Collaborators and Parvenus?  
Berlaymont and Noircarmes,  
Loyal Noblemen in the Dutch Revolt

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Scholarship on the Dutch Revolt has always devoted much attention to the fortune of Prince William of Orange, which led to a historiographical neglect of noblemen who during the conflict remained loyal to their lord, Philip II. These loyal noblemen have often been regarded as Catholic collaborators with the Spanish and as egoistic parvenus longing for royal patronage. Through a juxtaposition of Charles Count of Berlaymont (1510–1578) and Philip of Sainte-Aldegonde, Baron of Noircarmes (?–1574), this contribution reassesses the link made between patronage and political opinion during the Revolt. Both noblemen obtained similar favours with different patronage strategies, which led to a lifelong rivalry between them. Nevertheless, during the Dutch Revolt they both engaged in loyal opposition, even agreeing to jointly raise complaints against the regime of the Duke of Alba at the Spanish Court. So recipients of Habsburg patronage in the Netherlands became foremost empowered bargainers, able to air their criticisms, rather than to transform into mere marionettes of the King.

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Introduction

Scholarship on the Dutch Revolt has always devoted much attention to the fortune of Prince William of Orange (1533–1584).⁴ This happened for evident reasons: Orange was, of course, one of the first to rebel against King Philip II of Spain, and he soon became the ‘natural’ leader of the uprising thanks to his wealth, prestige, and propaganda. Needless to say, as the Revolt paved the way for the Dutch Republic and its Golden Age, the victories and achievements of the Prince still figure prominently in the ‘myth of origin’ of the Netherlands.⁵ This legitimate interest in the rebellious William of Orange led, however, to a historiographical neglect of those
noblemen who during the troubles remained faithful to their overlord, Philip II. Even if these loyal noblemen did what they were supposed to do according to sixteenth-century standards, they did not receive a good press in (Dutch) historiography: over and over again they were regarded as Catholic collaborators with the Spanish and as egoistic parvenus searching for royal patronage. The fortune of the Count of Rennenberg echoes this negative canonization: after nine months of negotiations he reconciled with his King on 3 March 1580, but from then onwards his reconciliation was framed as a swift treason for money and titles, (depending on the account more or less) triggered by his Catholic belief.

In this contribution the old and customary link made between patronage and political opinion during the Dutch Revolt will be discussed through a juxtaposition of two of the ostracized loyal noblemen, namely Charles Count of Berlaymont (1510–1578) and Philip of Sainte-Aldegonde, Baron of Noircarmes (?–1574). This noble pair had a parallel profile and status: neither were of high-born nobility, but each of them disposed of considerable properties and revenues in the border provinces with France. Equally, both noblemen were on their way to consolidating their upward social mobility through means of a provincial governorship in the Habsburg Low Countries. Beyond their similar social status, they also share the classic reputation as collaborators-parvenus in an older nationalist and romantic historiography (and unfortunately still on many popular websites). As the only indigenous nobles appointed in the Council of Troubles, the exceptional tribunal led by the Duke of Alba to punish rebels and heretics, Berlaymont and Noircarmes were indeed compromised with the execution of the Counts of Egmond and Hornes and the conviction to death of the Prince of Orange, all their social superiors. But, in addition, Charles of Berlaymont was alleged to have called the noble insurgents ‘nothing more than beggars’, after which they turned that insult into an honour by adopting it as the name for their opposition. There is evidence to doubt that he really pronounced these words, yet the story is still found as an undisputed fact in many accounts of the Dutch Revolt. Noircarmes was even further (and, as will become clear, partly unjustifiably) discredited because of his continued help to Alba’s harsh military expedition in 1572 and 1573, especially to the sack of Mechelen, Zutphen, and Naarden.

The micro-perspective on two loyal noblemen serves well to re-establish the role of brokerage and agency in patronage questions, as proposed by Hans Cools, Marika Keblusek, and Badeloch Noldes in Your Humble Servant, Agents in Early Modern Europe, and vigilantly applied by Geert Janssen in his study on the seventeenth-century patronage and clientage of William Frederick Count of Nassau-Dietz. By examining change and agency, both works react against the too structuralist tendencies of the pioneering studies on early modern patronage and clientelism by Sharon Kettering, Robert Harding, and Antoni Maçzak. Or, as Janssen frames it, ‘clientage was not a matter of fixed relationships, but a process of continual adaptation to change and to different social environments’. These new acknowledgements support the earlier, yet often challenged, thesis of Kristin Neuschel on the continuing autonomy and power of clients in the asymmetrical patronage relations of the early modern
Clearly, also during the Dutch Revolt and within the Spanish-Habsburg composite monarchy, patron-client ties were flexible, while patronage clienteles and political factions were permeable. Berlaymont and Noircarmes were undoubtedly competing for the same patronage resources and chose therefore different brokers to the Habsburg Court. Also, within the new context of changing patronage opportunities during the Revolt, they adopted different strategies. But, despite their different patrons and their competition, they maintained a similar political stance on several points. Notwithstanding their portrayal as collaborators in Dutch historiography, they even cooperated to express their disagreement with Habsburg policies. In this way, they belonged to what Gustaaf Janssens in 1989 discerned as the ‘loyal opposition’ during the Dutch Revolt, an idiom familiar in British parliamentary history but used here to denominate loyalists expressing discontent within the legal boundaries of the early modern monarchy.

Despite the recognition that nobles from different clienteles could thus be in agreement on political strategy, current historiography on the Spanish-Habsburg monarchy and especially on the factionalism at the Spanish court stresses the congruency between clienteles and political factions. José Martínez Millán and his research group at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid identify the factional struggle at the court not only as a fight for patronage resources, but also as a crucial disagreement on political and religious values. In this light, the faction of the Duke of Alba shared a rigid conception of the divine power of the monarch (as taught at the University of Salamanca), whereas the faction of the Prince of Eboli proved more open to a constitutionally anchored monarchy and a progressive spirituality (as taught at Alcalà and propagated by the Jesuits). In foreign policy, the albistas were the hawks, the ebolistas the doves. Paul David Lagomarsino and lately José Eloy Hortal Muñoz have rightfully revealed how this court factionalism also played a major part in decisions regarding the Low Countries. Notwithstanding the novel and refreshing insights of this literature, the model is under pressure when associating Dutch nobles with Spanish factionalism. To be sure, as Liesbeth Geevers recently argued in her meticulous study on the three malcontent grandees, Orange, Egmond, and Hornes, the Spanish Court had more interest in having Dutch nobles in its sphere of influence than the other way around. Despite their communication and patronage links with members of Spanish court factions, the Dutch grandees steered a more or less independent course. The fate and fortune of Berlaymont and Noircarmes will show that this line of reasoning also applies to the less obvious case of loyal and not so high-ranking noblemen during the Dutch Revolt.

Perfect parvenus

Time and again John Elliott and Helmut Koenigsberger have argued for the importance of patronage in holding late medieval and early modern composite states together. In the ‘elusive Netherlands’, where a myriad of provinces gradually integrated in the same political union, the Dukes of Burgundy and their Habsburg
successors showed themselves well aware of this challenge.\textsuperscript{16} When it came to integrating the aristocracy, they used a wide range of patronage resources for creating a new dynastic nobility in their service: offices at a splendid court, membership of the dynastic Order of the Golden Fleece, appointments in advisory and judicial councils, provincial governorships, and mandates over standing troops, better known as the \textit{bandes d’ordonnance}. Hans Cools has accurately described how between 1470 and 1530 the distribution of and competition for these offices — dubbing them even as ‘noble institutions’ — created a supra-provincial open elite in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{17} The wide range of possible rewards meant that social upward mobility could be attained in many ways. Also the juxtaposition of Berlaymont and Noirarmes clearly demonstrates how different territorial backgrounds and trajectories led to similar outcomes. Even though both being born in the border region with France, Berlaymont stemmed from rather traditional landed nobility, while Noirarmes belonged to rich city patriciate which attained a noble status, the second most important type of aristocracy in the densely urbanized Low Countries.\textsuperscript{18} The open character of this supra-provincial elite, nevertheless, exposed newcomers to the characterization of parvenu. Berlaymont himself would not even hesitate to coin the term for his contender newcomer Noirarmes. Their lifelong rivalry was born in the competition for the same Habsburg patronage resources.

The province of Hainaut traditionally counted many landed elites, of which the family of Berlaymont was but one.\textsuperscript{19} The lineage possessed many fiefs there, such as Berlaymont, of course (with the hereditary title of \textit{bouteiller du comté de Hainaut}), Floyon, and Pérulwez. Charles of Berlaymont paid homage to this provincial anchorage by marrying Adrienne, daughter of the leading Hainaut lineage Ligne-Barbençon in 1532.\textsuperscript{20} As many other Hainaut nobles, he acquired prestige and honour in the wars of Emperor Charles V against France, even if that resulted in repeated sacks of his fiefs by French troops, and even if his mother’s relatives persisted in French service.\textsuperscript{21} His most important victory occurred in 1553 when besieging Longwy, deep into French territory. In 1544 Berlaymont was rewarded by the Emperor with the governorship of the adjacent border province of Namur, where he possessed some minor lordships, and around then he also received the command of a \textit{bande d’ordonnance}. After the French sack of the crucial Mariembourg fortress in 1555, he was entrusted by the Emperor himself with the construction of a new citadel in the frontier city of Charlemont. So, under Charles V, Charles of Berlaymont had obtained through military service all crucial positions for governing and defending a border province: a governorship, standing troops, and the command over a citadel.

Only the ascension to the throne of Philip II brought Berlaymont to the supra-provincial government in Brussels, better known as the three ‘collateral councils’.\textsuperscript{22} He was immediately appointed as Councillor of State and one of the Presidents of the Council of Finance. The subsequent election as Knight of the Golden Fleece in 1556 symbolically sealed his upward social mobility acquired through his firm loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty. When in 1559 Philip II left the Netherlands for his birth land, Berlaymont even became a permanent advisor to the new governor-general (and the King’s half-sister) Margaret of Parma. He did so together with Antoine Perrenot,
soon to become Cardinal Granvelle, senior bureaucrat of the Habsburg dynasty, and the renowned jurist Viglius, President of both the Council of State and the Secret Council. Berlaymont clearly manifested himself as a client of Granvelle, one of the most powerful brokers within the Habsburg monarchy. It has long been debated whether Granvelle, Viglius, and Berlaymont effectively formed a consulta, a secret privileged council commissioned by Philip II, or a spontaneous synergy of men permanently present at the Brussels Court. In any case, when the letters of Berlaymont arrived in Madrid, they were immediately translated into Castilian and scrupulously annotated by the King. Confronted in 1561 with this new power constellation at the Brussels Court, the Count of Hornes complained bitterly that the parvenu Berlaymont was more honoured than himself.

In Artois, then, Philip of Sainte-Aldegonde, Baron of Noircarmes, stemmed from rich city patriciate, which had acquired a legal noble status. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, members of the Sainte-Aldegonde family assumed a thriving role in Saint-Omer, the second city of the province. There they positioned themselves as successful merchants, city mayors, and échevins, and as patrons of the Church of Sainte-Aldegonde and the Hôpital du Soleil. The family property consisted mainly of lands within or closely outside the city walls of Saint-Omer, as they acquired consecutively the fief of Nortkelmes (soon to be named Noircarmes, today Quelmes), Wisques, Genech, Selles, Avelin, and Maingoval. In contrast to the Berlaymonts, the Noircarmes family was originally more present at court than in war. Philip of Sainte-Aldegonde was introduced at the imperial court by his father, himself a chamberlain and sommelier de corps of Charles V. In 1547 Philip was one of the nineteen chamberlains accompanying the Emperor to Augsburg. His younger brother Jean, Lord of Selles, became member of the archers de corps of Philip II. By 1557 he was promoted to lieutenant-captain of this Flemish Guard, after which he also followed Philip II to Spain in 1559. Charles V and Philip II solicited father and son Noircarmes as the local bailiff and captain of Saint-Omer, rather than bestowing offices at the provincial or supra-provincial level upon them as they did with Berlaymont. In these functions father and son Noircarmes had now to defend imperial and royal prerogatives, whereas their family predecessors in the position of mayors or échevins had guarded the local privileges.

In that context, it might be understandable that Noircarmes allied with the malcontent Dutch grandees in their League against Granvelle. Exactly because Noircarmes was excluded from the Brussels councils, it was easy for him to join the protest of Orange, Egmond, and Hornes, and share their demand for a States-General to solve the country’s remaining problems. The grandees quickly — but in the end vainly — supported his candidature for the Council of State. Berlaymont cynically mocked that Noircarmes was but a ‘fifth wheel’ in his attempt to belong to the movement of the magnates. Notwithstanding Berlaymont’s critique, it was precisely Noircarmes’ allegiance to the malcontent grandees that led to his promotion to the rank of provincial governor. First, for the convocation of the Estates of Valenciennes in June 1566, Noircarmes could take temporarily the place of governor.
from Hornes’ younger brother, Montigny, who was sent on a mission to Spain.\footnote{32} Chosen for the same mission, the malcontent grand bailiff of Hainaut successfully obtained from Margaret of Parma for Noircarmes to exercise his own governorships \textit{ad interim}.$^{33}$ Although Noircarmes still lacked an official appointment in the Brussels government, he could now participate in the meetings of the Council of State through his function as Grand Bailiff. At this new appointment, Berlaymont declared that \textit{ce jeune homme} only cared about himself. He thought that Philippe of Croÿ, Duke of Aarschot, had more right to this powerful position through his prestige (after the omnipresence of the Croÿs at the Burgundian Court), rank (the only duke in the Low Countries), experience (as Councillor of State since 1565) and especially his many Hainaut fiefs (which Noircarmes did not possess).\footnote{34} Nevertheless, the Duchess of Parma quickly put trust in Noircarmes and put him in command over a \textit{bande d’ordonnance}. It was indeed remarkable that Noircarmes quickly developed himself as pillar of the Habsburg regime. In March 1567, Noircarmes conquered Valenciennes — the ‘Dutch Genève’ — after having besieged voluntary Calvinist troops in Lannoy, Tournai, and Maastricht. His international reputation was now safe, and cleared from former \textit{malcontenterie}.$^{35}$

So, at the outbreak of Iconoclastic Fury in the summer and autumn of 1566, one of the starting posts of the Dutch Revolt, Berlaymont held the Namur governorship and Noircarmes the even more prestigious \textit{grand bailliage} of Hainaut, albeit on a temporary basis. They had realized this impressive upward social mobility in quite different ways. Berlaymont as a warrior noble, Noircarmes as a courtier, the first on the provincial echelon, the latter on the local level, the first associating with Granvelle, the latter with the malcontent grandees. Even if there has been discussion in how far a provincial governorship could be an effective means of building up an own clientele, it certainly brought wealth (out of numerous emoluments, prerogatives in justice, and gift-giving of cities), power (both towards inferior and superior levels), and patronage possibilities for appointments (even if shared with local authorities).$^{36}$ The governorship might have been a princely favour, but it was certainly no \textit{sinecure}, even less since the Reformation had replaced the French as the arch enemy. Both Berlaymont and Noircarmes continued in the Catholic religion, upholding the religious patronage of their families.$^{37}$ The latter insisted that the King should not even think of permitting two confessions in his realms.$^{38}$ Was this inspired by his stay with the imperial court in Augsburg in 1548, during which the Emperor promulgated the \textit{Formula Reformationis} in order to strengthen and reform the Catholic cause? Perhaps the reason for their ongoing allegiance to Philip II was their deliberate stance on keeping Catholicism as the only religion within the Dutch realms, rather than their parvenu state.

**Changing patronage patterns**

It was no coincidence that in August 1567 Margaret of Parma delegated only Berlaymont and Noircarmes as native nobles to welcome Fernando Álvarez de
Toledo, third Duke of Alba, and his army in the Luxemburg Thionville. Alba eventually also became governor-general in October 1567 when the Duchess of Parma refused to govern any longer with him as captain-general. Five years later, it was Alba’s turn to refuse to share power with the newly appointed governor Juan de la Cerda, fourth Duke of Medinaceli and, like him, Grande de España. Medinaceli eventually retreated in November 1573, without having had any chance to assume independently governmental tasks. One month afterwards, and still under loud protest from Alba, the Aragonese noble and Gran Comendador de Castilla Don Luis de Requesens managed to take over the Brussels government until his death in March 1576. These changes of regent always presented critical moments for politics and patronage: bonds had to be renewed or created, the rules of the game to be re-established. During the Dutch Revolt, however, the change of governor turned even more precarious. From 1567 to 1576, for the first time since the institution of the office, the governor-general was neither of royal blood nor of indigenous nobility, causing a lot of protest. Anyhow, as governors, Alba and Requesens were crucial agents in the distribution of Habsburg patronage in the Netherlands and also Medinaceli, as governor-appointed, tried to assume a role as local broker to the royal court. Nevertheless, their patronage towards aristocrats was seriously limited by the revolt. By 1567 a part of the nobility — grandees and gentry alike — had left the country, as had been the choice of Orange. In 1568 and again in 1572, returning exile noblemen managed to convince part of their social equals to support their rebellion against the tyrant Philip II and the ‘usurper’ Alba. These many ruptures in traditional social and civil allegiances turned the Revolt into a civil war, with recurrent resemblances to the contemporary French Civil and Religious Wars.

Geoffrey Parker has suggested that the arrival of Alba brought a new governing style to the Low Countries, to be characterized as a ‘household government’: decision-making moved from the Brussels collateral councils to the ducal household and his council of war. In other words, decision-making moved towards Alba’s familia. This statement is a little exaggerated as, already under Mary of Hungary and Margaret of Parma, household and military functions had been relevant in political decision-making (as in the rest of Europe until at least halfway through the seventeenth century). Moreover, Philip II refused any of the changes to governorships and court functions that Alba proposed to him, and he preferred the old patronage system to remain exactly as it was. Still, the crucial difference was the omnipresence of the newly arrived tercios, which increased the number of criados paid directly by the King and decreased the power of the local military commanders. In addition, the informal consejo de guerra, which consisted of courtiers from the Duke’s household and his personal secretary, decreased the role of the Council of State in questions of war and peace. Unmistakably, Noircarmes understood the new challenge: he aimed to enter the familia of Alba as soon as possible, probably encouraged by his international recognition after the siege of Valenciennes. The interim-grand bailiff quickly managed to receive from the Duke a new command over a hundred men of Walloon light cavalry, in addition to his existing charge of a bande d’ordonnance.
More unpredictably, Noircarmes was also appointed *chef de finances*, sharing the task with Berlaymont. His new allegiance thus finally promoted him to the Brussels government, an office missing before in his *cursus honorum*. Noircarmes further integrated into the Duke's *familia* when making friends with Don Fadrique, Alba’s eldest son, who soon joined him in the Netherlands. At this point, at latest, Noircarmes mastered the Spanish language. Obviously, his close proximity to Alba left Margaret of Parma irritated and disappointed in her former *protégé*. In hindsight, it remains striking that Alba cherished the advice of a member of the League against Granvelle, an alliance which he had considered to be outright lese-majesty in 1563.

All the same, as a statesman skilled in the art of *divide et impera*, Alba did not particularly favour Noircarmes over Berlaymont. This becomes especially clear when reconstructing the wearisome negotiations between the Duke and Philip II for the vacant provincial governorships from 1568 until 1570, which has also been the subject of a study by José Eloy Hortal Muñoz. The King proposed to give the Hainaut governorship to the Duke of Aarschot, because he thought that Noircarmes was often absent in his province as *chef de finances*. Nevertheless, Alba maintained that both tasks were compatible, as Hainaut was close enough to Brussels and the finances asked for only three days’ work in two weeks. He decided instead to ask Noircarmes to withdraw from his finance office in return for his definitive confirmation as bailiff. For Berlaymont, however, Alba pushed the logic in the opposite direction. Alba judged it incompatible to appoint Berlaymont as governor of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht because he was the head of the three *chefs de finances* and would thus be away from court too much. As a substitute, Alba conceded to appoint Berlaymont as Master of the Hunt (*grand veneur*) of Brabant, Namur, and Flanders, even if he had desired these honours for himself. He equally supported the appointment of Berlaymont’s son Louis to the Archbishopric of Cambrai, although the candidate did not meet the conditions set up by the Council of Trent.

When both Berlaymont and Noircarmes asked for the elevation of their baronies into counties, Alba drove his strategy of *divide et impera* even further. Noircarmes tried to bargain: he would willingly resign as *chef de finances*, if he received the title of Count. Alba gave negative advice to Philip II and suggested delay because Noircarmes’ weak health could soon ‘solve the problem’. In the end, Noircarmes was forced to resign as *chef de finances* without obtaining any favour in return. Surprisingly, Alba seemed more disposed to elevate Berlaymont to Count; yet, here, the King thought Noircarmes would take it as a sign of distrust and suggested postponing the procedure in relation to both noblemen. Even if Noircarmes dishonourably lost his position as *chef de finances*, he continued exclusive cooperation with Alba and his son, Don Fadrique. His military expertise became vital in the renewed campaign in April 1572 after the successful invasion of the Beggars. Whenever at the same place — as in Utrecht in July 1573 — Noircarmes made sure to reside as close to Alba as possible. It even made no difference that the Duke of Medinaceli — a new potential broker towards Madrid — arrived in the Netherlands. His sustained
loyalty was now rewarded with the provisional provincial governorship of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht, when its tenant, Boussu, fell into the hands of the Beggars. Hence, the newcomer Noircarmes now held the prestigious governorships which once were bestowed upon the Prince of Orange.

Berlaymont proved more flexible in his choice of brokers to the Spanish Habsburg Court. The support of his patron, Granvelle, clearly facilitated his relations with first Medinaceli and later on Requesens. When arriving in the Netherlands, Medinaceli had clearly chosen to act as a patron and broker towards the clients of Granvelle. Upon the request of whom to trust, the cardinal had declared that he knew best the ‘elder’ servants, not surprisingly thus recommending his client and former co-councillor Berlaymont. When Medinaceli was leaving, Berlaymont was wise enough to ask him to intervene for him at the Spanish Court. Afterwards, when writing to him on the situation in the Netherlands, he always solicited the recommendation of himself and his family to the King. Before his arrival in Brussels, Requesens had been in close contact with Granvelle, first during his embassy to the Holy See and later as Viceroy of Naples. Also Requesens acted as broker to the clients of Granvelle in the Low Countries. Upon Noircarmes’ death, Requesens soon arranged for the vacant governorships to go to Berlaymont’s eldest son, Gilles. In less than a year the fief of Berlaymont was elevated to a county. It would be tempting, thus, to locate Berlaymont in the clienteles of the adversaries of Alba. However, this is not only in contradiction with the already mentioned favours Berlaymont received from the Duke, but also with the fact that he also presented himself as the servant of the Duke, even when he left the Netherlands. So did his son, Louis, asking for his brother to be promoted to bishop of Tournai, ‘cognoissant la sincere affection quil vous a pleu monstre porter a ceulx de nostre maison’, and promising to keep being a tres affectionnez serviteur. Just as before, during the Dutch Revolt Berlaymont and Noircarmes relied on different patrons to reach similar aims of social upward mobility. While Noircarmes had therefore exclusively sought support from Alba, now positioning himself as military commander, Berlaymont as a councillor had been assisted by the Duke on the one hand and Granvelle, Medinaceli, and Requesens on the other.

Loyal opposition

Did the difference in patronage strategies between Berlaymont and Noircarmes also imply a different political stance during the Dutch Revolt? The question becomes even more urgent as the (appointed) governors have been associated with very opposite factions and policies. In literature, Alba (and in his train the albistas) stand out as hawks, while Medinaceli and Requesens have been regarded as doves due to their supposed affiliation with the ebolistas. The discussion on the Iconoclastic Fury in the Spanish Council of State of 29 October 1566 usually serves to illustrate the importance of factionalism in the formulation of the policy towards the Low Countries. Four of the councillors present, namely the Prince of Eboli and his clients, suggested that the King undertake a journey, accompanied by a small but significant
army, in order to re-establish loyalty and to grant a pardon. The other four, presided over by Alba, eventually won by urging for an impressive military expedition before the King travelled to the pacified Low Countries. This is one of the only cases of a perfect congruency between patronage factions and political opinions, at least so far as this concerns the Spanish Court. Pushing the congruency between patronage and politics further, as has been done, would mean that Noircarmes supported the military and repressive politics of Alba, while Berlaymont would have opted for more leniency. Nevertheless, Dutch nobles hardly fit into this rigid scheme of Spanish factionalism. As mentioned, Liesbeth Geevers recently argued that the faction of the Prince of Eboli was not able to integrate the three malcontent Dutch grandees into their power struggle at court. Even if the ebolistas maintained a large correspondence with Orange, Egmond, and Hornes, their brokerage did not satisfy the expectations of the Dutch grandees.

The advice of Berlaymont reveals similar incongruence between patronage and politics. In the summer and autumn of 1566, Berlaymont expressed political opinions which seemed similar to those just enunciated by the ebolistas. He asked, for example, for the King to come immediately, as only his presence would change the opinion of the malcontents. After the Iconoclastic Fury, he advised the King to wait as long as possible to start a military response. The King had to avoid every war, acting with douceur where possible in order to restore the public order. Despite this resemblance to the ebolista stance, his immediate patron, Granvelle, was the outspoken opponent of the faction. In his memoranda, Berlaymont safely only referred to his duty to counsel the King as ‘fi el vasallo y muy obediente criado y obligado a mi Rey y soberano señor’. In a later audience with Alba, Berlaymont criticized the arrests of Egmond and Hornes, and he defended the privileges of his brother Knights of the Golden Fleece, even if they had been his political enemies before. Furthermore, he contested that the judicial proceedings defined the King as souverain du payz and not souverain de l’Ordre. Alva responded that his opposition could lead to an admonition during a chapter of the Golden Fleece and forbade other audiences on this theme. In the trial of Egmond and Hornes, Berlaymont thus positioned himself more as a critic than as a treacherous collaborator. Berlaymont also turned into a supporter of a possible general pardon for repentant vassals, exaltando humiles et deprimendo superbos. Gustaaf Janssens therefore characterized Berlaymont already as a member of the loyal opposition. Nevertheless, Berlaymont’s rapprochement to Medinaceli, who has been seen as the candidate of the ebolista faction, did not imply a pacifist stance. Even if Medinaceli had been welcomed as the long-awaited medicina caeli — medicine from heaven — it was only half a year later, after the harsh sack of Malines in October 1572, that Juan de la Cerda openly opposed Alba’s policies. Berlaymont, however, had sought immediate access to the brokerage of the newly appointed governor. It is significant that, after Medinaceli’s opposition, Berlaymont still continued to seek his company in order to air his criticism.

Hence, the power base, acquired by patronage, could easily serve to formulate criticisms of Habsburg policy, regardless of immediate patrons. The notion of clemency, and the concrete measure of pardon, served this ‘loyal opposition’ well. As
a rule in classic Ciceronian-Senecan political thought, a conflict could be solved by the *voie de douceur* or the *voie de rigeur* or *de force*. In the context of a rebellion or heresy, clemency did not mean relinquishing completely a military or repressive response, but instead accompanying it with reconciliatory measures such as a (general) pardon, the journey of the King, or eventually even the convocation of the States-General. The disapproval of Berlaymont might perhaps come as less unexpected, as he was not dependent on Alba as patron and broker to the royal court. It is more surprising and also less known that Noircarmes, too, criticized the Duke’s government, with similar arguments to those of Berlaymont. This gives further evidence to the fact that patronage actually enlarged the political bargaining base of the recipient.

As early as 1568, the Grand Bailiff of Hainaut exposed his rather negative assessment of Alba’s tactics to his brother, Selles, at that time in the Netherlands after a mission in France. Upon his return to the Spanish Court, Selles wrote his brother’s opinion down in Castilian (which was heavily influenced by his French mother tongue, however). The until now unknown autograph remains today in the British Library amongst the papers of the Grand Inquisitor, the Cardinal of Espinosa. Noircarmes first criticized Alba’s military strategy, which took into account neither the power of Dutch cities nor the crucial position of the border provinces nor the possibility of an invasion by foreign powers. More fundamentally, he thought that the King had to win the hearts of his vassals, both of noblemen and others (*assy de cavalleros como de cualquier otro genero de personas*). The King seemed to lose his nobility and his lands at once, therefore he had to use force only partially and complement it with *douceur* and a general pardon. He also underlined that he did not want the King to completely renounce the *via de fuerça*, but he had to complement it with mildness.

In 1570 and 1571, Berlaymont and Noircarmes even set their traditional rivalry aside and jointly warned the King of their opposition to the Tenth Penny, a new tax proposed by Alba, by secretly sending a courtier to Madrid. They thought the new tax would only provoke more unrest, and should thus be abolished. Again, in 1573, Noircarmes harshly assessed the policy of his patron. Now he urged not only for a general pardon, but also for peace negotiations. For hardliners, peace negotiations were unacceptable, because they implied equality between the King and the rebels, whereas a pardon still maintained the hierarchical relationship. Still, he was the only one to get from Alba the official permission to start negotiations with the rebel party. In December 1573, he sent diplomats to rebel cities, but only Gouda responded. When English troops left the city in January 1574, Noircarmes formally promised the Gouda citizens pardon, but the attempt to negotiate did not get off the ground. The capture of Philip of Marnix de Sainte-Aldegonde, Calvinist advisor to the Prince, was another occasion Noircarmes seized upon for negotiation. He obliged Marnix to write letters to Orange in order to convince him to negotiate peace. William of Orange cleverly responded that he wanted *une seure et bonne paix*, given the fact that God asked all Christians for peace. As his only condition, he asked that the *hispanolz* leave the country and he was convinced that Noircarmes wanted this,
Tactically, the Prince recalled their joint presence in *la chambre du feu empreureur* and hinted at the doomed fate of Philip of Hessen and the Margrave of Brandenburg, once also nobles in Habsburg service. As always in civil war, perceptions shifted alongside parties and factions, but Noircarmes found himself in a particularly awkward position. He was the forthright enemy of the Dutch Beggars, but at the same time he was the opponent of some Dutch loyalists, too. They incriminated him for offering pardon to Gouda too late. To make things even worse, Noircarmes was also dismissed by Spaniards for being too lenient. According to an anonymous note also kept in Espinosa’s papers, by the end of 1573 Noircarmes was even hated by the Spanish nation because he did not attack the walls of Haarlem ‘contrary to the opinion of good soldiers’. Still, according to the report, he obstructed royal *criados* in order to help his friends and relatives within the city walls, which was the only reason why the royal army had lost Alkmaar. Noircarmes wanted to prolong the war because he was *prinçipe y absoluto señor* in it. In the end, he only wanted to make a compromise according to the wishes of the rebel States, ‘but against the honour of God and Christianity’. Alba, too, soon came to mistrust Noircarmes’ negotiations. Noircarmes only avoided a fall from grace under Requesens by dying in Utrecht on 5 March 1574, according to his doctor because *il s’est par trop travaillé à negotier*.

**Conclusion**

Helmut Koenigsberger, John Elliott, and José Martínez Millán have all demonstrated that the Habsburgs were well aware of the potential of patronage to hold their composite state together. Over and over they used the distribution of offices, titles, and gifts as a means of rewarding and reinforcing loyalty. In this way, the Habsburgs skilfully strengthened their power and prerogatives and intensified the links between centre and periphery. Nevertheless, the system never reached its fixed equilibrium, and the limits of Habsburg patronage became time and again painfully apparent when nobles acted upon their *devoir de revolte*. The Dutch Revolt was without doubt the most protracted of these conflicts, with the most disadvantageous outcomes for the Spanish Crown. It tested the boundaries of the patronage system not only by the open and overt rebellion of William of Orange, but also — as this contribution has argued — by the loyal and more discrete opposition of not so high-ranking noblemen. Their motives and actions might have been overlooked in traditional historiography, but their decisions likewise influenced the political culture of the Dutch Revolt. The discord amongst the Dutch nobility in general, and amongst the loyal nobility in particular, underpins the recent reinterpretation of the Revolt as a civil war.

Berlaymont and Noircarmes were members of the open and malleable aristocracy created and sustained by Habsburg patronage. Even if rather petty nobles at the beginning, they received awards and offices in the central institutions. Both obtained the highly prized provincial governorship in return for their continuing loyalty, in border regions as crucial as Hainaut and Namur. For both noblemen, the hostilities during the Dutch Revolt offered even greater chances for social mobility when
important governmental and military offices fell vacant. In addition, they esteemed highly the religious stance of their King, fighting against the Reformation and guaranteeing the exclusive position of Tridentine Catholicism. Philip II was in any case better placed to do so than the, by then, Protestant William of Orange. The decision of Berlaymont and Noircarmes to remain loyal was thus rational, religious, and emotional at the same time, rather than a decision out of mere selfish parvenu behaviour.

Still, Habsburg patronage created fierce competition amongst nobles, another often overlooked basis for tension and division amongst loyal nobility. In having built up a system with many different rewards, the Habsburg created scope for internal rivalries, particularly for noblemen with similar social profiles. Berlaymont and Noircarmes aspired to the same goals in titles, the court, and the provincial governorships, yet they used different strategies and patrons. Before the Dutch Revolt, Berlaymont spent his formative years at the battlefield, gradually climbing up from the provincial to the supra-provincial level. Noircarmes lived his youth at court and was subsequently employed in loyal city politics. Berlaymont had Granvelle as immediate patron, Noircarmes the malcontent grandees. During the Revolt, Noircarmes sought access to Alba’s family, while Berlaymont relied upon the Duke, Granvelle, Medinaceli, and Requesens altogether. The enmity between both noblemen grew worse over the years; in the end, it also damaged the Habsburg reputation. Joachim Hopperus, Dutch keeper of the Seal in Madrid, thought that both should openly reconcile and give up their strife in order to achieve a more rapid pacification of the Netherlands.

Different patrons did not exclude similar political opinions within the chaos of the Dutch Revolt. Despite their antagonism and their different patrons, Noircarmes and Berlaymont shared quite common ideas on a desirable approach for the pacification of the Netherlands. For them, a military intervention was necessary, but only if accompanied by reconciliatory measures and gestures. For both, the new tax of the Tenth Penny was a bridge too far. Secretly, they seized upon the possibility to envoy together a servant to the Spanish Court in order to manifest their protest again the new financial measures of the Duke of Alba. This made them part of the wider loyal opposition to the Habsburg government during the Dutch Revolt. Noircarmes even used his position to critically assess the style of government of his patron. So recipients of patronage in the Netherlands became foremost empowered bargainers, able to air their criticisms. The Dutch grandees had acted accordingly from the 1560s onwards, but also members of the remaining loyal nobility continued opposition, even if more discretely. In times of civil war, patronage and politics differed from the logics they followed in peace times, to the great discontent of all parties involved. That is why, on the occasion of Noircarmes’ death, Granvelle wrote that the King had not lost anything, ‘because at the very moment Alba favoured him the most, he was writing heinous letters against the government of the Duke’. The Cardinal had kept some of these letters and was willing to send copies if they had not already have kept these letters in Spain. It was a bitter testimony of the fact that the Habsburg patronage in the Low Countries did not always yield the desired effects.


The orthography of early modern noble names remains a rather arbitrary decision. I preferred the traditional and early modern orthography of Berlaymont and Noircarmes above the less familiar contemporary names of these fi efs, currently spelt as Berlaimont and Quelmes.


12 The first major work in this series was Instituciones y Elites de Poder en la Monarquía Hispánica durante el Siglo XVI, ed. by J. Martínez Millán (Madrid, 1992); now the thesis is deepened and reformulated in works with the scope of one single court: Felipe II (1527–1598), La configuración de la monarquía hispánica, ed. by J. Martínez Millán and C. J. De Carlos Morales (Valladolid, 1998); La Corte de Carlos V, ed. by J. Martínez Millán et al. (Madrid, 2000) and Felipe III: La Casa del Rey, ed. by J. Martínez Millán and M. A. Visceglia (Madrid, 2008). P. D. Lagomasino, ‘Court Factions and the Formation of Spanish Politics Towards the Netherlands (1559–1567)’ (unedited PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1973) and J. E. Hortal Muñoz, El manejo de los asuntos de Flandes, 1585–1598 (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, PhD thesis 2004, published on CD-ROM in 2006).


19 V. Flammang, ‘Partis en Hainaut? La place de la noblesse hainuyère dans la lutte entre Jacqueline de Croÿ, first Prince of Chimay: d’Albret, Lady of Avesnes and wife of Charles of Michel de Berlaymont and Marie de Barrault met when she was serving as lady-in-waiting to Louise d’Albret, Lady of Avesnes and wife of Charles of Croÿ, first Prince of Chimay: Nobiliario universal de France ou Recueil générale des gênealogies historiques des maisons nobles de ce royaume, t (Paris, 1820), 407–09.

20 A modern biography of Berlaymont is still lacking; there are biographical entries as ‘Berlaymont’, Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden, ed. by J. Van der Aa (henceforth BWN), 123 (2008), 541–63. See additional notes by Anton van der Lem, ‘Berlaymont, Charles, graaf van’ on the website Dutch Revolt of the University of Leiden: <http://dutchrevolt.leidenuniv.nl/Nederlands/default.htm>.


23 During his life, Philippe of Sainte-Aldegonde, Lord of Noircarmes, also obtained the fi ef of Maingoval of Haultepenne and Hierges which belonged to the lordship de la Bassée, under jurisdiction of the prince-bishop of Liège, which he did however hope to change his position in the Flemish Guard, J. E. Hortal Muñoz, ‘ Een vreemde wending van de vredesmissie in de Nederlanden van Jan van Noircarmes, baron van Selles (1577–1580)’, Bulletin de la Commission Royale d’Histoire, 171 (2005), 135–92, and, for his position in the Flemish Guard, J. E. Hortal Muñoz, ‘Las guardas palatino-personales de Felipe II’, La Monarquía de Felipe II: la Casa del Rey, 1, 453–506.
In 1554, one of Berlaymont’s sons had become Knight of the Order of Malta. Berlaymont consciously refurbished the chapel in his castle of Beauraing, Noircarmes continued the patronage for his family chapel in the (now) cathedral of Saint Omer, where he was also buried when he died.

In 1565, he was nominated for his captainship. He only receives 100 fl orins a month as comparison, he only receives 12,000 fl orins for his service from the city of Mons; for his family chapel, he only receives 100 florins a month for his captainship.

In 1576, he became governor of the province of Flanders for the Dutch Revolt (1564–1567), Revue belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, 86 (2008), 735–58 (pp. 748–92).


On the reception of these letters by the nobility: see the critical questions by H. van Nierop, ‘Willem van Oranje als hoog edelman: patronage in the Low Countries, just as he was also interested to reform the government and tax system. Generally, he wanted to raise the profile of the governor, by giving him a larger personal court, more impressive personal guards, and by reserving to the governor the venerias of Brabant, Flanders, and Namur. Alva was also in favour of the earlier idea of appointing provincial governors for fixed terms, rather than for life. Nonetheless, the King was not keen on the novelties suggested by his mayordomo mayor. He did not agree to a limited time for the provincial governorships, or to the separation of the venerias. J. E. Hortal Muñoz, ‘La concesión de mercedes en los Países Bajos durante el gobierno del duque de Alba. La importancia del

46 Gentilhombres de su Magestad con cargo de asistir cerca la persona de su Exa. para hazer loque se le ordenare del servicio de su Magestad los quales dichos scudos han de ser de oro, AGS CMC 2aE 49 s. f.


48 100 lances chevaulx leigiers naturelz et subiectz.

49 Morillon to Granvelle, 14 July 1567: Poullet, CGr, III 3–11 (II) and Morillon to Granvelle, 12 October 1567: Poullet, CGr, III 43–49 (XIV).

50 J. E. Hortal Muñoz, ‘La concesión de mercedes’.

51 In this situation, Selles tried to have his older brother appointed as the captain of the Flemish Guard in Madrid. Lo que apunto su Magestad cerca de la consulta de los gobernadores, vandas, feudos, encomiendas, y otras cosas de Flandes en Madrid lunes, 19 de septiembre 1569: AGS E 544 fol. 99 (copy); ‘lo de St Omer dessea Mos, de celles para retirarse, porque si el cargo de los Archeros no se disse a su hermano se les haria muy grave ser teniente de otro ninguno’.

52 Aarschot was buen caballero, pero no para dar gobierno, he would thus not serve well as Grand Bailiff of Hainaut: Alba to Philip II, 2 February 1570: Epistolario del III Duque de Alba, Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, ed. by Duke of Berwick and Alba, 3 vols (Madrid, 1924) [henceforth EDA], II, 331–16 (1064). Similar qualification of Aarschot by Alba as buen cavallerio, no es amigo de negocios in his political testament to Requesens: G. Janssens, ‘Het politiek testament van de hertog van Alva: aanbevelingen voor don Luis de Requesens over het te voeren beleid in de Nederlanden (Brussel, 2 december 1573)’, Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis, 175 (2009), 447–74 (p. 464).

53 Hortal Muñoz, El Manejo, pp. 192, 200, and 33, 44 (for election Louis de Berlaymont).


55 Alba to Philip II, 5 September 1571: EDA, II, 724 (1418).

56 Noircarmes to Alba, 9 November 1573: ADA Caja 46 no. 61.


58 Granvelle to Medinaceli, 15 August 1572: IVDJ, envío 80 (cpt. 3) doc. 3.

59 Berlaymont to Medinaceli, 3 March 1573: BFZM Altamira ctp. 102 doc. 17 (copy).

60 Berlaymont to Alba, 1 October 1574: ADA Caja 30 no. 53.

61 Louis of Berlaymont to Alba, 16 September 1574: ADA Caja 31 no. 28; Hortal Muñoz, ‘La concesión de mercedes’, p. 207.

62 Only recently Julie Versele had challenged the traditional ascription of Medinaceli and Requesens to the ebolista faction, ‘Los móviles de la elección de don Luis de Requesens como gobernador general de los Países Bajos después de la retirada del Duque de Alba (1573)’, Studia Historica (Universidad de Salamanca), 28 (2006), 259–76.

63 Geever, Gevallen vazallen, pp. 182–83.

64 ‘y assi con ella no se pueden remediar los males [...] ay ny con ninguno otro remedio que V.Md. pueda embiar y dar como con su venida y presencia’, Berlaymont to Philip II, 29 August 1566: AGS E 530 s. f. and Berlaymont to Philip II, 29 August 1566: AGS E 530 s. f. (relación).


66 Berlaymont to Philip II, 29 August 1566: AGS E 530 (original and Spanish translation).


68 Morillon to Granvelle, 1 February 1568: Poullet, CGr, III, 190–93 (LXI).


70 Morillon to Granvelle, 3 November 1566: Poullet, CGr, III, 77.

71 Janssens, Brabant in het verweer, p. 254.

72 Morillon aan Granvelle, 17 October 1572: Piot, CGr, IV, 459.

73 V. Soen, Geen pardon zonder paus! Studie over de complementariteit van het koninklijk en pauselijk generaal pardon (1570–1574) en over inquisiteur-generaal Michael Baius (1560–1576) (Brussels, 2007).
74 Cf. Hopperus to Alva, 27 June 1568: ADA Caja 36 no. 50.

75 Lo que Monsieur de Noircarmes mi Hermano me encargo de decir a su Magestad para la conservación de los estados de Flandres [sic], s. d. [September 1568]: BL MS Add. 28,387 fols 140–41 (autograph), 138–39 (copy).

76 Morillon to Granvelle, 10 March 1572: Poullet, CGr, iv, 125–28 (XLIX).

77 Noircarmes to Alba, 10 December 1573: ADA Caja 46 no. 71 (copy, French).


79 Noircarmes to Alba, 10 December 1573: ADA Caja 46 no. 71 (copy, French).


81 Orange to Noircarmes, 23 December 1573: WvO 3089; Orange to Noircarmes, 4 January 1574: WvO 10905, AGS E 557 fol. 50.

82 Morillon criticized him for giving the pardon to Gouda too late, indicating that this had meant the royal party had lost much: Morillon to Granvelle, 26 January 1574: Poullet, CGr, v, 11–14 (V). Earlier criticisms in Morillon to Granvelle, 14 July 1567: Poullet, CGr, iii, 3–11 (II) and Morillon to Granvelle, 12 October 1567: Poullet, CGr, lii, 43–49 (XIV).

83 Las causas que los españoles que sirven, en este felicísimo Exercito de su Magestad dan, para mostrar la necesidad que ay, de que V. Exa. asista personalmente a todo lo que resta de hacer en la guerra presente, son en substancia [s. d., end of 1573]: BL MS Add. 28,388, fol. 18–14.

84 Alva to Requesens, 1 January 1574: EDA, iii, 573.

85 Morillon to Granvelle: Poullet, CGr, v, 14–17 (VI).


88 Granvelle to Juan de Zúñiga, 11 April 1574: BL Add. MSS 28, 388, fol. 42v (copy): ‘... no perdiera nada en ello su Magestad, quando mas le favorescia el Duque escrivia letras infernales contra el Duque y la forma del govierno, quiça tienen algunas en España, yo podria mostrar algunas’.

Notes on contributor

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