Models of Electoral Competition - Three Essays in Political Economics.

This is the book containing my dissertation. If you follow the link you can download the PDF version.
Jan Klingelhöfer, Stockholm 2010
ISSN 0346-6892
ISBN 978-91-7447-109-0
Printed in Sweden by PrintCenter US-AB, Stockholm 2010
Distributor: Institute for International Economic Studies
 

This thesis consists of three theoretical essays in political economics.
 
“The Swing Voters’ Blessing” shows that less informed voters do not necessarily lead to less desirable policy outcomes. On the contrary, under certain conditions less informed voters force politicians to implement more centrist policies.
 
“Lobbying and Elections”shows the effects of lobbying on policy in a model with voters who have rational expectations of interest group influence on policy. In equilibrium, lobbying can be welfare enhancing.
 
“Lexicographic Voting” shows that prospective and retrospective voting motives can be reconciled within the standard rational choice framework. The median voter’s preferred policy is implemented while the ruling party can be held accountable for rent-seeking behavior.

» [Download]