Research
Interests
My research interests center on international organization and institutional design, negotiation in asymmetric bargaining contexts, international law and human rights, and political methodology.
Current Projects
I am currently working on a book manuscript that examines the ability of small states to achieve favorable outcomes in negotiations in international institutions.The decision to participate in an international institution is voluntary, even for small states. Dominant theories suggest that powerful states join international organizations because they can control the design of these institutions and solidify their resources by doing so. If these institutions are not beneficial then these states cease to participate. However few theories question the wide participation of the "losers" of international organizational design--small states. Accordingly, I argue that under certain conditions small states are the primary beneficiaries of institutional design.
In my dissertation, I look at the case of the International Criminal Court and I am expanding this analysis to investigate weak state strategies over time and in various issue areas including trade and territorial issues.
My theory focuses on coalitional dyanmics and issue-linkage across international organizations. Smaller states comprise the vast majority of organizational memberships and when these states pool their resources they can use linkage pressures to entice more powerful states to agree to terms they may not have otherwise.
I am also looking at the International Criminal Court beyond the period of negotiation, asking how have small states fared since the initial establishment of the Court?
Institutional Design
How do states adjudicate among the competing goals for international institutions? How do states select a voting rule that optimizes individual control and institutional responsiveness. In this project, I collect data on the institutional features of 230 organizations to determine how states prioritize these goals and design an organization that addresses a common international problem and meets their specific needs simultaneously (with Daniel Blake).
Human Rights and Economic Incentives
Do govenments adjust political and economic rights protections in the face of economic incentives? Turning around traditional "race to the bottom" and globalization arguments, we assess whether the level and type (economic or political) of rights provision will attract or divert FDI away from developing countries. Rather than taking the common assumption that investment affects rights we account for the strategic role of government in setting rights levels to attract FDI (with Byungwon Woo).