the one we have found for the population as a whole.

is still a crucial determinant in these countries. As it turns out, age and religion are key determinants of vote choices in all the other regime types, too. Gender, by contrast, is generally insignificant, except for the radical populist right in CME countries, which is much more frequently chosen by men than by women.

*Class* related patterns are more complex. The middle classes and the more highly educated generally participate more frequently in the vote than the working classes and the less educated, with particularly great differences in CEEs. In the continental CME countries, the highly educated vote disproportionately for the Greens. Generally, the parties that benefit least from the highly educated are the radical left and the radical right, but also the social democrats. As far as income is concerned, in all regimes, voters with higher incomes disproportionately opt for the mainstream parties of the right, to some extent also for the social democrats. Public sector employees with higher incomes are especially likely to vote for the social democrats in CMEs and in NCMEs, but not elsewhere. Among the new middle classes, one result clearly stands out: relative to the production workers as the reference class, the socio-cultural professionals are clearly more likely to vote for the social democrats. They opt more strongly than production workers for this party family in all regimes, except for the Nordic CMEs (results not shown). Moreover, in all regimes, both the new (socio-cultural professionals and managers, but not technicians) and the old (liberal professions and small business owners) middle classes opt more strongly for the mainstream parties of the right than production workers. Surprisingly, with the notable exception of SMEs, not only the new, but also the old middle classes disproportionately choose the greens, too. Trade union members generally vote disproportionately for the left, greens included. Finally, note that the vote for the radical populist right does not seem to be class-specific in any of our regime types.

After this brief account of the effect of control variables, let us return to the impact of the preference scales, in order to test whether party choice is driven by economic or cultural attitudes. *Table 8* presents the corresponding effects for all regime types. In order to facilitate the interpretation of these results, we have drawn two figures (9 and 10), which situate the party families from the various regimes in the two-dimensional space, based on the combination of their dimension-specific odds ratios. In these figures, odds ratios smaller than one have been transformed according to a simple formula (transformed odds ratio =  $-1/\text{odds ratio}$ ) so as to make them comparable to the ratios greater than one. Figure 9 presents the overall configuration. As is immediately apparent, the spread of the party families on the cultural dimension is much greater than the corresponding spread on the economic dimension. As is also immediately apparent, the extended spread on the cultural axis is entirely due to the contrast between the green parties, on the one hand, and the radical populist right parties, on the other hand. The contrast between the determinants of green and right-wing populist party choice is particularly important for the continental CME countries, which we have presented in more detail above, and slightly less strong for the Nordic CME countries. For the SMEs, the radical populist parties – the French Front National and the Greek LAOS – are quite distinct, too, but the French Greens (the only Greens in this regime with a non-negligible support) – do not distinguish themselves from the mainstream parties. The same applies for the Greens in LME, and both types of challengers in CEE countries. In fact, the Greens in CEE countries are quite different from the Green parties in the other parts of Europe, since their preference profile closely resembles that of the liberal parties. The only other outliers are the radical left parties in CME and NCME countries.

<Table 8, Figure 9 >

Based on these results, some readers might be tempted to argue that the relative importance of the cultural dimension is entirely due to some marginal parties in only two out of five regime types. Thus, one might conclude that these specific, culturally mobilized parties are irrelevant to the electoral dynamics that affect politics and policies concerned with capitalism. As far as the Greens are concerned, it is true that they are still relatively small in most of these countries. But one should not forget that they are on the way of becoming the main party on the left in Germany – with 24.1 percent they obtained a larger share of votes than the social democrats (23.1 percent) and became the second largest party in the recent regional elections (spring 2011) in Baden-Württemberg. With respect to the radical populist right, it is true that, in LME and to some extent also in SME countries, the electoral system has prevented its rise so far<sup>12</sup>. Moreover, in CEE countries, the populism of the mainstream right parties may have served to limit its electoral weight. In most of the continental and Nordic CME countries, however, the radical populist right has become an important party. Thus, in the NCMEs, the Norwegian Progress Party is the country's second largest party with 22.9 percent (2009), and the True Finns have equally become the country's second largest party with 19.1 percent (2011). The Danish People's Party with 7.5 percent (2009) and the Swedish Democrats with 5.7 percent (2010) are smaller by comparison. In the CMEs, the Swiss People's Party has become the country's largest party with 28.9 percent (2007), combined the separatist Belgian New Flemish Alliance together with the radical populist Vlaams Belang take 25.2 percent (2010), i.e. more than any other party, and the Dutch PVV takes third place with 15.5 percent (2010). In line with our general argument, the relative importance of these two challenger party families has been increasing over the last couple of elections in the countries, where they had a chance of getting a foot on the ground in the first place. Hence, these parties have arrived at the center of electoral

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<sup>12</sup> France also has a majoritarian system, and the proportional systems of Greece and Spain are known to be little proportional because of their large average district size. Accordingly, Powell (2000) classifies them together with the majoritarian systems. In our sample, only Portugal has a rather proportional system.

competition in contemporary capitalism, with effects that go beyond their core policies, such as environmental policy or immigration. Both green and populist right-wing parties are important enough to form part of government and to shape politics and policy in contemporary capitalism. Thus, it is important to take into account that their electoral constituencies differ strongly from the ones that have traditionally been associated with left- vs. right-wing electorates. Green voters are highly educated members of the new middle classes, whereas right-wing populist parties collect the votes of low-educated groups, with no distinct class profile discernable in our analyses. Even though driven by cultural concerns, these shifts in voter preferences eventually also affect those parties' profiles in economic and social policy making.

Even among the moderate mainstream parties, economic conflict is not the primary driver of party competition anymore. In order to be able to distinguish more clearly the configuration of the mainstream parties, Figure 10 zooms in on the centre of the space in the previous figure. In this figure, the three main party families in each regime – social democrats, liberals and conservatives/christian democrats – are connected to each other to form a triangle. The overall orientation of the resulting triangles tells us something about the relative importance of the two dimensions for the choice between these three mainstream parties. In two regimes – Nordic CMEs and CEEs, the economic dimension is clearly more important given the horizontal spread of the corresponding triangles. This is particularly evident for the Scandinavian CMEs. Here, cultural conflict seems to be “delegated” to the new left and populist right, whereas the mainstream parties represent voter attitudes towards social insurance and redistribution. In the CEE countries, however, the three main families are located quite closely together, which suggests that their voters are not very distinct.

By contrast, in the other three regimes – LMEs, continental CMEs, and SMEs – the economic dimension does not seem to dominate choice for the mainstream parties, quite the contrary. Triangles are rather more spread across the vertical, i.e. cultural dimension. This result is very clear in the LME countries (UK and Ireland), whereas in continental CMEs and in SMEs, both dimensions matter, with the cultural one prevailing over the economic one. In these three regimes, the conservatives distinguish themselves from the social democrats above all on the cultural dimension. In the SMEs and in the UK and Ireland (the LME triangle in the figure), they are also quite clearly distinct from the liberals on the cultural dimension, whereas they are culturally close to the liberals in CMEs and in Ireland (triangle not drawn to avoid too many lines).

<Figure 10>

The upshot of this discussion can be summarized succinctly by two observations: first, the cultural dimension is crucial for the distinction of the increasing number of voters who choose the new challengers in the party system in all but the LME and CEE regimes. Second, the cultural dimension is also more important for distinguishing between the voters of the mainstream party families in LMEs, and at least as important as the economic dimension in continental CMEs and in SMEs. The economic dimension prevails for the choice of mainstream parties in Northern CMEs. The lack of ideological structuration in the CEE countries may explain the relative lack of importance of both dimensions for this regime. And the LME exception is primarily institutionally determined (i.e. the electoral systems suppresses the emergence of challenger parties). Overall, the analysis of electoral configurations clearly shows that both the socio-structural profile of political parties and the motivations that drive people's vote choices cannot be analyzed in purely economic left-right terms. Economic preferences remain an important driver of party choice, but only for the mainstream parties (and not in LMEs and Eastern Europe). This transformation is

also reflected in the socio-structural profile of the electorates. Education, income and class are not related unidimensionally to party vote (anymore). The highly educated and the new middle classes are spread across the entire party spectrum, with a particular preference for the green parties. And right-wing populist parties are particularly attractive for young men with low levels of education.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Our goal in this contribution was to map the structure of the political space of individual-level preferences throughout democratic European capitalist regimes, in order to discuss and assess its impact on party choice and electoral politics. In this conclusion, we review the findings and discuss their implications for the analysis of the politics of contemporary capitalist democracies.

In line with previous analyses, we have argued theoretically and shown empirically that there are at least two fundamental dimensions of conflict structuring voter preferences, one economic and one cultural. We add to the existing literature with regard to the composition of these dimension: the conflict line opposing cultural openness to cultural conservatism integrates not only the issues of immigration (which dominates the cultural dimension everywhere), EU integration and cultural liberalism, but in most countries (the exception refers to CEE countries, where the cultural dimension is very inconsistent in general and the economic scale much stronger) also questions of welfare chauvinism and welfare misuse. Even though these latter two issues refer to welfare policies (i.e. distributive issues), voters' attitudes towards them are clearly disconnected from their attitudes towards welfare generosity more generally. At the same time, we show that attitudes on the economic dimension have become very heterogeneous. People's opinions on distributive

principles (social insurance vs. redistribution), for instance, do not load on the same factor as people's attitudes towards redistribution and social investment policies. These findings show that the analysis of voter preferences towards economic policies must take into account that the boundaries between economic and cultural issues have become blurred, and that distributive conflict has become complex and heterogeneous, and thus cannot be reduced to a single left-right dimension.

We found striking differences in the average levels on these two dimensions across countries, with the Nordic and continental CME's being much more culturally open than the other countries, and all Western European countries being more economically liberal (i.e. right-wing) than people in southern and eastern Europe. While these regime differences confirm the distinction of types of capitalist regimes, their reasons need to be explained. We referred to modernization theory to explore some of these differences (at both the micro and macro levels) and found strong correlations between structural development and average attitudes. The richer a country in terms of GDP/capita, the more people are satisfied with the economic performance of their economy and with welfare benefits, and the more they defend economically market-liberal attitudes. This "saturation-effect" seems to be indirect, i.e. affluence loses its impact once we control for satisfaction with economic performance. On the cultural side, we find strong evidence for post-industrialization as a determinant of average attitudes. The more an economy is post-industrialized (i.e. the new middle class outweighs production workers), the more people have culturally open values. We tried to explain the mechanism behind this effect with reference to losers of deindustrialization developing feelings of disempowerment and alienation, which we measured with their dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. The effect is strong: the more dissatisfied people are with democracy, the more culturally conservative they are. The upshot of the regime comparison is that politics

in contemporary capitalism develop at very different base levels of support for economic liberalism and cultural openness.

Interestingly, however, despite these differences in average country levels, the configurations of interests, i.e. the socio-structural determinants of values and party choice, are very similar across countries and regimes. In terms of these socio-structural factors determining individual level preferences on both dimensions, we find clear patterns: education, class and age drive cultural openness. The older people are and the less cognitive and human capital resources they have, the more they reject openness with regard to immigration, EU integration, universalism and welfare state chauvinism. Also, middle class respondents are more likely to be culturally open than members of the working class. However, education is the strongest and most consistent predictor of cultural openness. Things are different when it comes to the economic preference scale. Here, we find no direct effect of education on economic liberalism, but a stronger impact of income (alone or in interaction with education). This difference is due to a split within the new middle class: socio-cultural specialists, i.e. high-skilled service workers in interpersonal occupations, have more economically interventionist preferences than managers or technical specialists. Hence, these socio-cultural specialists differ only weakly from the (lower-skilled) working class in their preferences for redistribution and social investment, which implies that the new middle class has become heterogeneous with regard to the economic dimension of political conflict. Distributive conflict can no longer be portrayed simply as a conflict between the upper and the lower classes (even though income continues to play a role in differentiating the highly educated among each other). Rather, as we show graphically, parts of the new middle class have aligned with lower classes with regard to economic preferences.

These (re)configurations of socio-structural groups and their preferences have important electoral implications. Class and education are increasingly associated with cultural preferences, in addition to or even instead of economic ones. Since this translates into party choice, it changes both the socio-structural profile of party constituencies and the underlying dynamic of party competition in contemporary capitalism. Two major findings result from our analysis of party choice: first, cultural attitudes explain the vote choice for green and radical right-wing populist parties. Also, the spread of party families across the cultural dimension is much greater than the corresponding spread across the economic dimension, especially in Nordic and continental CMEs and in southern European SMEs. Hence, green and radical right-wing populist parties as two specific, culturally mobilized parties are reshaping the European party systems profoundly. In some countries, they receive up to 30 percent of the votes and more, which makes them likely to enter government coalitions. Even though driven by mostly cultural concerns, these shifts in voter preferences thus also affect parties and governments with regard to economic and social policy making.

The second finding is that economic preferences have a more limited effect on electoral preferences, distinguishing mostly between the choice of moderate right-wing parties and (radical and moderate) left-wing parties. In Nordic CMEs and Eastern Europe, the economic dimension is clearly more important in differentiating moderate right- from moderate left-wing parties than the cultural dimension. Especially in Scandinavia, cultural conflict seems to be “delegated” to the new left and populist right, whereas the mainstream parties represent voter attitudes towards social insurance and redistribution. In continental CMEs and LMEs, however, the choice for these mainstream parties is at least equally strongly structured by cultural preferences than economic ones.

Overall, our analysis of electoral dynamics shows that both dimensions need to be taken into account in order to understand party politics in contemporary capitalist regimes. Culturally mobilized challenger parties alter the dynamics of party competition, even with regard to the moderate parties that still distinguish themselves with regard to economic issues. This economic dimension itself has been transformed by parallel processes of globalization and welfare state maturation. Parties do not compete with regard to macro-economic policies anymore, but with regard to rather specific welfare policies such as redistribution and social investment. Of course, the correct conceptualization of individual level preferences in both cultural and economic terms depends on the research question one wants to answer. It may make sense to define cultural and economic preferences more narrowly to analyze specific socio-structural configuration or a particular party family. However, if our goal is to understand what voters want, why they choose specific parties and what this choice implies for politics and policies in contemporary capitalist democracies, we need to take both preferences scales into account.

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## Appendix I: List of variables

Indicators <sup>1314</sup>	Original ESS variables	Survey question
Immigration	imsmetn	... allow many/few immigrants of the same ethnic group/race as majority
	imdfetn	... allow many/few immigrants of different ethnic group/race as majority
	impctr	... allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
	imbgeco	... immigration bad or good for country's economy
	imueclt	... countries cultural life undermined/enriched by immigrants
	imwbcn	... immigrants make country better/worse place to live
Cultural liberalism	wmcpwrk	... women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family
	mnrjtjb	... men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce
	freehms	... gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish
	schtaut	... school teach children obey authority
	hrshsnt	... people who break the law much harsher sentences
Welfare misuse	uentrjb	... most unemployed people do not really try to find a job
	bennent	... many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to
	prtsick	... employees often pretend they are sick to stay at home
Welfare Chauvinism	imrcon	... immigrants receive more or less than they contribute
EU Integration	euftf	... European unification go further/gone too far
Egalitarianism	smdfslv	... for fair society, differences in standard of living should be small
Redistribution	gincdifl	... governments should reduce differences in income levels
Job for everyone	gvjbevn	... government should be responsible to provide a job to everyone who wants one
Childcare	gvpdlwk	... government should be responsible to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents
Pension insurance	earnpn	... higher or lower earners should get larger old age pensions
Unempl. insurance	earnueb	... higher or lower earners should get larger unemployment benefits
Economic satisfaction	slvpns	... pensioners' standard of living is good
	slvuemp	... unemployed people's standard of living is good
	eldcrsv	... the provision of affordable child care is good

<sup>13</sup> Immig, cultlib, wmisuse: constructed by factor analyses for the entire file, based on corresponding original ESS variables; missing values on the original variables have been imputed based on the other original variables of the respective set.

<sup>14</sup> wchav2\_s, eu1\_s, gresp1\_s, incdiff\_s, fairsoc\_s, govinc\_s: transformed original variables; missing values on the original variables have been imputed based on related variables (wchav2\_s: imscbn, imsmetn-imwbcn; eu1\_s: trstep, trstun, immig; gresp1\_s: gvhlthc-gvslvue; incdiff\_s: gincdif, smdfslv; fairsoc\_s: gincdif,dfincac; govinc: smdfslv dfincac).

	vngfnjb	... the opportunities for young people to find a first full-time job are good
	stfec0	... satisfied with the present state of the economy in their country
	nmnybsc	... of every 100 people of working age in your country, how many would you say do not have enough money for basic necessities? (high values reflect low poverty rates)
Satisfaction with democracy	stfdem	... people are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country
Church attendance	rlgatnd	How often attend religious service apart from special occasions
Catholicism	rlgdnm	Religion belonging to at present: catholicism
Party choice	prvt	... for which party did you vote in the last election?
	prtcl	... which party do you feel close to?

**Table 1:** Factor analyses for the economic preference scale: factor loadings for uniform scale, rotated solution<sup>1)</sup>

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2
Egalitarianism	<b>0.53</b>	0.10
Redistribution	<b>0.51</b>	0.12
Job for everyone	<b>0.58</b>	0.02
Childcare	<b>0.49</b>	-0.05
Pension insurance	0.03	<b>0.63</b>
Unempl. Insurance	0.05	<b>0.63</b>
Eigenvalue	1.12	0.82

<sup>1)</sup> All scales based on exploratory factor analysis reported in the above table

**Table 2:** Factor analyses for preference scales: factor loadings for regime-specific and uniform scales, rotated solutions<sup>1)</sup>


Variable	LME		CME north		CME	
	Liberal c.		Nordic countries		Continental Europe	
	(GB, IE)		(DK, FI, NO, SE)		(BE, CH, DE, NL, SI)	
	cult	eco	cult	eco	cult	eco
Immigration	<b>0.68</b>	-0.01	<b>0.69</b>	-0.05	<b>0.68</b>	0.05
Welfare chauvinism	<b>0.55</b>	-0.00	<b>0.48</b>	-0.09	<b>0.47</b>	0.01
Welfare misuse	<b>0.44</b>	-0.05	<b>0.50</b>	-0.02	<b>0.44</b>	0.04
Cultural liberalism	<b>-0.39</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.55</b>	-0.09	<b>-0.48</b>	-0.13
EU Integration	<b>-0.39</b>	0.06	<b>-0.31</b>	-0.15	<b>-0.43</b>	0.08
Egalitarianism	-0.01	<b>0.39</b>	0.01	<b>0.53</b>	0.07	<b>0.45</b>
Redistribution	0.03	<b>0.44</b>	-0.01	<b>0.58</b>	0.10	<b>0.53</b>
Job for everyone	0.01	<b>0.50</b>	-0.04	<b>0.49</b>	0.07	<b>0.53</b>
Childcare	-0.09	<b>0.44</b>	-0.13	<b>0.32</b>	-0.10	<b>0.44</b>
EW	1.27	0.80	1.39	1.01	1.32	0.98

Variable	SME		CEE		Uniform scales	
	State capitalism (CY, ES, FR, GR, I, PT)		Eastern European capitalism (BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LV, PL, RO, RU, SK, UA)			
	cult	eco	cult	eco	cult	eco
Immigration	<b>0.64</b>	0.09	<b>0.56</b>	0.10	<b>0.61</b>	0.11
Welfare chauvinism	<b>0.49</b>	-0.00	<b>0.47</b>	0.06	<b>0.41</b>	-0.05
Welfare misuse	<b>0.27</b>	-0.01	0.08	-0.02	<b>0.32</b>	0.02
Cultural liberalism	<b>-0.38</b>	-0.19	-0.17	<b>-0.34</b>	<b>-0.40</b>	<b>-0.31</b>
EU Integration	<b>-0.36</b>	0.06	<b>-0.37</b>	-0.03	<b>-0.32</b>	0.05
Egalitarianism	0.10	<b>0.46</b>	0.11	<b>0.56</b>	0.13	<b>0.53</b>
Redistribution	0.05	<b>0.40</b>	0.11	<b>0.54</b>	0.10	<b>0.51</b>
Job for everyone	0.07	<b>0.56</b>	0.03	<b>0.60</b>	0.06	<b>0.59</b>
Childcare	0.02	<b>0.53</b>	-0.02	<b>0.49</b>	-0.06	<b>0.47</b>
EV	1.03	1.03	0.74	1.32	0.94	1.23


<sup>1)</sup> All scales based on exploratory factor analysis reported in the above table


**Table 3:** Correlation between the capitalism-specific scales and the uniform scales, per region

capitalism	cultural	economic
LME	0.99	0.99
CME North	0.99	0.98
CME Continental	0.99	0.99
SME	0.99	0.99
CEE	0.96	0.99


**Figure 1:** Overall level of political preferences by country: country means


**Figure 2:** Overall level of political preferences by capitalist regime type




**Figure 3:** Mean country levels of economic liberalism and level of economic affluence

**Figure 4:** Mean country levels of economic liberalism and level of satisfaction with the country's welfare and economic performance



**Figure 5:** Mean country levels of cultural liberalism and post-industrialization

**Figure 6:** Mean country levels of cultural liberalism and satisfaction with democracy



**Table 4:** Determinants of mean country levels of economic and cultural liberalism, OLS-regression

	Economic liberalism b/se	Economic liberalism b/se	Cultural liberalism b/se	Cultural liberalism b/se
GDP/capita	0.032*** (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)		
Mean economic satisfaction		0.451*** (0.15)		
Post-industrialization			0.013*** (0.00)	0.007* (0.00)
Mean satisfaction with democracy				0.094** (0.03)
_cons	-0.705*** (0.14)	-0.111 (0.24)	-0.036 (0.04)	-0.472*** (0.16)
Adj. R2	0.51	0.62	0.32	0.45
N	29	29	29	29


**Table 5:** Determinants of cultural preferences, by capitalist regime type: OLS-regression

	LME	CME North	CME Cont	SME	CEE
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Age	-0.006*** (0.00)	-0.004*** (0.00)	-0.006*** (0.00)	-0.002*** (0.00)	-0.005*** (0.00)
Gender (female)	-0.082*** (0.03)	0.042** (0.02)	0.015 (0.02)	0.042** (0.02)	0.048*** (0.01)
Education	0.109*** (0.03)	0.201*** (0.03)	0.161*** (0.03)	0.193*** (0.03)	0.052*** (0.02)
Income	-0.002 (0.01)	0.014 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.015 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Educ*Income	0.007 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)
Public sector	-0.063 (0.06)	-0.039 (0.04)	-0.030 (0.04)	-0.086* (0.05)	-0.007 (0.03)
Income*PubSector	0.021** (0.01)	0.017*** (0.01)	0.017*** (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.000 (0.00)
Socio-cultural specialist	0.318*** (0.06)	0.248*** (0.04)	0.267*** (0.04)	0.216*** (0.04)	0.166*** (0.03)
Self-employed	0.395*** (0.08)	0.191*** (0.05)	0.379*** (0.05)	0.166*** (0.06)	0.164*** (0.05)
Technical Expert	0.288*** (0.07)	0.119*** (0.04)	0.213*** (0.04)	0.174*** (0.04)	0.136*** (0.03)
Manager	0.190*** (0.05)	0.154*** (0.04)	0.194*** (0.03)	0.088** (0.03)	0.124*** (0.03)
Office clerk	0.168*** (0.05)	0.135*** (0.03)	0.108*** (0.03)	0.068** (0.03)	0.088*** (0.03)
Service worker	0.069* (0.04)	0.082*** (0.03)	0.051* (0.03)	0.030 (0.03)	0.040** (0.02)
Small Business Entrepr.	0.129*** (0.05)	-0.042 (0.04)	0.150*** (0.03)	0.025 (0.03)	0.075** (0.03)
Trade union member	0.086** (0.04)	0.073*** (0.03)	0.042* (0.02)	0.068** (0.03)	-0.014 (0.02)
Prod. worker * Union member	-0.040 (0.05)	-0.105*** (0.04)	-0.009 (0.03)	0.039 (0.04)	0.017 (0.03)
Religiosity	0.022*** (0.01)	-0.017** (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.029*** (0.01)	-0.009* (0.01)
Catholicism	-0.146*** (0.04)	-0.093 (0.09)	-0.058*** (0.02)	-0.198*** (0.02)	-0.033 (0.02)
Const	-0.020 (0.09)	0.054 (0.08)	-0.260*** (0.08)	-0.749*** (0.08)	-0.006 (0.06)
R2	0.18	0.21	0.16	0.18	0.12
N	3339	6394	7131	6208	10267


**Table 6:** Determinants of economic preferences, by capitalist regime type: OLS-regression

	LME b/se	CME North b/se	CME Cont b/se	SME b/se	CEE b/se
Age	0.002** (0.00)	-0.003*** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.002*** (0.00)	-0.004*** (0.00)
Gender (female)	-0.062** (0.02)	-0.093*** (0.02)	-0.094*** (0.02)	-0.026 (0.02)	-0.060*** (0.02)
Education	0.030 (0.03)	-0.003 (0.03)	0.024 (0.03)	0.037 (0.03)	0.018 (0.02)
Income	0.031*** (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	0.024*** (0.01)	0.017* (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Educ*Income	0.005 (0.00)	0.012*** (0.00)	0.013*** (0.00)	0.009** (0.00)	0.018*** (0.00)
Public sector	-0.044 (0.06)	0.099** (0.04)	-0.061 (0.04)	0.179*** (0.05)	0.035 (0.03)
Income*PubSector	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.032*** (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	-0.019** (0.01)	-0.009* (0.01)
Socio-cultural specialist	0.116** (0.06)	-0.018 (0.04)	0.090** (0.04)	0.010 (0.04)	0.102*** (0.03)
Self-employed	0.192** (0.08)	0.157*** (0.05)	0.190*** (0.05)	0.166*** (0.06)	0.324*** (0.06)
Technical Expert	0.174*** (0.07)	0.141*** (0.04)	0.147*** (0.04)	0.108*** (0.04)	0.054 (0.04)
Manager	0.250*** (0.05)	0.216*** (0.04)	0.220*** (0.03)	0.112*** (0.03)	0.107*** (0.03)
Office clerk	0.096** (0.04)	0.084** (0.03)	0.125*** (0.03)	-0.023 (0.03)	0.064** (0.03)
Service worker	0.008 (0.04)	0.018 (0.03)	0.070** (0.03)	0.008 (0.03)	-0.006 (0.02)
Small Business Entrepr.	0.115** (0.04)	0.104*** (0.04)	0.199*** (0.03)	0.074*** (0.03)	0.107*** (0.03)
Trade union member	-0.138*** (0.04)	-0.092*** (0.03)	-0.122*** (0.02)	-0.144*** (0.03)	-0.080*** (0.02)
Prod. worker * Union member	0.094** (0.05)	-0.031 (0.04)	0.032 (0.03)	0.063 (0.04)	-0.021 (0.03)
Religiosity	-0.031*** (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.014** (0.01)
Catholicism	-0.096*** (0.03)	-0.089 (0.09)	0.003 (0.02)	0.109*** (0.02)	-0.047* (0.02)
Const	0.251*** (0.09)	0.820*** (0.08)	-0.083 (0.08)	-0.715*** (0.08)	-0.235*** (0.06)
R2	0.09	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.19
N	3339	6394	7131	6208	10267

**Figure 7:** Political preferences by level of education and capitalist regimes, mean values



**Figure 8:** Political preferences by class and capitalist regimes, mean values



**Table 7:** Determinants of the vote in continental CMEs, for six party families, odds ratios, t-values, and significance levels<sup>1)</sup>

	radleft b/t	green b/t	socdem b/t	lib b/t	conscd b/t	rpp b/t
cultural2	2.314*** (6.66)	3.511*** (11.70)	1.719*** (8.73)	0.991 (-0.11)	1.018 (0.25)	0.251*** (-10.30)
economic2	0.631*** (-3.63)	0.885 (-1.10)	0.865* (-2.38)	1.392*** (4.82)	1.196** (2.81)	1.368** (3.17)
inter	0.817 (-1.40)	0.755* (-2.21)	0.988 (-0.16)	1.036 (0.43)	1.011 (0.13)	1.134 (0.92)
age	1.021*** (3.98)	0.997 (-0.67)	1.028*** (10.91)	1.028*** (8.84)	1.029*** (10.43)	1.007 (1.64)
gender	0.717 (-1.94)	1.068 (0.51)	1.025 (0.29)	0.889 (-1.17)	0.963 (-0.41)	0.688* (-2.54)
education	1.275 (1.80)	1.740*** (5.24)	1.166* (2.24)	1.332*** (3.60)	1.329*** (3.82)	1.257* (1.97)
income	0.933 (-1.74)	0.983 (-0.58)	1.043* (2.19)	1.115*** (4.69)	1.077*** (3.46)	0.994 (-0.19)
pubsector	0.875 (-0.38)	0.886 (-0.39)	0.752 (-1.50)	1.268 (0.99)	0.673 (-1.80)	0.692 (-0.90)
Income*public sector	1.075 (1.11)	1.097 (1.94)	1.084** (2.63)	0.993 (-0.18)	1.093* (2.52)	1.042 (0.65)
Socio-cultural professionals	1.819 (1.74)	2.001** (2.75)	1.436* (2.11)	1.535* (2.04)	1.381 (1.65)	0.887 (-0.38)
Liberal professions	1.486 (0.74)	4.704*** (4.89)	1.347 (1.13)	3.253*** (4.42)	1.720* (1.98)	1.219 (0.44)
technicians	1.996 (1.69)	1.54 (1.54)	1.377 (1.74)	1.623* (2.19)	1.501* (1.97)	1.189 (0.55)
managers	2.330* (2.55)	1.800* (2.41)	1.577** (2.97)	2.446*** (5.03)	2.240*** (4.87)	1.499 (1.64)
clerks	1.402 (1.25)	1.446 (1.51)	1.204 (1.35)	1.131 (0.69)	1.481** (2.66)	1.091 (0.35)
Service workers	2.161** (3.00)	1.22 (0.88)	1.247 (1.80)	1.002 (0.01)	1.029 (0.20)	0.885 (-0.54)
Small business owners	1.306 (0.73)	2.225** (3.22)	0.975 (-0.15)	2.308*** (4.61)	1.544* (2.52)	1.094 (0.36)
unions	2.358*** (3.48)	1.411* (2.08)	1.389** (2.81)	0.724* (-2.39)	1.009 (0.07)	1.027 (0.12)
Worker*unions	0.973 (-0.09)	0.952 (-0.19)	1.16 (0.98)	1.426 (1.89)	1.266 (1.37)	1.088 (0.29)
Church attendance	0.771*** (-3.67)	0.987 (-0.27)	0.96 (-1.32)	1.004 (0.09)	1.338*** (9.49)	0.983 (-0.34)
catholics	0.737 (-1.23)	0.779 (-1.54)	0.812* (-2.19)	1.171 (1.42)	1.746*** (5.80)	0.761 (-1.74)
_cons	0.388 (-1.93)	0.042*** (-7.33)	0.112*** (-7.92)	0.045*** (-9.26)	0.025*** (-11.83)	0.308* (-2.53)
Pseudo-R2	0.21	0.23	0.13	0.17	0.22	0.14
N	1100	2061	3337	2720	3202	1391


<sup>1)</sup>\*=.05, \*\*=.01, \*\*\*=.001

**Table 8:** Political preferences as determinants of the vote for different parties families, by varieties of capitalism: odds ratios, t-values, and significance levels<sup>1)</sup>

	radleft	green/soclib	socdem	Lib/cons	conscd	rpp
<b>LME</b>		b/t	b/t	b/t	b/t	
cultural		1.826*** (3.74)	1.437*** (3.83)	0.709* (-1.99)	0.698*** (-3.43)	
economic		0.979 (-0.15)	0.780** (-2.64)	0.888 (-0.73)	1.258* (2.50)	
inter		0.94 (-0.37)	1.167 (1.36)	1.28 (1.14)	1.078 (0.71)	
N		736	1510	677	1727	
Pseudo R2		0.19	0.18	0.27	0.23	
<b>Nordic CME</b>						
cultural	2.292*** (6.32)	3.599*** (7.77)	1.490*** (4.95)	1.29 (1.65)	1.036 (0.37)	0.360*** (-6.99)
economic	0.366*** (-5.76)	0.707 (-1.44)	0.645*** (-4.95)	1.591** (3.27)	1.707*** (6.18)	1.014 (0.11)
inter	1.349 (1.74)	1.029 (0.12)	1.201 (1.73)	1.196 (1.15)	1.236 (1.95)	1.093 (0.54)
N	1294	1014	2886	1170	2480	1286
Pseudo R2	0.27	0.23	0.23	0.32	0.25	0.25
<b>Cont. CME</b>						
cultural	2.314*** (6.66)	3.511*** (11.7)	1.719*** (8.73)	0.991 (-0.11)	1.018 (0.25)	0.251*** (-10.30)
economic	0.631*** (-3.63)	0.885 (-1.10)	0.865* (-2.38)	1.392*** (4.82)	1.196** (2.81)	1.368** (3.17)
inter	0.817 (-1.40)	0.755* (-2.21)	0.988 (-0.16)	1.036 (0.43)	1.011 (0.13)	1.134 (0.92)
N	1100	2061	3337	2720	3202	1391
Pseudo R2	0.21	0.23	0.13	0.17	0.22	0.14
<b>SME</b>						
cultural	1.528*** (4.20)	1.585* (2.54)	1.271*** (4.21)	1.246* (2.24)	0.662*** (-5.88)	0.320*** (-5.83)
economic	0.609*** (-4.84)	0.962 (-0.20)	0.770*** (-4.35)	1.031 (0.34)	1.257** (3.15)	0.781 (-0.94)
inter	0.963 (-0.31)	1.069 (0.30)	1.211** (2.61)	1.07 (0.59)	1.05 (0.58)	0.914 (-0.38)
N	2387	592	3533	1670	2595	877
Pseudo R2	0.15	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.19	0.13
<b>CEE</b>						
cultural	1.096 (0.93)	1.179 (1.07)	1.221*** (5.01)	1.120* (2.40)	0.969 (-0.80)	0.680*** (-4.02)
economic	0.758** (-3.19)	1.698*** (4.34)	0.909** (-2.78)	1.432*** (9.34)	1.031 (0.90)	0.884 (-1.51)
inter	1.008 (0.07)	1.724*** (3.46)	0.98 (-0.46)	1.105* (2.01)	1.149** (3.13)	0.853 (-1.50)
N	2356	1596	9457	6917	9794	2367
Pseudo R2	0.21	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.07


<sup>1)</sup>\*=.05, \*\*=.01, \*\*\*=.001

**Figure 9:** odds ratios for cultural and economic preferences<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup>The negative odds ratios have been transformed according to the formula  $-1/\text{odds}$  in order to make them comparable to the positive odds ratios.

**Figure 10:** odds ratios for cultural and economic preferences, only major parties<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup>The negative odds ratios have been transformed according to the formula  $-1/\text{odds}$  in order to make them comparable to the positive odds ratios.

